

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-055

CONTENTS

19 September 1990

NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Proposals for New Union Treaty Examined [Ye. Sorokin; SOYUZ No 28, Jul 90]	1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------	---

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Election of Ter-Petrosyan as Armenian Supreme Soviet Chairman [M. Grigoryan; KOMMUNIST, 7 Aug 90]	5
Election of Armenian Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairmen Analyzed [T. Akopyan; KOMMUNIST, 8 Aug 90]	6
Armenian Finance Minister on Economic Assistance for NKAO [Dzh. Dzhanoyan; KOMMUNIST, 4 Aug 90]	7
Armenian Deputy Minasbekyan Explains 'Justice' Deputies Group [M.S. Minasbekyan; KOMMUNIST, 19 Jul 90]	8
Estonian Supreme Soviet Discusses Government Program [N. Kuznetsova; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 25 May 90]	12
Estonian Government Reviews Police Law, 'Kodukaytse' [Yu. Khindov; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 23 May 90]	15
Kazakh CP Platform Published [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 20 Jun 90]	15
Ukrainian Party Leadership Changes Assessed [Ye. Yampolskiy; RADYANSKA UKRAYINA, 19 Apr 90]	20
New Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Opposition Groups [I. Saliy, V. Lisovenko; RADYANSKA UKRAYINA, 5 Jul 90]	23
Tkachenko on Issues in Ukrainian Agriculture [A. Tkachenko; PRAVDA UKRAINY, 21 Jul 90]	24
Proceedings of Lvov Soviet of People's Deputies Meeting Viewed [M. Doroshenko; RADYANSKA UKRAYINA, 19 Apr 90]	26
Uzbek Komsomol Explains Disappointing Election Results [KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA, 26 May 90]	29

NATIONALITY ISSUES

Khakass People Uphold Sovereignty At Congress [P. Romanov; LESNAYA PROMYSHLENNOST, 23 Aug 90]	31
Armenian Political Scientist on Republic Politics, Infighting [A. Migranyan; KOMMUNIST, 6 Jul 90]	31
Chairman Explains Purpose of Armenian 'Sasun' Union [S. Pogosyan; KOMSOMOLETS, 7 Jul 90]	34
Glasnost Editor Ter-Grigoryants Comments on Transcaucasus Issues [S. Ter-Grigoryants; KOMSOMOLETS, 24 Jul 90]	35
Manucharov on Imprisonment, Karabakh Movement, 'Krun' Committee [A.M. Manucharov; KOMMUNIST, 18 Jul 90]	37
Interview With Chairman of Azerbaijan's Democratic Union [N. Suleymanov; UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA No 29, Jun 90]	40
Role for Georgian National Congress Outlined [I. Khaindrava; MOLODEZH GRUZII, 6 Jul 90]	42
Kazakh Supreme Soviet on Sovereignty	44
Draft Declaration Considered [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 27 Jul 90]	44
Adoption of Law Favored [A. Ladin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 Aug 90]	45
Kazakhstan's State Language Program Supports Kazakh, Russian [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 1 Jul 90]	45
Implications of Tajik as Official Language Examined [G. Papyrina; KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 18 Jul 90]	52
Tajik Supreme Soviet Decrees 22 July 'Language Day' [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 21 Jul 90]	54
Commission Hears Problems of Germans in Kazakhstan [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 2 Jun 90]	54
Rukh Commemorates Battle of Poltava [M. Yakovenko; PRAVDA UKRAYINY, 12 Jul 90]	55
Leaders of Uzbekistan's 'Union of Free Youth' Explain Goals [R. Dzharayev, V. Inoyatova; KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA, 6 Jul 90]	56

LAW AND ORDER

USSR Justice Minister on Legal Reform [V.F. Yakovlev; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 30, 25 Jul 90]	59
Charter of RSFSR Lawyers' Association Published [SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA No 11, Jun 90]	61
Yerevan Internal Affairs Official Requests Public Support in Crime Control [S. Atarbekyan; KOMMUNIST, 6 Jul 90]	64
Turkmen Legislation on Disciplinary Action for Judges, Assessors [TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 7 Jun 90]	67

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Gosteleradio Chairman Comments on Soviet TV Issues [M. Nenashev; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 1 Aug 90]	72
Commentator Views Effect of Alternative TV on State Broadcasting [Yu. Bogomolov; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 33, 15 Aug 90]	75
'Radio Moscow' Announcer Removed From Air in 1983 Interviewed [S. Romanovskiy; SOBESEDNIK No 25, Jun 90]	77
CPSU Central Committee Official on Party Leadership of Press [G.V. Pryakhin; PRAVDA, 2 Aug 90] ..	80
Correspondent Defends TASS Against Charges of Conservatism [V. Malyshev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 2 Aug 90]	83
Editors Comment on Publication Cost Increases, New Press Law [A. Yurkov, et al; SOBESEDNIK No 31, Aug 90]	85
Glavlit Chairman on Censorship Work Under New Press Law [V. Boldyrev; SOBESEDNIK No 31, Aug 90]	86
Deputy Editor on Political, Legal Pressures Used Against PRAVDA [A. Karpychev; ZHURNALIST No 7, Jul 90]	87
Editor Details Function of Moscow Armenian Cultural Society Paper [R. Shirinyan; KOMMUNIST, 24 Jul 90]	90

HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

Party Examines Ukraine's Political History [PRAVDA UKRAINY, 16 Jun 90]	92
------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

Volga, Kuybyshev Reservoir Contaminated [S. Zhigalov; IZVESTIYA, 14 Aug 90]	93
Another Chernobyl-Related Strike Committee Formed in Gomel Oblast [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA, 12 Aug 90]	93
Chernobyl-Related Assistance	93
Funds to be Dispersed to Victims [G. Apresyan; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 27, 4 Jul 90] ..	93
Cleanup Workers Union to be Formed [I. Aleksandrov; SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIA, 17 Jun 90]	94
Assistance Certification to be Issued [G. N. Pankova; SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIA, 17 Jun 90]	94

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Demographic Situation in Georgia Reviewed [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 14 Jul 90]	95
Atheistic Propaganda, Religious Freedoms Discussed [A. Tursun; KOMSOMOLETU UZBEKISTANA, 27 Jul 90]	95
Chernobyl Compensation Restrictions Noted [O. Shepitko; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 30 Jun 90]	96
Writer's Anti-Semitic Views Protested [V. Lukhanova, et al.; IZVESTIYA, 1 Jul 90]	96
Council Formed To Defend Rights in Culture Sphere [F.M. Burlatskiy, et al.; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 28, 11 Jul 90]	97
Greater Investment in Culture in Turkmenia Noted [L. Kachurina; TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 27 Jun 90]	98

Proposals for New Union Treaty Examined

90UN2469A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 28,
Jul 90 p 6

[Report by Yevgeniy Sorokin: "What the Union Treaty Should Be; Reflections by Participants of a Meeting in the Kremlin Devoted to the Elaboration of the New Document"]

[Text] As has already been announced, according to an agreement reached at a session of the Council of Confederation in the Kremlin, a meeting has been held by a work group with representatives from the Union republics and devoted to a discussion of the approaches to working out a new Union Treaty. In the course of the discussion, constructive ideas and proposals were voiced and these can underlie the procedure of the treaty process.

We offer for your attention a brief record of this meeting.

V. Isakov, chairman of the Council of the Republic of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet:

How do I see the process of creating a new Union Treaty? Here I would establish several stages.

The first, in my view, should be the organizational one. The principals of the treaty process establish commissions to conclude the Union Treaty from among the people's deputies and the most authoritative and best known public figures in the republic. I feel that our next meeting should be held with the involvement of the representatives from these commissions.

The second stage is a public discussion. The concluding of a Union Treaty cannot be carried out within the bowels of the governmental structure. This should be an open, democratic process. Only in this instance will the creating of the treaty be of not only legal significance but also have political and moral strength.

The third stage is the reconciling of the positions. Here there must be meetings on the level of experts, committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviets.... The proposals worked out in the republic should be coordinated both in the executive and in the legislative bodies of power.

Finally, there would be the drawing up of the achieved agreements. We can proceed from general provisions which are agreed upon and recognized and then clarify the details and particulars. It is also possible, on the contrary to move from the details and the particulars to working out general principles which seem the most productive.

I see the Union Treaty not as a single document. It would be much more realistic to have a group of agreements and this would include a system of treaties, both multilateral and bilateral, on the various aspects of our relations.

A. Akayev, president of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences:

There is an obvious need to accelerate the elaboration of the new Union Treaty. There are valid reasons for this. The introduction of presidential rule in our nation as well as in a number of the Union republics has helped us to reach the finish line.

The question arises: Do we need a Union at all? The representatives of Kirghizia are absolutely convinced that it is essential and it must be strengthened.

Here are certain arguments in favor of this.

The first argument is the extraordinary occurrences which are multiplying day by day. I have in mind the natural disasters such as earthquakes, ecological disasters and so forth. Understandably, the nation has established a body to prevent and eliminate the consequences of these extraordinary occurrences and headed by V. Doguzhiyev. It is actually working professionally and responds promptly to such events.

Or take interethnic conflicts which have blazed in many regions of the nation. In order to prevent and thwart these phenomena, it is indispensable to strengthen our Union.

The second argument is scientific and technical progress. At present, this is a symbol of a state's greatness. The economic reforms and the changeover to a market economy force the shifting of this into a new channel in order to introduce modern technology and obtain the high-quality goods which can compete on the all-Union and international market. Scientific and technical progress presupposes a free exchange of information and technologies, as well as the pooling of efforts for carrying out general national programs. No union republic, even such large ones as the Russian Federation, the Ukraine or Belorussia is capable of carrying this out individually, by themselves.

Finally, the third argument is the general Union market which should be organized in the nation and ensure a free exchange of technologies, material and labor resources.

Yu. Sharipov, chairman of the Commission of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Questions of the Social and Economic Development of the Union and Economist Republics, the Autonomous Oblasts and Districts:

There are key conditions the carrying out of which can lead to the successful work on the Union Treaty. First of all, there is a changeover to the flexible structure of our Union. What do we have in mind here? In defining the competence of the Union bodies, it would be advisable to focus on a minimum set which would provide strategic, foreign political stability and the economic security of a union of sovereign states. As the basis one can take those functions which are set out in the RSFSR declaration on its state and economic sovereignty. All

the remainder should be regulated independently by the republics. Such a construction will ensure the interest in the Union by all the republics even those which are now extremely touchy to the question of their sovereignty.

At the same time, the Union Treaty should formulate standards which provide the right of the republics to establish unified state-political and market structures with other interested republics. The free unification of republics with similar socioeconomic, ethnic and religious conditions will make it possible to eliminate the consequences of the centrifugal trends and keep the existing economic and humanitarian ties.

Only such a flexible structure of the Union will make it possible to resolve or at least establish the prerequisites for resolving the state-political crisis today.

At present, it is becoming clear to many that there is an inseparable link between democracy and the market. They cannot exist without one another. The democratization of life has led to the destruction of the administrative management systems. The delay in the market reform has led to the degeneration of democracy into the extremism of the national or social community and to attempts to resolve economic questions by noneconomic means.

Thus, the transition to the market at present is not so much an economic demand as it is a political one. Of particular importance is the transition to the market for regulating interrepublic relations. The free, voluntary economic ties of the republics under the conditions of a common Union market will be the foundation for the socioeconomic and political integration of the republics within the Union.

It can be said with certainty that the rapid creation of a general Union market will make it possible in the very near future to reduce the tension in interethnic relations and break the centrifugal forces. Clearly, the question of the functioning and protection of the Union market and the basic rules of conduct on this market should be reflected in the new Union Treaty.

We would like to raise one other question the importance of which is still underestimated and that is the internal convertibility of the ruble. The weakening of the ruble has led to a situation where a number of republics and regions in the nation is ready to operate and trade on external markets at any price, if only they can obtain foreign exchange. Here this is being done to the detriment of the partners within the nation. This trend which is destroying the common Union market can be overcome only by the immediate transition to the convertibility of the ruble at a realistic exchange rate and by involving all the foreign exchange earned by the nation in the market turnover.

S. Sartayev, member of the Kazakh Presidential Council:

If we proceed from the view that the USSR will be a union of sovereign states, then a new treaty must be drawn up. And we should proceed from the view that we

will be involved with sovereign states and these sovereign states should resolve which questions and which problems they will delegate to the Union government, to the USSR.

The question arises of what we will do with those laws which predetermine the fate of these sovereign states as of today? I have in mind the Law Governing the Delimitation of Competence Between the USSR and the Union Republics, the Law on the Economic Independence of the Union Republics and the Law on Withdrawal from the USSR. These laws have already predetermined what the fate of these sovereign states will be.

Obviously, when we will compile a general plan or construct a treaty for the formation of the USSR, then we should assume that there are none. Or we should take everything useful from these laws and all the rest which to some degree restricts or limits us should be put aside. Only under these conditions is it possible to form a viable Union, having worked out the corresponding treaty.

Do we need a Union? Yes, for today it is essential. But what sort of Union? A federative or confederative one? If we had in mind the federative one which we had previously, such a Union is no longer necessary for us. Life itself dictates that only a Union of sovereign states is viable. And in this context, it seems to me, there is a prevailing trend toward a confederative Union.

But this in no way means that we at present should run about without coordination. A confederative association, if it is understood on the historical level, means a union only for certain problems. But you and I, if we wish, can add a new content to this confederative Union. It is possible to decide which questions relate to the exclusive competence of the USSR and which to the sovereign states and which are of joint competence. Some have proposed that we completely exclude questions of the joint competence of the USSR and the Union republics. But this is a problem for debate. Here it has been quite correctly pointed out that there is no absolute sovereignty. It does not exist in the United States either, as the country is linked with many other states by diverse international and intergovernmental agreements. Sovereign states concede a portion of their rights to the union state and this is precisely the highest manifestation of sovereignty.

The economist formations, in particular the autonomous republics, should also be principals of federation. In this context very many political and economic problems arise. Under what principles and on what basis should the autonomous republics and oblasts and autonomous okrugs be members of the Union?

For a start, we must have a general plan of a political and legal sort defining under what principles the principals of the Union and the Federation are to join together. Everything should be based on common sense.

V. Fasilenko, professor at Kiev State University:

From the very beginning, when we approach a solution to the problems, it is essential to define the status of the work group which will be concerned with compiling a draft of the Union Treaty. Is this to be a body under the Council of Federation or under the President or is this to be a body of the USSR Supreme Soviet or its Council of Nationalities.

It seems to me that the group should have an autonomous, independent status. If we say that the concluding of a Union Treaty is a concern of the Union republics as sovereign states, then they should independently resolve all questions. This is a body to prepare for a conference to work out, sign and conclude the Union Treaty.

Furthermore, all the Union republics should be represented on this body and its status would be that one Union republic had a single delegation with one vote. And it should be a matter for the republics to include two representatives or five-ten or whatever number of consultants. Clearly, there should be a rotating chairmanship on this body.

And about the Union Treaty itself: according to the general plan of the President, the Treaty should form a union of sovereign states. This conforms fully to the spirit of the times. And for this reason not so fundamental are the arguments of whether this will be a federation of confederation, a renewed federation or a renewed Union.

There is one other question and that is the question of the relationship of the Union Treaty with the Constitution.

It seems to me that the Union Treaty should be a component part of the Constitution. It is essential to provide a provision whereby the amending of the Constitution is possible only with the agreement of all Union republics.

The amendments should come into force after their ratification by the Supreme Soviets as the superior bodies of power in the Union republics. Then we will avoid the lamentable practice which brought us to a situation where we ended up not in a federation but actually in an unitary state with the well-known problems.

Kh. Saidmuradov, vice-president of the Tajik Academy of Sciences:

The question of drawing up a draft of the Union Treaty has long been a matter of discussion on various levels and among the scientific community. Scientific symposiums and seminars have been held where the scientists including lawyers, economists and historians have voiced their viewpoints. The broad discussion has shown the need for the rapid drawing up of a draft of the Union Treaty. In actuality, the people are waiting.

At times in the course of meeting with our voters, we, the deputies, are termed "procedural" deputies. There have been various discussions of different types or procedural questions instead of the adopting of radical measures. In discussing the given question we must also be more practical.

The historical experience of the Soviet state shows that certain laws adopted by our supreme bodies as a whole have not been bad. Let us take the 1929 Treaty. It has nothing that is of an antistate or antipopular nature. But this treaty remained on paper and many of its points were purely formal. We began to forget about the existence of this treaty.

The 1922 Treaty gave rise to a totalitarian state. There were no principles of democracy, if one speaks about the sovereign rights of the republics. For this reason now, in drawing up the text of the Union Treaty, we must show concern that this be a treaty of not formally equal republics but really sovereign and equal republics.

But we must not close our eyes to the fact that as a result of the necessary or unnecessary sectorial specialization, certain areas have been turned into raw material suppliers for other regions. And such a trend is continuing.

Obviously, when a treaty of equal republics will be concluded, these deformations will be rectified.

I. Yakovlev, chief of the International Law Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

The new Union Treaty is, without any doubt, an epoch-making document. It will be new in form and content not only from the viewpoint of national law but also international law. In essence, a new principal of international law is being born and this consists of sovereign socialist states. This requires colossal work and fully empowered representatives at all stages including scientists, specialists and practical workers.

The face of the new Union will have a great impact on the development of other states. Up to the present, there has been no analog of what is now being discussed here. I propose that the new Union will be neither federation or confederation. How can we call this association? For now there is no answer.

At present, it is important to work out a combination which would strengthen the rights of the republics, provide them with oxygen and an opportunity to develop quickly. But at the same time, this would strengthen the general Union and its international role. This is a very complex problem which requires flexibility, a depth of theoretical study and great debate. Various opinions have been voiced but they were not of a confrontational nature. All the proposals and any approaches should lie on our desk.

If we break up the Union and make it a collection of individual republics without a single face and international front, then the entire system of international relations will be destroyed. And this undoubtedly, will

have a negative influence generally on the entire process of world development. Certainly, if we automatically replace one major role of the Union with 15 small roles, then there will be neither a permanent member on the UN Security Council or a contribution by the Soviet Union as a union in resolving many problems.

Clearly, the optimum approach to working out any international agreement consists in providing a maximum coverage for all problems which involve the Union, the sovereign republics and all the main directions of their life in a single state. Of course, the Treaty will be a component part of the Constitution.

How is this to be interpreted in the immediate decisions? Clearly, there will be different approaches. The question of the delimitation of competence is the most delicate and complicated requiring a special elaboration in all directions. And particularly in terms of the portion of the treaty under which the sovereign, equal participants will delegate their rights to the Union and to the Union bodies of power.

The degree of delegating equal rights can depend, of course, upon the specific content, upon the real areas of foreign policy, defense, a portion of domestic policy and the economy. Here also are the transnational problems which more and more involve our life now. The more profoundly we are able to regulate this in the Treaty, the fewer the problems which the Union will encounter subsequently.

Of course, a higher competence, if we want to see the Soviet Union as a principal of international law and as a nuclear power will be assigned to the Union. Otherwise, no one will have any relations with it. But a definite, more developed competence and real rights should belong to a greater degree to the Union republics. They can also act as the principals of international law.

The right of principal of the republics depends not only upon us and upon the republics. It also depends upon the recognition of this right of principal in international law. For instance, we might propose the specific participants in an international meeting, but others should also agree to recognize the presence of one or another principal at the meeting.

We could now, as in the old times after the war, propose that all 15 republics be members of the UN. We have good experience in collaboration and a positive contribution by the Ukraine and Belorussia. But would the permanent members of the Security Council agree to support this proposal? This would mean that the Soviet Union would have 12 additional votes. Hence, this is not an automatic question and an issue of not only the desire of the center and the republic.

The participants of the meeting agreed to continue work on the level of experts and submit its results for discussion to the subsequent sessions of the plenipotentiary representatives of the Union republic Supreme Soviets.

Election of Ter-Petrosyan as Armenian Supreme Soviet Chairman

90US1289A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
7 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by M. Grigoryan: "So, the Chairman Has Been Elected..."]

[Text] On 4 August 1990 the Armenian Parliament elected as its chairman Levon Ter-Petrosyan.

The difficult, two-year-plus marathon, replete with tragic losses and upheavals, hopes and disappointments, culminated in a victory for the forces which began this struggle in February 1988 in Yerevan's Theater Square. Whether this is an intermediate finishing line or a real one—the datum point of a new stage in Armenia's historical development—time will tell. As yet one thing is clear: what was to have happened according to the laws of dialectics and the logic of the unfailing victory of the new and progressive over that which is old, outmoded and becoming a thing of the past has happened.

Let us briefly recall what preceded this. We recall the thousands-strong mass meetings of the tragic 1988. The time of street democracy, inevitable, obviously, in a transition period, dictated its own course of the development of events. The political chaos and anarchy which have held sway in the republic in the past several months began at that time essentially. The republic's old corps of deputies, "elected" in the stagnation period, manifestly failed to correspond to the demands of the times. Decisions were adopted under the pressure of the crowd, and there could have been no question of any normal parliamentary business. It was at that time that people whose appearance was dictated by the times themselves, for each political era advances its own leaders, appeared on the political scene.

We recall also the tragic days of Black December, when the shaken and stunned people, petrified in their grief, were struck one further blow by the arrest of the members of the "Karabakh" Committee, they being guilty solely of patriotism and membership of an "informal" organization. What political labels were not pinned on them, of what sins were they not accused, it being declared: we are on different paths, the people will not follow them....

Perhaps we should not be recalling all this today, on this, generally, joyful day. But I would like in this way to emphasize the arduousness and dramatic quality of the path trodden by Ter-Petrosyan and his comrades in arms. And at the same time their victory today shows that no force is capable of halting a new, progressive undertaking if it really comes from within and is nurtured by invigorating public juices. We had been reproached frequently of late for, having instigated the first, essentially truly restructuring movement in the country, then ending up in the rear of the democratic reforms.

The election as chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the leader of the Armenian National Movement [AOD] has shown that it can only be a question of the pace—we recall the months-long and still not completed process of formation of the new parliament—but by no means the essence of the processes occurring in the republic. We would note also that no republic ahead of us in the pace of democratization has experienced such social upheavals as have fallen to the lot of the Armenian people.

What does the election as chairman of the leader of the AOD signify? Essentially, the alignment of forces in parliament was clear right from the outset, and the nomination for the office of chairman of V. Movsisyan and L. Ter-Petrosyan merely demonstrated this graphically. And whereas differences were not observed in the camp of the "party-schedule" deputies, the representatives of various political and public organizations were not that united, in the first days of the parliament's business, in any event. However, the absence of some alternative to the AOD nomination, other than the party leader, indicates that there was unity on this matter, for all that. Let us hope that this is merely the start of that consolidation of progressive democratic forces of which the republic is in so much need.

It would be ridiculous and naive to hope that the new chairman might solve all problems overnight and that democratic norms will rein in the republic tomorrow even. The situation is extremely difficult, and a solution to the crisis will require tremendous efforts and much time. But it has to be seen that the time of anarchy in the republic is past. The crisis of the party leadership, which was expressed in manifest impotence in the face of the orgy of anarchy, naturally led to the formation of new democratic power structures by the legitimate, constitutional path.

The time of mass-meeting democracy is over, and the political struggle has shifted from the streets to the meeting hall of the Supreme Soviet, finally acquiring civilized parliamentary forms.

It is hard to agree with the deputies, very few, it is true, who have accused the AOD of an aspiration to power. First, paraphrasing the well-known saying, it may be said that it is the political organization which does not aspire to leadership which is bad. And, second, what is meant by power in the republic today? Not privilege and license, of course, as in former times, but primarily tremendous responsibility for the fate of one's people and their future.

In the course of the elections, which were far from smooth, incidentally, it was observed repeatedly that it was a question not of individual personalities but of the choice of the Armenian people's historical path. Without disputing this, I would note that it is a question of a personality also. It was by no means fortuitous that the Armenian National Movement nominated for the office of chairman precisely L. Ter-Petrosyan. The withdrawal

of the other leaders of the AOD indicates that this decision was unequivocal and unanimous. I do not wish to reiterate all of what has been said about the newly elected chairman by his associates, who know him well. I would mention merely what is, in my view, most important from what can be seen from outside. This is, first, conviction as to the rightness of his cause and, second, that particular, inner breeding which shows through in respect of political rivals and in methods of conducting parliamentary struggle and in each word also of Ter-Petrosyan. That breeding which, unfortunately, many deputies, and, yes, all of us, lack.

Election of Armenian Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairmen Analyzed

90US1289B Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
8 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by T. Akopyan: "Time Does Not Wait"]

[Text] In previous years the election (excuse me, appointment) of the chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet was regarded as an event not worthy of notice. A new face had come to carry out the unburdensome (considering the decorative nature of the Supreme Soviet) duties, and the people kept silent. On Saturday tens of thousands of people, who had packed the city's streets, unequivocally expressed their attitude toward the election of Levon Ter-Petrosyan head of the Armenian Parliament. This event changes the political situation in the republic fundamentally. We will return to the course of the election of the chairman, but meanwhile let us describe the 6 August session.

Prior to the start of business, L. Ter-Petrosyan announced that he was standing down as chairman and member of the board of the Armenian National Movement [AOD]. He was by this step demonstrating his aspiration to adhere to the principle proclaimed by the AOD of preventing a combination of executive office simultaneously in official state bodies and public and political structures. The chairman also declared that the republic authorities were capable of deciding all questions connected with the domestic political and operational situation in the republic, provided that there was no outside interference. This statement was duplicated as an official document and published in the press.

Taking advantage of his constitutional right, the chairman offered for the deputies' consideration the candidates for deputy chairman. For the office of first deputy—Babken Ararktsyan—for the office of deputy—Gatik Arutyunyan.

B. Ararktsyan is a member of the board of the AOD and a comrade in arms (in the language of party journalism) of Ter-Petrosyan who tasted together with him and other members of the "Karabakh" Committee the "charms" of incarceration in Butyrskaya Prison. Although none of the journalists accredited at the congress ventured to guess the name of the person whom the chairman would

pick as his first deputy and, consequently, the nomination of B. Ararktsyan was not predetermined, it was logical. The No. 2 in the highest organ of power should, of course, be of like mind with the chairman, to whom the latter may, if necessary, hand over the reins of government. The more so in that the deputy faction from the AOD and the deputies who are aligned with it and who share its program have a majority in parliament.

Deputy G. Arutyunyan is, although we should now say was, head of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Socioeconomic Department. Conjectures have for this reason been expressed as regards this candidacy. A sharing of portfolios between the different forces in parliament? An endeavor not to short-change the "apparatchik" faction (I will call it this provisionally and say somewhat later why)? Such a tactical method on the part of the parliamentary majority should not be discounted. Nonetheless, I am inclined to believe that G. Arutyunyan's assertiveness at the session, his professional attributes and, to judge by everything, his competence on economic issues played a part first and foremost. All who followed the course of the discussion of this candidacy surely noted his ability to respond honestly to the questions, very tricky at times.

Both B. Ararktsyan and G. Arutyunyan gained the votes needed for election at the first attempt and took their seats either side of the chairman. We congratulate them on behalf of the newspaper and wish them success in their difficult and responsible work.

So, may G. Arutyunyan be called an "apparatchik"? Yes, if we proceed from his position in the Central Committee apparatus. No, if we judge him by his style of thinking, his work in recent years and his participation in the elaboration of Armenia's economic concept. So we need to move back and put to one side and disregard the deputies' biographical particulars and evaluate only their ability and desire to work. The election of a deputy from the losing "team" to such a high office inspires optimism.

The several rounds of balloting showed that the leader of the AOD did not have an absolute majority initially and gradually picked up the votes of wavering deputies. From round to round the first secretary of the Central Committee lost them. Nonetheless, there were many firm supporters of V. Movsisyan who voted for him persistently—over 80 deputies. I would like to believe that in casting their votes for the leader of the republic party organization they were thereby supporting his program of Armenia's further development, his personal qualities and so forth. I would like to, but do not. For after the first round of voting and following discussion of the candidates, not one deputy from Movsisyan's "team" supported his leader, except in the secret pressing of a button. Remember how actively L. Ter-Petrosyan was supported by his followers. While paying tribute to the experience and professional qualities of V. Movsisyan, they nonetheless maintained that it was the leader of the AOD who should head parliament and

urged and urged this upon the waverers. Support for Movsisyan and his program was not heard. No one stood up and said that he was voting for the first secretary because he believed in his program and in the man himself.

Of course, the entire 70-year history of the party's practical activity "weighed down" on Movsisyan's candidacy. This is true. But the struggle was unsuccessful also because the deputies representing the "party schedule" simply pressed the "yea" button. But were unprepared for open struggle.

Could V. Movsisyan have won with such a "team"? It has to be believed not. At least, working with such a "team" and such sympathizers, unable, reluctant and afraid to openly support their leader and declare their principles and aims, would have been extremely difficult.

So, the democratic wing won, and, consequently, forecasts may be made. The sovereignty declaration has been adopted, and the new state symbols of flag, anthem and coat of arms will be approved. It is perfectly possible that the word "socialist" will be dropped from the appellation "Armenian SSR". The republic's administrative-territorial division will be subject to alteration. The question of national military formations will be decided, treaties with the republics and foreign countries concluded and the decree on land and a law on freedom of speech (glasnost has already done its great work) enacted. The list is endless.

However, parliament's priority step should be, as its chairman declared, stabilization of the situation. Only after this will it be possible to feed the hungry, provide shelter for the homeless and reassure the tearful.

Parliament has a credit of the people's trust. But time is moving on....

Armenian Finance Minister on Economic Assistance for NKAO

90US1288A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
4 Aug 90 p 2

[Interview with Dzh. Dzhanoyan, republic minister of finances and chairman of the Commission To Organize Material Aid to Artsakh by an Armenpress correspondent: "The Motherland Continues To Help the Artsakh"]

[Text] Recently, the republic press has published a number of announcements on the government-established Commission to Organize Material Aid to Artsakh. In the aim of obtaining detailed information on the activities of the commission, the difficulties in its work and other questions arising in this context, our correspondent met with the commission chairman and republic Minister of Finances, Dzh. Dzhanoyan. Below follows this interview.

[Armenpress] Would you briefly describe the economic and political situation in the republic.

[Dzhanoyan] The 1988 destructive earthquake, the Artsakh movement which began prior to this, the blockade which has been repeated several times and the presence of almost 260,000 refugees—all of this has put the republic in a difficult economic and political situation. We are feeling circumstances which do not correspond to the present moment in the activities of our economic and political structures. The lack of advanced technology, permanent contractual relations and proper quality of the products produced in the republic do not provide an opportunity to stabilize the republic's economic situation. As for the political situation, it can be definitely asserted that until the question of the Artsakh is settled constitutionally proceeding from the economic and political factors of the problem, there can be no satisfactory moral-political situation in the republic.

[Armenpress] Clearly, proceeding from precisely such motives, the republic government has established a special commission to organize material aid to the Artsakh. What are the tasks in the commissions activities?

[Dzhanoyan] It must be pointed out that the enterprises, institutions, organization, and population of the republic even before establishing the commission regularly provided substantial aid to the Artsakh and the Armenian-populated rayons adjacent to it. Food, building materials, various commodities, and medicines were supplied. All of this was carried out, so to speak, spontaneously and not always with precise consideration of all the details of the individual needs of the Artsakh people in order to provide greater effectiveness from this aid.

The basic aim in establishing the commission is to give this patriotic undertaking a state-organized nature. The material aid, like the assistance in building and assembly work, the creation of production and small enterprises directly were carried out on the basis of the requests and demands of the state administrative bodies of Artsakh Oblast and the Armenian-populated rayons adjacent to it.

[Armenpress] The commission has been operating for around three months. Could you mention several examples of the results of concretely provided aid?

[Dzhanoyan] Many routine questions have been resolved. The soviet bodies of the Artsakh have requested that we resolve first questions of road construction, central gas supply to the population points, water supply and other questions of a social nature. This is precisely what we have done. Effective work was carried out to broaden the amount of road construction in the Artsakh and to strengthen the physical plant. Upon a government decision 3 million rubles were allocated to carry out road construction. The construction volume on the water supply networks this year is 1.5 million rubles and for central gas supply, 3.8 million rubles. There have been many requests and demands.

[Armenpress] The funds of the republic government are limited and the concerns are great. Could you mention from what sources the funds of the Commission for Providing Aid to the Artsakh are formed?

[Dzhanoyan] The material assets for the Artsakh according to the commission's regulation, are formed: a) from money of the enterprises, organizations and institutions obtained from holding volunteer Saturday work-days and other measures; b) from deductions made upon the decision of the labor collectives of the enterprises and organizations from their own funds; c) amounts received from Soviet and foreign citizens, foreign organizations, the organizations of the diaspora and its individual representatives; d) other contributions. On 15 May of this year, the republic Ministry of Construction and Operation of Motor Highways and its subordinate collectives through the newspaper KHORURDANI AYASTAN made the appeal that one day a month be worked free and the funds formed turned over to the fund for material aid to the Artsakh. The commission has also appealed for the labor collectives, the production associations and enterprises in the republic to turn over funds to it.

[Armenpress] Possibly, we should make a similar appeal to the foreign Armenian organizations, the business circles of the diaspora and Armenians living abroad?

[Dzhanoyan] Of course we must, this is even very essential. I feel that this can be done through our agency. And if you are ready to do this, then I, as the commission chairman, appeal to all our compatriots living overseas—help the Artsakh, help the economic and social transformation of this region of our historical motherland, help in realizing the aspirations of the Artsakh Armenians.

[Armenpress] At times, various benefactors in supporting one or another undertaking impose definite conditions and the accepting of these entails sacrifices and the putting up of necessary funds.

[Dzhanoyan] Your question is understandable. Naturally, everything can be specifically stipulated even in such an undertaking for the good of the motherland as providing material aid to the Artsakh. Such conditions and stipulations are one of the components of the moral make-up of the civilized world. Why, for example, if someone intends, for instance, to establish an enterprise processing agricultural products in the Artsakh, should we not name it after him? I feel that this is a normal phenomenon. Many might say that at one time there were such proposals, however the conditions were not accepted. Yes, such cases are known but times have changed and we along with them. So let it be known to our compatriots living overseas who would like to help the Artsakh under various conditions that we respect their intentions and guarantee the observance of the conditions. Nor can we exclude the carrying out of a number of operations to produce profits on the basis of the rules which have gained universal recognition.

Let us again remind the readers that the Commission of the Armenian government to provide material aid to the Artsakh in the Yerevan Municipal Department of the USSR Foreign Economic Bank has opened up a foreign exchange account 57000006.

Armenian Deputy Minasbekyan Explains 'Justice' Deputies Group

90US1206A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST in Russian*
19 Jul 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy M.S. Minasbekyan by Armenpress correspondent K. Agababyan: "There Should Not Be Stalemate Situations"]

[Text] The ways for resolving certain problems and questions and surmounting a number of difficulties related to the situation which has arisen in the republic were the basis of a conversation by the Armenpress correspondent with the USSR People's Deputy M.S. Minasbekyan.

[Correspondent] The situation in the republic continues to remain tense. Where and how, in your view, must a solution be sought?

[Minasbekyan] I agree with your assessment of the situation. Most of all, I am concerned by the fact that a portion of the population has developed a feeling of uncertainty in tomorrow, hopelessness, pessimism and a mistrust of positive changes. This is the most tragic result of the crisis. It can lead to social passivity or to an even more destructive, spontaneous social outburst and disruptions. Desperation is a poor advisor.

At first glance, a stalemate situation has arisen and this creates the corresponding moral and psychological climate: on the one hand, it is impossible to achieve political stability in society without normalizing the consumer market, improving the social and domestic conditions of the public, when the store shelves are empty and prices and crime are steadily rising. On the other hand, it is impossible to bring about a rise in the economy and the instilling of proper order in society without political stability. An infamous circle is created when the former is impossible without the latter and at the same time the latter is impossible without the former.

[Correspondent] Where then is the way out and how should we start to escape from the arising situation?

[Minasbekyan] The republic needs a precise, clear political and economic program comprehensible for the people and capable of leading us out of the crisis, for the development of the economy and all the spheres of social, cultural and spiritual life of society. There should be a program which would be supported by the people. Only on this basis is it possible to stabilize the situation

and to move on to a consolidation of all the healthy forces and form a creative moral and psychological climate in society.

Seemingly, there is no miscomprehension in such a positing of the question. Proof of this is the presence of various programs for the formal and informal organizations. But why do they not work? Why is there not a consolidation but rather a certain demarcation? And this in a situation when certain objective prerequisites for emerging from the crisis already exist. Without listing all of them, among these one could put (regardless of the shortcomings and contradictions) a final decision to switch to a market economy, a recognition of diverse forms of ownership and so forth.

[Correspondent] So, everyone is trying to improve the state of affairs but the reverse processes are occurring in life....

[Minasbekyan] In my opinion, this has happened because all of society has not resolved the chief, fundamental question of whether Armenia is to remain in the renewed federation or not. I did not arrive at this conclusion all at once. But now it seems to me that point for breaking the infamous circle which we described above. If we analyze the already existing programs, then either they simply resolve to enter or withdraw, or this question is described ambiguously, or it does not exist at all.

Note that the programs of the parties, the movements and the public organizations are not based on the opinion of the people on this fundamental question. Simply no one has asked the people about this. And as this is the case, it is difficult to count on the support of all the people and this is what we have now.

Understand me correctly, it is a question not of complete sovereignty for the republic. This has been settled once and for all. But whether we enter the Union or not will determine the political and economic program for emerging from the crisis and this program will be fundamentally distinct.

[Correspondent] Could you explain this idea a little more?

[Minasbekyan] Please. I will quote an excerpt from a version of the program. If we join the Union, then consequently, we should be interested in establishing a center, an Union parliament which on a just basis would settle the disputed questions of interrepublic relations. Of enormous significance for us is a defining of the functions, rights and duties in establishing the State Committee for Nationality Questions (Goskomnats). The treaty of union should become an object of careful elaboration and the defense of its provisions. We should also work for the integrated implementation of the Union Decree "On Measures to Accelerate Socioeconomic Development in the Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in 1988-1995" as well as the solution to a number of other very important questions.

If we decide to pull out of the Union, then the above-listed questions lose any meaning for us and we must seek out different ways for the socioeconomic development of the republic.

[Correspondent] As for the program, understandably it will be diametrically opposite, depending upon the decision taken. But how should it consolidate society?

[Minasbekyan] The task is posed thus not because there are strong centrifugal forces in Armenia but rather because the time when everything was decided for the people and manipulated on their behalf is irretrievably over. For this reason, on the main vital questions it is essential first of all to learn the opinion of the entire people. The instruments for this are known: a referendum of plebiscite. Then it is essential to establish an united group of people's deputies, representatives of the public organizations, scientists and practical workers, and this with full right and on behalf of the people would work out a program and after discussion of the program, the people would consciously accept it as their vital undertaking and, consequently, the so-necessary consolidation would commence for us.

Otherwise, what would happen would be the same as with perestroika the start of which was linked by millions of people with an immediate rise in prosperity, and this was a major mistake. The people must be constantly and clearly warned that fundamental changes and a discarding of the obsolete are impossible without a deterioration in the existing situation. And it is essential to stipulate the approximate dates for emerging from the crisis. Then the people would know what was waiting for them and would not perceive the process as a series of unrealized expectations. In the former instance, they would unite together, mobilize themselves and accelerate perestroika and in the latter, a depression would set in, separation and mistrust which would exacerbate an already bad situation.

To put it briefly, the slogan "The People Are the Master of Their Destiny" should become practice. In our case, the question is fateful for the nation and it must be approached with all responsibility. Here there should be no place for emotions, insults or group interests. No one should stand on the sidelines in this important stage for our history as the worse is engendered by indifference. A clear calculation, the higher interest of the nation and responsibility for its fate inevitably underlie the decision to be taken.

It is also essential to consider the geopolitical and economic position of the republic, the established ties, the resource, export and foreign exchange capabilities and the quick rebuilding of what was destroyed by the earthquake—we cannot even list it all.

In my view, the opportunity will appear to break the infamous circle of causal ties, having clearly defined the initial positions and without a knowledge of these it is impossible to move forward and, equally important, lead

a certain portion of the people out of a state of passivity and mistrust. We will achieve nothing good with such attitudes.

If we allow each member of society to have his say over the main question of today, to learn the opinion of his compatriots, to feel himself involved in the decision being taken and responsible for the fate of his children, family, future generations and, ultimately, for the fate of the entire nation, then he undoubtedly will become an active fighter to bring society out of the crisis following the adopted political and economic program.

[Correspondent] How do you conceive the implementing of your proposals?

[Minasbekyan] I feel that I have already basically answered this question. But here is what concerns me the most: instead of a consolidation will not all of this lead to a sharp polarization, to a split in society? Here everything will depend upon the wisdom, authority and organizing abilities of the newly elected republic parliament. Without claiming indisputability, it would be possible to propose the approximate following sequence in the primary actions of the parliament.

It studies public opinion.

It adopts a law or provisional regulation on a referendum. Here the parliament itself should unambiguously define its position on the question of "yes" or "no," that is, whether the republic would enter the renewed federation or not and the corresponding declaration would be adopted on this. It would adopt a declaration on the unconditional supremacy of human rights over all other rights, but would feel that in extreme, crisis situations and in the transitional period the rights and interests of the nation on the territory of its residence could be higher than human rights, and that the shorter this period, the sooner society would become democratic in the full sense.

During this period, a moratorium would be introduced on the right of the minority after the holding of the referendum. Any action against would be viewed as an action against the interests of the nation.

An objective information center and consultative points would be established in the districts for the public.

Some ten days prior to the beginning of the referendum, the parliament would cease its work and the people's deputies would disperse to their election district.

A free expression of the will of the people would be ensured. Observer groups would be established with the participation of the diaspora for observing the law or provisional regulation on the day of holding the referendum.

Whatever the decision might be, it should be unswervingly carried out by all. Possibly in this manner we will make a beginning to a respectful attitude and unconditional fulfillment of the laws without which a state under

the law is inconceivable. But here in the relationships it is essential to establish dialogue and patience and the search for ways to unite the healthy forces.

I am confident that our people with their inherent wisdom and optimism will find the correct solution.

[Correspondent] How do you see the economic portion of the program proposed by you and is there not something common in both versions?

[Minasbekyan] There is. But this question is so serious that it should be a subject of separate examination. I would merely say that in no case should we be oriented at a barter economy as this would lead to economic isolation.

It is essential to define the priority directions for our republic. Among these we must put maximum utilization of our intellectual potential. I have already proposed that some thought be given to establishing an academy city where work would be carried out from the idea to developing the technology and its sale. This task is economically very advantageous as well as ecologically safe as this is very important for our republic. It would be possible to focus on this task, for example, the Europolis which at present so much is being written and spoken about. Other approaches are also not to be excluded.

The accelerated development of the economy after defining the priority areas is possible with healthy competition and establishing certain benefits as well as dependable guarantees for entrepreneurship activity. And this means that new laws are required and they should become a subject of serious discussion in the republic parliament. We should be clearly aware that under market conditions there will be a certain stratifying of society along proper lines. Here chief attention must be given to the social protection of people, particularly the poorly-off portion of the public. But as a whole, the richer society is with a rational tax policy and the establishing of the principles of social justice, the better its members will live.

The economy is inseparably linked to personnel policy. Everyone should be interested in having society possess highly professional politicians and entrepreneurs. Our well-being will largely depend upon how they work. Such individuals must be trained and this is not the question of just a single day. Objective criteria for assessing their activities must be worked out for the promoting of these specialists. Among the first here is what the candidate has done specifically for his people. Let me repeat, not said and not promised, but what has already been done concretely prior to promotion, and what are his paths in life, labor career and moral appearance. At the same time, the closest attention must be given to our youth. I believe profoundly in its potential, only this must not be spoiled by protectionism.

I have intentionally not taken up the role of the intelligentsia, cultural figures and all of those who contribute

to the spiritual life of society. Simply this is beyond the subject of today's conversation. But I feel the more difficult, the greater the responsibility that rests on their shoulder for maintaining good spirit in the people and without this victory is impossible. If you recall history, you will find many examples of this.

In generalizing what has been said, let me point out that as of today, without the triumph of common human values and the primacy of human rights, there can be no efficient economy, social market, social protection of the people and healthy nation.

[Correspondent] As has become known from an article in the newspaper IZVESTIYA, precisely these questions stand at the center of attention of the group of USSR people's deputies Justice and you were the initiator of its founding. What impelled you to establish it?

[Minasbekyan] If you deeply analyze the reasons for the growing discontent in society, then it is possible to learn that this is largely explained by the violating of human rights and the principles of social justice.

At the same time, the year's experience in deputy activities has persuaded me that isolated work in this area does not produce the desired result. Here I particularly want to emphasize that I consider it to be a result only when the proposal and the corrections are adopted or taken into account in the laws or decisions. And for this, it is very important to correctly pose the question and ensure the corresponding support of the USSR people's deputies.

Our people have experienced a great deal and are experiencing much from the problems and deformations in interethnic relations. In one of my speeches at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I said that the reason for the arising tensions is, on the one hand, the presence of a constitutional right of nations to self-determination and, on the other, the absence of a clear mechanism for realizing this, that is, actual lack of rights. I received support from many deputies as the reasons became clear.

If the question of annexing the NKAO [Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] to Armenia, then an audience, where each person has his own problems, perceives this as a conflict between two republics. But if it is said that the Armenian portion of the Artsakh population was the first to attempt the actual realization of its sovereign right to self-determination, and this is actually the case, and how this question is settled will largely determine what principles we invest in the renewed federation, this involves everyone.

Another problem. Some even now are trying to switch immediately in the economic relations between the republics to the conditions of a convertible ruble and world prices. This is fine if there were the resources and it would be possible to commence immediately in equivalent exchange. But what can we do when the nation's economy for decades has moved along a different path? In this instance the political dictating of terms can be

replaced by the economic dictating and this is more fettering and most importantly can be unlimited in time. Who should oppose this? Or in accord with the law on the delimitation of powers between the center and the republics, the autonomous oblasts should conclude a treaty with the republics and the differences are to be resolved in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Who here in organizational terms should defend the interests of the small peoples?

These and a number of other questions have led me to the notion of the need to establish in accord with the "Regulation of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet" a group of USSR people's deputies entitled Justice and in which there should be at least a hundred members. I drew up a platform in which I endeavored to set out the organizational principles, for example, how the member of the group in his district would establish analogous deputy groups consisting of people's deputies of all levels and in the public organizations and among the voters, assistance groups from those who so desired.

The Justice Group has the right to send its members to any region of the nation for conducting an independent investigation on the spot. Here all the state bodies and officials, in accord with the law, should provide the required assistance. In a word, the group has broad powers even to participating in solving cadre questions.

In a short period of time the number of members has exceeded the required amount and this made it possible for me officially to notify the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet about this. After this, the establishing of the Justice Group was announced at the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet.

At present, there are around 120 group members. They are representatives from Moscow, Leningrad and virtually all regions of the nation and are basically members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. For this reason, we are hoping that it will include several hundred people's deputies and it will become one of the most numerous.

I know that in a number of regions of the nation they are already organizing analogous groups and it would be a good thing if Armenia did not lag behind in this process.

[Correspondent] What are the plans of the group for the future?

[Minasbekyan] Because of the parliamentary vacations, all members of the group have received letters with a request to submit proposals on the program which will be worked out on the basis of the platform. In September, with the beginning of the work of parliament, the group will meet and approve a program as well as a work plan and after this these will be published in the newspaper IZVESTIYA.

[Correspondent] According to your proposal, the decision of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies states that in terms of a number of nations justice has

still not been restored. Will the Justice Group be involved with the nationality question?

[Minasbekyan] Naturally, they should be part of its program. Then some endeavored to play down the importance of this correction. Now much has changed. For this reason, the group members will do everything in their power to carry out this congress decision and restore justice.

[Correspondent] You are not a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, however your corrections and proposals have been incorporated in the USSR Constitution and in a number of fundamental laws and decisions. How were you able to "get them in"? What do you intend to do in the future?

[Minasbekyan] All that I succeeded in doing was, as they say, on the level of personal initiative. In the future, I will pay basic attention to the work of the Justice Group. Naturally, in the instance that our republic joins the renewed federation.

The very process of legislation is extremely complex. I have been lucky in that good relations were established with many USSR people's deputies and primarily with the representatives of the autonomous formations many of whom have joined the group. My amendment to the Property Law would not have passed without their support. We have done a good deal of work on the concept of autonomous formations. Possibly we have not achieved everything but that is natural. A little more than a year is not such a long time and experience does not come all at once. But, in my view, there have been changes. In any event, when I came forward with the concept that the autonomous formations should be granted the same property rights as the Union republics, and that here they should not consider either the size of the territory, the number of population or other factors; when I spoke about the free entrepreneurship zones and the procedure for delegating rights from the bottom upwards, about sovereignty and the informal organizations, I felt every-increasing support. This work must be continued. Moreover, equally important questions await their resolution. The main thing here is not the number of speeches or the emotional intensity but rather hard work between the sessions, a sober assessment of the situation, the calculation and result.

Until we reach a state under the law, society will not be fully democratic. And for this the laws must be carried out. Let no one fear that they are not always and in every way good. It is the task of the deputy corps to constantly improve them. In civilized states, this process is unending, for the laws should live in society and change with them.

I would like to emphasize that I do not consider the path proposed by me for emerging from the crisis as the only correct one and without fail would support any other better variation. But we must not delay on this question. It is time to define our terms and move on to a self-adjusting, stimulating system which makes it possible to

best realize the interests of the people. There is a long and difficult task for us to follow. There will be victories and failures. We must do this for the sake of the future of the nation. The main thing is that all of us be united and in no instance lose our optimism and belief in the future.

Estonian Supreme Soviet Discusses Government Program

90UN2084A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 25 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by Nelli Kuznetsova, parliamentary correspondent in Toompea: "Deputies on the Government Program"]

[Text] Beginning a report on the current session of the republic Supreme Soviet with a discussion of the day's agenda has already become a sort of journalistic cliché. However, it is during these "morning exercises", in the course of the very arguments over what to discuss, that the deputies' positions, their opinions on what is going on, and their ability to see the newly-sprouted ideas beyond a simple fact, or, conversely, the growing danger, are distinctly highlighted.

It is exactly from this point of view that a question brought up by A. Sirendi during the discussion of the day's agenda seized my interest. Sirendi had proposed that the Supreme Soviet express its opinion on the "trust telephone" announced by the Tallin city soviet. What kind of an innovation is this? Is it ethical, in our complicated time, when the sprouts of democracy are forcing their way up so tortuously, to create an opportunity for anonymous announcements? The totalitarian regime, as we know, was based on informing. Are we not causing the return of this danger?

An argument began. However, in the end, the majority of the deputies did not consider it necessary to add this issue to the day's agenda, feeling that this was a matter for the Tallinn city soviet and its crisis committee. But many still had doubts. Yes, and in general, is the unrestrained, growing politicization of the masses really so good, and is it really so useful?—as the famous dramatist A. Gelman put it. The same Gelman recently told the press of his fears that this threatens the political process itself with dehumanization. A political battle is unavoidable, but there is no reason to carry it to violence.

This idea was lurking in the hall during a discussion of four decrees of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, which the Supreme Soviet needed to ratify, as well. The speaker on this issue was T. Anton, chairman of the parliament's legal commission. It must be said at this point that the decrees evoked a most contradictory reaction—sharp disapproval from some, doubts from others, and from others, approbation. This concerned two of the decrees especially—those on the responsibility for evading labor service, and on the creation of the organization "Eesti kodukaitse".

Representatives of the Christian Democratic Union spoke out against the first of these. In the opinion of Deputy Pastor I. Khallaste, the labor service was conceived as an alternative to service in the Armed Forces. Indeed, it had been previously maintained that young men who felt that they could not carry arms for religious, ethical or other reasons could enter the labor service. But now, the service itself has changed. T. Anton himself emphasized that the labor service is the creation of formations that would be subject to the administrative organs of the Estonian Republic. But if young people who have already applied to enter the labor service now decide not to go into these formations, must they bear criminal responsibility? M. Laar, protesting the decree, expressed the opinion that young men concentrated in one place could be easily "captured" for service in the Armed Forces, and that it would be very difficult to protect them.

But just what is the labor service, anyway? Is it voluntary or compulsory? This question caused many doubts. All the more, because negotiations with the Center on the issue of service in the Armed Forces have still not taken place. Taking into consideration the whole series of contradictions built into the decree, the deputies decided to return it to the deputies' commission for revision. It must be said that it was not easy to answer the deputies' numerous and heated questions. It was not without reason that T. Anton, in answer to J. Liim's question about where the place of exile would be if this sort of punishment became necessary, joked sadly that he considers the main place of exile to be the tribune of the Supreme Soviet.

Discussion of the other issue—on the organization "Eesti kodukaitse"—was, perhaps, even more heated. "Where is the logic?" asked Deputy V. Lebedev. "We have just approved the Decree on the Depoliticization of the Organs for Maintaining Law and Order. And now, with another decree, we are introducing an organization that belongs, essentially, to the NF [People's Front] into the state administration structure." Doesn't this give the NF special advantages as a political force? Yes and no, answered T. Anton. No, because the NF is not a party, but a social movement, and yes—because there are many allies of the NF in these formations. It is unlikely that anyone in this hall, emphasized T. Anton, does not see a causal relationship between the events of May 15 and the creation of "Eesti kodukaitse".

The decree was approved by a majority vote. But questions remained. Many of the deputies and the voters still had questions. Does the creation of a rigid admission system for, shall we say, the House of Print, really fit in with human rights, about which lately so much is being said here so beautifully? And wouldn't the creation of these types of detachments signify the kind of powerful pressure that could lead to the creation of a totalitarian regime, but with a different orientation? Deputy S. Petinov announced frankly that the measures taken by the Government in such a complex period engender towards it a certain mistrust. R. Veydermann retorted

that there could be no talk about mistrust, as the Government was able to bring the situation on May 15 under control. He was supported by T. Anton, who emphasized that the representative organ of any nation has the right to protect itself. Incidentally, I cannot help but recall Pastor I. Khallaste's thought, which he expressed in the lobby, evoking smiles in the midst of bitter arguments: there have been no attempts to overturn the government because, right now, there is no government.

The decree was approved by 65 votes, with 18 voting against it, and one abstention. It is impossible not to notice that a certain group of the deputies did not vote at all during this matter, just as it does not vote during the adoption of other difficult and disputed decisions, either. What does this mean? Silent disagreement? Being afraid to express one's position? Fear under pressure? In the mean time, those who disagree could have created a system of counterweights in the parliament that would have brought us to a real multi-party system without a new leading party.

And once more, I would like to repeat the thoughts of the famous social activist: the goal of a multi-party political battle is, despite all of its inarguable importance, modest enough; it only takes place to help us choose the most useful of many party programs, and of the many political leaders—the most intelligent and decent. And no more. Maybe it would have been worth placing this epigraph before the last issues on the day's agenda.

The discussion of the Government program presented by E. Savisaar was an important event in this session of the Supreme Soviet. In it, the basic orientations of the Government's operations were presented. Here, special attention is devoted to the tactics and strategy for achieving independence, to socio-cultural policy, to the principles of conducting economic reform, and to reform in the areas of law and public education. It is also noted that with the de facto restoration of state independence in the political sphere, it is of primary importance that the Government be granted, on the strength of well-planned international guarantees of independence, constructive negotiations with the USSR and assurances of stability in Estonia's internal policies. The first chapter has already been dedicated to negotiations with the USSR, which the Government considers to be the "only possible way to reorganize political, legal and economic inter-relationships", and to nationality policy, which, as the program points out, "attempts to assure the local population of any nationality protection of its national interests, and to assure the national minorities conditions for self-realization in the cultural realm." "The development of agricultural life", which is very important under conditions in Estonia, occupies another chapter.

In presenting his program, the prime minister noted that the Government realizes that "nobody before us has set himself such a serious program."

In the discussion that followed, this idea was supported by I. Raig, who called the document proposed by E.

Savisaar the Estonian Republic's first government program since the war. And because this is a conceptual document, noted I. Raig—in essence, a program for the restoration of the Estonian Republic, it really should not contain any sort of concrete calculations. T. Made emphasized, as well, that this is a political program, even though it was in fact compiled for ideal conditions, when “wolves will not eat grandmothers, and Red Hats will wear blue, black and white ones”. Although, said T. Made, the Government's initiative, which is evident in this material, and its conception of how society's life should be organized is impressive, and this undoubtedly engenders trust.

However, many of the deputies did not agree with the idea that the government program was unique. Incidentally, on this subject, representatives of entirely different orientations were in agreement. A. Sirendi, for example, said that he had read something like it before, having in mind, obviously, the document's declarative character. The only innovative aspect, in his opinion, lies in the fact that the program's developer and the person responsible for its execution are one and the same, or, it would be more correct to say, the same organ. We will agree that before, things were indeed different in many ways. Deputy I. Khallaste noted that, in itself, the fact that such a program has appeared is a positive phenomenon, although, in his opinion, it has certain things in common with documents of Khrushchev's time: many promises were made, and everyone can see now what society has come to. He categorized the document that was presented as the “program of a leftist socialist government”—lots of slogans, but nothing concrete.

I would like especially to single out the presentation by M. Titma, who said that this was a discussion of a serious document, for which the Supreme Soviet and the Government are answerable to the people. During his speech, he admitted that his colleagues from the NF regard both the document and the discussion of it with the requisite share of self-criticism, and are not turning the matter into a political game. Even in the period before the elections, too many promises were made—rosy pictures of the future. But times are so hard that people must be told the truth. In the opinion of M. Titma, by the end of the year the standard of living will fall by two times. And it will be better if we all understand this and, as they say, “prepare ourselves for winter”. In this sense, the presentation of a “rainbow document” such as this, according to M. Titma, is a political mistake. For whom was it written? For the nation, for the public? That is, for propaganda? For the Supreme Soviet, that is, for business? But in that case, it should have included—on at least one page—calculations that would have shown how and at whose expense the changes will occur, and the reforms be carried out. Where do we get the funds?

Nobody in the world has yet successfully developed initiative, provided social protection and raised the standard of living, all at the same time. How and in what order does our Government plan to do this? It is natural that both the deputies and the voters—everyone who is

waiting for the Government to take effective measures that will make improvement in the quality of life in Estonia possible—are concerned about this matter.

We have no place to sell our produce. And this is the main problem for the Estonian economy, said M. Titma. Nor can one fail to agree with the fact that this issue is both an economic and a political one. There is a direct connection between this issue and the way that we imagine the future of the republic.

Both M. Titma and T. Made, along with certain other deputies, noted that the program also lacks a clear concept of the basis for an economic structure. This applies to industry and agriculture, as well.

Deputy J. Telgmaa noted yet another danger: at this point, there is no mechanism for limiting the growth of anarchy and disorder in the economy. Some sort of regulating measures are necessary to block the influence of the “black market” mechanism during the period before the switch to a market economy is completed. And there was one more idea in the presentations by J. Telgmaa and M. Titma that seemed very important to me. The Government must not shift the responsibility for solving too many problems onto the uyezdy and volosti [districts and small rural districts]—they do not have the developed structure, experience or funds. This could result in large losses and chaos.

One cannot accept a single idea or premise in economics without knowing how much it is going to cost, and what its results will be, Deputy J. Uluots emphasized to both M. Titma and Yu. Telgmaa. Using his graphic expression, we should hand this program over to the “teeth on the calculators, and let them crunch through it”, that is, let them perform all the correct calculations. But in order for the government to act, said J. Uluots, we need a whole series of laws. Even if the Supreme Soviet is in session seven hours a day, it will require four and ½ months to work through and ratify all of the necessary economic laws carefully. Thus far, as we know, the Supreme Soviet has not approved a single law. Up until now, we have only talked about political decisions, which have so far changed very little in our real life. And in this sense, it is impossible not to support M. Titma's conclusion that the time has come to act logically and rationally, throwing aside the political games. Unfortunately, we can see that at this point, they are still going on, giving rise to mutual embitterment, and hardening disagreements and political opposition. As if the political race that began before the elections cannot stop—the race for political power, for leading posts, for influence.

And, finally, one more observation. Strange though it may be, during the discussion of the program, the ministers were absent from the hall. The Chairman of the Government, himself, was even absent at times. Sarcastic T. Made even began his presentation at the Supreme Soviet with: “Respected absent prime minister...” But is the Supreme Soviet's opinion truly not important to the Government?

**Estonian Government Reviews Police Law,
'Kodukaytse'**

90UN2084B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 23 May 90 p 1

[Article by Yu. Khindov: "A Government Session"]

[Text] A session of the government of the Estonian Republic took place May 21 in Toompea. The first point on the day's agenda was personnel issues. Vello Ilmoya, who had been head physician at Tallinn's Pelgulinaskaya Hospital, was appointed first deputy minister of health. Ene Palo was released from her duties as first deputy minister, and Endel Kolyat was released from his duties as deputy minister of the environment.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Estonian Republic presented a draft law on Estonia's police force to the Government for a first reading. It originates from the draft for Estonia's conception of law enforcement. During the discussion of the law on police, laws of the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet were read, including the law on a provisional order for the administration of Estonia. The draft law on police consists of eight chapters, in which the goals, organizational structure, competence and responsibility of the police are defined. In his presentation of the draft law on police, O. Laanjarv, minister of internal affairs, noted that in developing police structures, it is very important to define the duties and rights of the police exactly. The minister also explained the problems that will need to be studied with the new law. Department head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, R. Polliman, gave concrete examples, touching upon the problem of official membership for investigators.

Minister of Internal Affairs, O. Laanjarv, acquainted the meeting's participants with the Charter of the organization "Eesti Kodukaytse", which was approved by a resolution of the republic's government. Eesti Kodukaytse is a voluntary people's organization that was created to protect state and public order. Already, men of Russian nationality are joining the ranks of Kodukaytse. Naturally, in the far future, a selection of candidates for the organization will be instituted. First of all, it will assure that the organization is not penetrated by criminal elements. Only people who are physically, psychologically and morally healthy, and who are able to fulfill the duties they have accepted can become members of Eesti kodukaytse. It will be possible to find deserving employees for the new Estonian police among the members of Kodukaytse. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Estonian Republic presented the Government session with a draft of the Supreme Soviet Presidium order "On the liquidation of treatment-labor dispensaries in the Estonian Republic". The deputy minister, Aare Kitsing, commented. The existing treatment-labor dispensaries are a continuation of the system of labor camps. Anti-alcohol treatment there is ineffective. Strict observation of human rights is not assured at these places in referring sick people for treatment. In the last 14 months,

the number of people assigned to compulsory treatment has decreased to 836, while the number of people receiving treatment has been cut to 750. Some of the people subjected to treatment have run away from the dispensaries. The fear has arisen that people who have been released from treatment-labor dispensaries may begin to violate the public order. These fears are unconfirmed.

The draft law on leasing was examined at the government session. In accordance with a decision of the government session on May 7 of this year, the working group introduced corrections into the text of the law. As Paul Varul, chairman of the working group and a docent at the Tartu University law school, said, the adoption of a law on leasing will create new opportunities for developing business initiative—the legal framework for leasing labor and leasing enterprises will be defined. The government decided to pass the draft law on to the Supreme Soviet.

Charters for the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health and the republic's State Department for Technical Supervision were also discussed at the government session, as well as other issues.

Kazakh CP Platform Published

90US1225A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 1

["Toward a Rebirth of the Kazakh Communist Party and Sovereignty for the Republic in a New Federation (Platform of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Approved at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan)"]

[Text] The contemporary political situation is convincingly demonstrating the need for and the timeliness of the reforms begun in the nation and the absence of a worthy alternative to the party's chosen course of fundamentally renewing all areas of the society's life.

Economic and political reforms are being effected, and the conditions are being created for enhancing our spiritual strength. The Leninist substance of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" is being resurrected. The soviets of Kazakhstan accept responsibility for government management and socioeconomic development. Ridding themselves of functions not their own, the party organs are focusing their efforts on developing the strategy and tactics for party-political work and on programs for social development, on organizational and ideological work and on enhancing the role of the Communists in the resolution of economic and social problems.

At the same time, the reforms in the economy, in social and national relations and in our spiritual life do not satisfy the republic's workers. The political and legal reforms have not been completed, and the soviet organs have not begun functioning at full strength.

The problem of enhancing the people's material welfare is upon us in all its acuteness. Inflation, the budget deficit and a market out of balance are negatively affecting the processes of economic renewal. Kazakhstan continues to be a raw-materials base for the nation, the dictate of Union ministries and departments continues, the processing industry and the social sphere lag behind in their development, and an ecologically disastrous situation has developed in a number of regions.

The job of raising the intellectual, general education and political level of the population is being accomplished slowly. We are faced with a deterioration in the world outlook of a part of the people, a loss of moral guidelines and an increase in crime. Along with the growth of political activeness in the workers, forces are emerging which advocate civic confrontation.

Nor has there been a perceptible renewal in the work of the Kazakh Communist Party itself. Democracy is developing slowly within the party. Many Communists and many party workers have found themselves unprepared to function in the new situation.

A great deal of work lies ahead with respect to the scientific comprehension and theoretical validation of developments, the definition of current and long-range tasks, the party's conversion to political methods in its work, consolidation and the enhancement of a sense of civic responsibility in all the society's healthy forces.

In view of the exceptional importance of the fundamental reforms in the republic, Kazakhstan's Communists consider it essential to define the principles on which their work will be based for the immediate future.

I. At the Center of Public Development—the People

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan approves the program for all-around development of the individual set forth in the draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress and considers the republic party organization's main task to be that of actually placing the human being, his interests and needs, his honor and dignity, his work and his happiness at the center of public development and of its policy.

For this purpose Kazakhstan's Communists are making a permanent break with the old thinking and with the authoritarian and bureaucratic deformations in the socialist society, and expressing their total rejection of the ideology and praxis of Stalinism.

In this year of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Kazakh SSR and the republic's Communist Party, we declare our loyalty to the Leninist theoretical heritage and the ideals of the October revolution. The socialist choice gave the Kazakh people new statehood, respect and mutual understanding within the family of fraternal peoples, and cleared the way for a national and spiritual rebirth. We are grateful to all generations of the Kazakh

people and [other] peoples of the Soviet Union who have made a contribution to the republic's socioeconomic and cultural development.

The bright and joyful side has been accompanied by many tragic things, however. Kazakhstan's Communists advocate an honest and objective analysis of the praxis of socialist development in the republic, and restoration of the complete historical truth.

We are for a humane and democratic society based on respect for the individual, social justice, cultural, scientific and technological progress and freedom of labor.

Our goal is a fundamental turn in policy and the economy toward the needs of the people. The priority areas involve expansion of the production of food and consumer goods, the provision of services, the construction of housing and social and cultural facilities, environmental protection, the strengthening of the people's health, immediate steps to improve the working and living conditions of women and the situation of pensioners, the disabled, war and labor veterans, the youth and children, and the social restructuring of the village.

The Kazakh Communist Party will strive persistently to ensure the entire range of rights—personal, social, political and economic—in combination with a high level of discipline and responsibility to the society.

Republic Communists are convinced of the need for a sharp turn toward the problems of indoctrinating the people. We put at the center of the political and ideological work the shaping of high moral and humane ideals, a dialectical, scientific world outlook and new political thinking, the enhancement of every individual's general and legal sophistication, and the establishment of conditions conducive to a healthy way of life for all Kazakhs. And it is the duty of the Communists to lead the ideological and moral improvement of the society.

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan advocates the consistent implementation of an integral youth policy in the republic through the Communist Youth League, continuity of education and its integration with the system of economic, social and political relations, which is undergoing a renewal, improvement of the moral and esthetic indoctrination of the upcoming generation, and increasing the responsibility of the society, the family and the school for the indoctrination of children and adolescents.

We attach exceptional importance to the matter of enlarging the republic's intellectual capacity and developing Kazakh science, including social science, increasing its role and its influence with respect to defining the prospects and directions for the republic's development, and forecasting socioeconomic and sociopolitical developments. We consider it beneficial to pass laws on the youth, science and to develop and implement programs for restructuring the instructional system at secondary and higher schools, scientific research and the training and advanced training of cadres.

While defending and promoting a scientific-materialistic world outlook, republic Communists adhere to the principles of freedom of conscience and religion, regard religion as a part of the people's spiritual life and are prepared to engage in a dialog with believers for the sake of establishing charity, spirituality and common human values.

We advocate eliminating the left-over principle and priority allocation of funds for the development of culture and the implementation of a new policy in this area. We are also for the safeguarding and careful handling of the cultural and spiritual heritage of the republic's people and our historical monuments and for a broad exchange of spiritual treasures with other peoples, and are against the commercialization of culture and art and nihilism in our attitude toward the national cultural heritage. We are counting on the active assistance and broad support of the creative intelligentsia in this matter.

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan firmly declares the inadmissibility of discrediting the Soviet Army's role and feels it has a duty to preserve the heroic traditions of the people, to enhance the prestige of the military service, to strengthen ties of sponsorship with the military units and work to improve housing and living conditions for army and navy veterans, fightingmen/internationalists and servicemen.

Republic Communists champion the inseparable right of every individual to have access to any information which is not a state secret, and the further democratization of agencies of the press, radio and television. We support the strict observance of legality and oppose the promotion of antihuman views. Communists employed in the mass media must promote the political line of the CPSU and increase their personal and collective responsibility for the objectivity and constructiveness of publications and broadcasts.

II. Toward the Economic Independence for the Republic

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan regards as an urgent task the matter of working vigorously to surmount the crisis in the economy. The republic possesses an adequate work force, intellectual capability and vast natural resources for this purpose.

Kazakhstan's Communists resolutely advocate acceleration of the republic's transition to self-government and self-financing, enlarged independence in the use of available resources and the elimination of arbitrary rule by the departments. We are convinced that the development of new horizontal management structures, economic ties with the Union republics based on mutual interests, parity of exchange and stability of contractual commitments will create a situation conducive to the resolution of the social problems which have accumulated.

We see the prospects for Kazakhstan's further development as part of a renewed federation based on precisely

defined delineation of the authority of the Union and the republic in planning, the area of finance and credit, and pricing.

At the same time we would point out that Kazakhstan also has its own, republic interests, which are not in conflict with the common, Union interests. We resolutely advocate the republic's right to ownership of the land and what it contains, the forests and other natural resources, with the transfer of their control, use and disposal to the soviets of people's deputies. We are unequivocally in favor of accelerated development and adoption of laws of the Kazakh SSR on ownership, on land and local self-government which will actually ensure Kazakhstan's sovereignty and maximum economic independence.

The republic's party organization favors a diversity of forms of ownership and healthy competition, a balance of which would open up the path for overcoming leveling tendencies, elements of dependency and the alienation of the workers from the means of production, and ensure social justice and the protection of honest, conscientious work. An economic and social assessment of the worker's actual contribution is the crucial criterion in this matter.

Kazakhstan's Communists will focus their efforts on the elimination of excess centralization and monopolization of management, the removal of the economy from state control by developing cooperative, joint-stock and other forms of ownership by the labor collectives, acceleration of scientific and technological progress, the establishment of mutually beneficial external economic ties and the establishment of joint enterprises with foreign partners and free economic zones.

The republic party organization needs to give special attention to the development of a concept for Kazakhstan's conversion to a market [economy], taking into account the republic's historical, national and demographic, socioeconomic and other conditions. A regulated market economy is expected to reform the production structure and provide for a balance of commodity supply and finances, ensure convertibility of the ruble and, ultimately improve the people's welfare. We believe that a market economy should be supplemented with a strong state policy with respect to social protection for the individual. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan advocates the establishment of a legislative program of social protection for those groups in the society which are less well off. We advocate reducing outlays for maintaining management agencies and defense and eliminating illegal privileges and benefits.

The Communists regard the matter of improving the food supply for the population as their most important task. In order to accomplish this without delay we need to provide for priority development of the republic's agroindustrial complex by revising the investment policy. We need to have laws on rentals, on the land, on ownership and other matters in order to overcome the alienation of the peasants and give them broad leeway

for independent action. The further development of the processing industry for the agroindustrial complex, the provision of rural residents with comfortable housing and the accomplishment of other urgent tasks relating to social and living conditions must receive special attention from the Communists.

We advocate accelerated development of the construction and construction materials industries, enlargement of the capacities of enterprises in the light and food industries, reducing the number of capital-intensive and ineffective production units, setting up science-intensive units and increasing the application of the latest resource-conserving and nature-protecting technologies.

Republic Communists advocate the immediate strengthening of state, labor and production discipline and the establishment of a legal barrier to the underground economy, corrupted elements and speculators, are against group egotism and localism and call upon all the workers to engage in an uncompromising battle with these things.

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan advocates the rapid development and implementation of republic programs for drawing the youth into industry, enlarging the national working class and the employment rate for the able-bodied population by locating new enterprises and production units locally, particularly in the western and southern regions, by developing the infrastructure of the communities and creating conditions conducive to individual labor activities and the rebirth of folk industries. Special attention will be given to the development of remote rural regions of the republic the most backward socially and economically.

The Communists consider it their prime duty to head the public movement to protect and improve our habitat and prevent an ecological disaster. We advocate the immediate cessation of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk Test Range and, together with the government of the USSR and military departments, a general auditing of the territory they occupy, with the return of some of it to economic use and compensation of the population for all material, economic and moral losses they have suffered in connection with the land's use for defense needs.

We advocate nationwide help in clearing up the Aral tragedy and developing a state program for improving the people's health in this and other ecologically adverse areas.

III. Toward Democratization of the Republic's Public Life

The republic party organization views as its most important political task that of implementing the Leninist concept of self-government for the society, strengthening and developing the system of soviets. The party organizations will exert their political influence upon the performance of the soviets through the Communists who work in them, take an active stance in life and enjoy prestige and the trust of the people. The Communist

Party of Kazakhstan will continue to fight for CPSU representation in the soviet organs.

Republic Communists are for a strong Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan, the highest agency of state sovereignty, which delegates some of its authority to federal institutions: the Supreme Soviet and the President of the USSR. We must accelerate the preparation of a new Constitution of the Kazakh SSR and the development and passage of new republic laws, and bring them into conformity with the altered conditions of sociopolitical life.

We support the work performed by the President of the Kazakh SSR aimed at establishing relations of equality between the USSR and the republic, strengthening the status of the Kazakh SSR and ensuring balance and effectiveness in the functioning of the entire state system. The republic's workers see in the president a guarantee of national statehood, territorial integrity, of the Union agreement and the consolidation of peoples residing in Kazakhstan and all healthy social forces.

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan is for enlarging and regulating the authority of the republic government as the highest executive and dispositional agency of power of the local soviets of people's deputies and their ispolkoms.

Republic Communists are for the establishment of various structures of public self-government there where the people live, for supporting and developing the soviets of the labor collectives as agencies of self-government in production.

We are for the establishment of a socialist, law-governed state guaranteeing supremacy of the law in all areas of life and the functioning of all state and public institutions strictly within the law, and reliable protection of the rights and interests of the citizens of a state within which the rights and liberties of the individual are inseparable from his duties. For this purpose we regard as one of our prime tasks that of improving the functioning of the law-enforcement agencies; consolidating real independence for the court and the procuracy and fundamentally improving the performance of agencies of internal affairs, state security, state arbitration and the legal profession.

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan is for the independence and the qualitative renewal of the trade unions as true agents of the aspirations of the workers, and for enhancing their role in defending the working people. The Communists favor stimulating the labor movement as an important component of social progress. We consider it essential to restructure all of the work of the people's control agencies. We are for renewing the Kazakh Komsomol as a youth organization sharing a single ideological and theoretical platform with the CPSU, and for relations between the party and the Komsomol based on mutual respect, trust and party-mindedness.

We are proponents of dialog and of constructive and earnest cooperation with all public and political organizations and movements which support the restructuring and the renewal of public life based on the principles of humane, democratic socialism. At the same time the Communists are resolutely opposed to extremist, confrontational sentiments and against attempts to create social tensions and destabilize the healthy sociopolitical situation in the republic. We believe that the procedure for establishing political and public formations and for their functioning should be defined by law and reflected in the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR.

IV. Toward the Reconciliation of International Relations

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan firmly adheres to the internationalist positions set forth in the platform of the CPSU, "National Policy in the Contemporary Situation," and resolutely rejects any attempts to denigrate friendship of peoples, which has passed some rigorous tests.

Affirming their adherence to the Leninist principle of the right of nations to self-determination, republic Communists are for true political sovereignty for the Kazakh SSR within a renewed federation. We are for speeding up the development and the signing of new Union agreements providing the Union republics with leeway for the independent resolution of accumulated political, economic and cultural problems and authorizing them to enter the international arena.

Kazakhstan's Communists support in every way the desire of people of any nationality to take part in the work of agencies of state authority and management, economic and sociocultural institutions and public organizations in the republic, taking their performance, political and personal qualities into account, and the right of every concentrated national community to have cultural centers, religious groups and other associations for the satisfaction of their national and cultural needs.

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan attaches particular importance to the implementation of the state program for languages. The Communists are in favor of a consistent course toward the establishment of the Kazakh language as the state language, the enlargement of its field of application and intensive study of the Russian language as the language of international communication functioning within Kazakhstan on the same level as the state language. We are for the establishment of conditions conducive to the unfettered use of native languages by members of national groups residing in the republic.

The Communists advocate complete and systematic implementation of the constitutional principle of equality of citizens and the development and implementation of a system of legal protection of their national honor and dignity.

Speaking for the Communists and all the workers of the republic, we declare that national liberty and the right of

peoples to self-determination may not be replaced with willfulness and separatism, coercion and anarchy. The party organizations will resolutely oppose any forces attempting to destabilize international relations in Kazakhstan and all those who, exploiting the concepts and slogans of the restructuring, pursue their own, avaricious group interests.

V. Toward a Renewed Communist Party of Kazakhstan

Republic Communists support the provisions in the draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Charter on the functions, the place and role of the party in the contemporary society, its work forms and methods and the main directions for the democratization of party life.

We are for a radically renewed, unified CPSU as the party of socialist choice and communist prospects, which reflects and defends the interests of the working class and all the workers, and which bases its policy on the creative development of the legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin, taking world public thinking, historical experience and the new realities into account. We regard the methodology of Leninism and its political strategy as one of the main sources of our ideological, political and ethical renewal.

In the situation of political pluralism and transition to a multiparty system, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is fighting to be the leading party by democratic means. It considers the program, theoretical, ideological and organizational functions to be its main functions. Decisively rejecting management and administrative duties, the party is switching to methods of political leadership, active ideological work in the masses and the consolidation of all the society's healthy forces on a socialist basis, and operating within the bounds of Union and republic laws.

Kazakhstan's Communists approve the provision in the draft CPSU Charter pertaining to independence for the Union republic communist parties. In the course of the reform of the Soviet federation and real substantiation of the republic's sovereignty, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan must acquire the right to participate directly in the resolution of basic issues in the life of our entire party, to work out program documents on its own and to decide issues pertaining to organization, cadres, finance, the party press and interparty ties.

Republic Communists are for true democratization of intra-party relations and for a rebirth and further development of the Leninist principles of democratic centralism and party comradeship.

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan advocates the establishment of the conditions for true power of the party masses, maximum independence and expanded rights for the primary party organizations as the foundation of the party, enabling them to define the structure and forms of their work and the regularity of their meetings, to decide on the matters of acceptance into

and the expulsion of members from the CPSU, and to use part of the membership dues. They rightly have the crucial role in defining and implementing party policy and determining the makeup of its directing organs.

We firmly advocate the creation of conditions conducive to a free comparison of views, joint discussion and adoption of decisions, and respect for the rights of the minority and of each Communist. In the democratization of party life we assign an important role to the republic council of secretaries of primary party organizations and the equivalent local councils.

Republic Communists are for enlarging democratization of the electoral process in the party and the establishment of a reliable system for the regular renewal of the elected organs, and against their formation on the basis of position. We should establish a rule whereby a Communist may not simultaneously serve as a member of more than two party organs within the republic. We must work out the status of the members of elected party organs, from the member of a raykom to the member of the Central Committee.

We are for a restructuring of the system for selecting, training and advanced training of party workers. The cadre decisions of party committees should be in the form of recommendations, with subsequent implementation according to democratic procedures. Localism and favoritism are inadmissible. Treatment of party cadres must be demanding but at the same time considerate and respectful. They must be socially protected.

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan will work toward the optimal structure for the party committees and a reduction in the management components. Their functions and the substance and forms of their work must be defined in accordance with the interests of the primary party organizations and the need to have a system of vital communication between the Communists and these organs.

The altered status of the republic's Communist Party is making new demands of its Central Committee as a political and ideological organ, an organ of collective leadership. It would be beneficial to establish the Politburo as a factor for real delimitation of the functions of party and state organs and for a conversion to political methods of leadership, as well as corresponding commissions headed by secretaries and Central Committee members, to elect the secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee by direct and secret ballot, the Central Committee secretaries and Politburo members at a plenum. Republic party conferences and, by decision of the Communists, party referendums could be conducted between congresses of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

We consider it important to change the work forms and methods of the party apparatus from commanding to political, forecasting and organizational methods by establishing a professional system for studying and shaping public opinion. The apparatus should be strictly

subordinate to the elected party organs and should be made up on a competitive basis of competent, professionally prepared and prestigious CPSU members with modern and unconventional thinking.

We are for permitting glasnost in intra-party work, for ridding it of obsolete provisions and norms, for a real battle against bureaucracy and for enhancing the responsibility of party committees and organizations in the work of handling appeals from citizens.

The Communists of Kazakhstan express their confidence that all the workers of Kazakhstan will support the platform outlined for the functioning of the republic party organization and will take a most active part in its implementation.

Ukrainian Party Leadership Changes Assessed

90UN1775A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 19 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by Ye. Yampolskyy: "So They Left...Leaving the Party: Group Portrait Not Without A Moral"]

[Text] "Avoid generalizations!" - We newspapermen were instructed, just so, not so many years ago by an official. The discussion was about dealing with critical facts. But times are different now and events are extraordinary. Since the beginning of the year, 11 of 25 first secretaries of the oblast party committee left their posts. They were quite diverse people; so were the circumstances. All the facts were reported in the papers, but the series of departures and the scale of changes causes deep concerns and a need for some conclusions.

Let us first look at how people become leaders of significant party committees; what the manner of their ascent is.

The Zigzag of Failure

There is an unofficial but mandatory ladder of service steps for the potential leader. Usually, his progress is assiduously observed to make sure that none of the rungs is skipped. Of course, these include education...elective komсомol work...an influential economic post...standing within party hierarchy: initial involvement, the rayon committee, urban work... It's not a bad idea to put in time on a national level. Sociologists call this type of career progress "zigzag". As a result of this approach, even in the ideal case, when the future leader moves up like clockwork, he reaches the zenith of political life at a fairly advanced age.

This is exemplified in the group of former secretaries. The final post - as head of the oblast committees of the party - were reached by these men at ages 49 (one person), 50 (one), 51 (three), 52, 53, 56, 58 (one each), 59 (two). Peak creative years were behind them. Of course, they were gaining experience for, say, ten years. But this may have been as a year's worth of experience repeated ten times.

Could there be a more direct way of gaining experience so as to prepare a person to reach the peak of influence during his most creative years? Many people feel that we do not have currently an effective method of identifying and advancing high level political leaders. The principles of selecting candidates will need to change. Approaches used in other spheres might be adapted.

Diplomas and Culture

Perestroika has advanced the question of intellectual worth of the Party, and thus its cadres, to a high level. Our deficiencies in this arena are obvious. De Gaulle considered general culture "the school" which taught how to command. Clearly, it educates more broadly than the usual higher education. Many years of overzealousness in Party work brought about a paucity of professionalism (in effect a paucity of interdisciplinary representation). For example, in a beet region, it has been demanded that the head of the oblast party committee should be a specialist in sugar beet production.

What was the case of the eleven men who have left their posts from this perspective?

Only one of them has a higher level degree in the humanities. The greatest number, four, are certified miners. (Even if we keep in mind that two of the regions produced coal, this is probably too many.)

Currently, it is the tendency to select specialists to Party offices from the fields of production and agriculture, changing the predominant interest of the Party from that of ideology and politics to that of economics. The strategy of meeting human needs in a hierarchy - first feed them, then educate them - created a loss of spiritual leaders in a plethora of economic concerns. This economic emphasis among the professional Party workers as well members of other social groups today is muddling Party purposes and Party methods.

There is a growing conviction among Party members that, for the top Party official, the highest priority should be a striking personality, a "colorful figure". In oblast's experiencing changes in first secretaries of oblast committees, trust has been placed specifically in "outsiders", e.g. a director general of an association, A. Myalytsya (Kharkiv), an economist, M. Voloshchuk (Zakarpattye), a pedagogue, Z. Kuravskyy (Ivano-Frankivsk), and a historian, R. Bodelan (Odessa).

This factor, like any other one in isolation, clearly is not decisive. When evaluating candidates for political leadership, no single parameter should be decisive no matter how significant it seems to be. For only the sum, or rather, the harmony of factors produces a versatile personality.

No Consistency of Character

Perhaps these remarks should have begun differently. As the democratization process unfolds, it becomes more apparent that people judge their leader's, personality,

and only after that, his capabilities. But candidate selection by appointment from above (which is how the "top men" came to power), takes little account of the candidate's personality. This is not one of the selection items on the ballot. But a description of personal characteristics does exist. It is written in offices by officials. It stresses business qualities. Many personality traits seem perhaps too ordinary to attract official interest: Mean or kind...untruthful or honest. Some characteristics, however, should not be avoided. What is a candidate's position relative to government? Are his priorities in government to benefit society or himself?

Attempts to separate politics and morality are always dangerous. Who hasn't heard the forgiving statement, "The leader was a bit outside the norm of good behavior, but he is a firm leader - he knows his business."

G. Bandrovskyy, the Zakarpatskyy head of the oblast committee, began his leadership post in the usual manner. Soon the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party chastised him severely for personal excesses.

At times, personality constrains a person. Last year, in the heat of the coal strike, in the central square of Donetsk, we saw many leaders of various ranks and levels - the union, the republic, the oblast. It was probably most difficult for A. Vinnyk, then the first secretary of the oblast committee of the Party; he seemed the most disturbed by events. He did not manage to regain his composure, without which it is not possible to appear solid or to inspire people. More than ever, a Party leader must know how to deal with "blows" resulting from circumstances. Responding to blows is a necessary talent for a candidate aspiring to the secretarial post of the Party.

Double Standard

Adherents of the "double standard" have not yet disappeared. A manner of behavior considered proper for "internal use" (in the apparat) and "outside use" coexist. They have little in common. Authoritarianism, wheeling and dealing, and pressuring are so strong that even steady apparat workers exhibit physical reactions at the mere mention of the "top men". In order to communicate with those in power, good rapport and good appearance are needed. Something of this sort happened in Chernivtsi, involving Mr. Nivalov.

The impression was that public opinion was offended by the "Yugoslavian event". (Read about the comments of highly placed tourists in RADYANSKA UKRAYINA at the end of last year.) At the time of losing his post, M. Nivalov had finished five years as first secretary of the oblast committee. It was apparent earlier that the oblast "grants" positions, and that interest in the office was serious. Why was nothing done to avert the problem?

But because it wasn't, at the plenary meeting of the oblast party, when M. Nivalov was being removed from his post for serious problems in managing the bureau and

breaking normal rules of Party ethics, worker G. Skripnik expressed surprise.—Respected representatives of the Central Committee were at our plenary meetings, and some special meetings. They saw that changes were needed, but did not direct us to make any. We could have reproached them for this. But truthfully, in Bukovyna and other oblast committees which experienced crises in leadership, there were unfortunately people brave enough to change the usual way of letting things slide, as there were in Tyumen, where an apparatchik dared to criticize the "top man".

During the plenum mentioned above, several speakers, as if giving chase to the retiree, reproached M. Nivalov for his excessive attention to soccer team "Bukovyna", to the detriment of other interests. I cannot vouch for the objectiveness of such reproaches. As a leader, he was formed in times when leadership's interest in soccer was perceived as a good sign. The joking expression, "soccer is a Party game", was accepted by some as a classical political postulate.

Ironically, in this instance, affection was mutual. When the son of the "top man" left the country for Yugoslavia, as a result of serious infractions, with the help of toadies, the younger Nivalov explained that "Bukovyna" took care of him. He traveled with the team; the father was a devoted soccer supporter.

Dictation or Dictate

One truth has not changed: style makes the man. Observing L. Palazhchenko as first secretary of the oblast committee (in Volyn and then Chernigov), I saw how often he was on farms - on a hot day, maybe even more tired than a field worker or husbandryman (let us not forget the added strain of responsibility of his office). We watched at plenary and ad hoc meetings as Leonid Ivanovych got all worked up, scolded, pressured... I looked at the listeners - their heads were down (with shame?) - as they sat above the minute takers. Everyone seemed to be concentrating hard on note taking. The meeting was not a discussion, nor an attempt to make decisions. I wonder in retrospect where the boundary was then; when does a dictation become a dictate? This type of situation, a dictatorial one, produces a loss of initiative, an attitude of not caring, reactions of an underdog. Eventually, power goes to the head of such a leader and he becomes a commander.

A year ago, four of the former 11 first secretaries did not receive mandates as national deputies of the USSR. There was a lively discussion on how to evaluate this in view of their future service, what their course of action should be. But life tends to even things out. The dismissal of I. Lyakhiv in Voroshylovgrad, Ya. Pogrebnyak in Lvov, G. Bandrovskyy and L. Palazhchenko can be related to their lack of success during those elections.

Delicate Moment

The question of attitude towards the western oblasts is an old one. It has always been delicate and it is embarrassing to discuss openly. The newest oblasts of the Republic at first commanded greater attention and assistance. This resulted in negative consequences, specifically a lack of trust towards the local cadres. But much has changed since then.

At the plenary session of the Zakarpatskyy Oblast' Committee of the Party, where notice of G. Bandrovskyy's retirement was discussed, communist members considered why he had received his post. Ten years ago, it was thought that local feelings, a nationalistic tendency, had taken root in Zakarpattye. As a result stern government was called for. There was no thought about the fact that "sternness" in leadership can manifest itself in unacceptable ways. As a result, it was not possible to overcome the alienation between the "top man" and local cadres. As was noted at the plenary session, undisguised supremacy and arrogance of the leader deformed politics considerably.

Mr. Nivalov came to Chernivetska Oblast, the neighboring one, from Prydniprovyie. There is no need to mention how highly regarded the "Dnipropetrovska political school" was during the preceding decades. Even appointees foisted by higher-ups had to be treated with honor. But the situation was that a leader who was not elected democratically did not feel accountable to those below him.

Creator of "VPM"

Eleven organizational questions at recent plenary meetings of oblast committees of the Party represent eleven human destinies. Beyond that lie interests, concerns, influences on the path to perestroika. Some of those who were removed from their positions experienced this as a result of pressures from below, others in response to pressures from above, and still others as a result of painful personal considerations. One question is disturbing. Only a year and a half has gone by since the conferences took place at which the elected leaders were confirmed. Several of the decisions made caused communists (and others) to be concerned. But they were made because some of the conference delegates did not want to part with authority, and others did not want to change authority above themselves. The victory was pyrrhic: precious time and the pace of change were lost.

Without playing down the drama of some of the removals from posts which were blamed on oblast revolutions, we should remember that this is probably only one episode in the powerful Party struggle which is unavoidable if renewal is indeed desired. One of the results is the knowledge that the search for and preparation of high level Party leaders requires a different approach. This represents a risk in an era of leadership by appointment.

In general, the secret is simple: True democracy should replace office maneuvering. When the motor of "VPM" (Rule of Party Masses) is really functioning, the question of finding a leader will disappear. Of course, this noble principle does not just happen - it has to be buttressed by appropriate procedures. A change in this arena is the most significant undertaking in the process of democratizing the Party. It is the collective responsibility of all Party members.

New Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Opposition Groups

90UN2497A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 5 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with two people's deputies I. M. Saliy, representing the Democratic Platform and V. Lisovenko, representing "For Consolidation" by I. Dmytrenko: "We Are Listening to What the Voters Are Saying..."]

[Text] In the materials of "Setting Limits" (Cf. RADYANSKA UKRAYINA on 17 June) the issue at hand was the alignment of political forces in our parliament. Specifically, the representative of the opposition, V. Filenko, was given an opportunity to explain [the opposition's] position on fundamental issues. Also readers had an opportunity to get information from first hand sources about what positions the opposition is coming from, on what bases it intends to conduct its parliamentary activity.

With precise accuracy, groups of deputies, communists and non-party people, expounded their program of further work in a statement "For a Soviet, sovereign Ukraine," which was given in our newspaper on 3 July. The signatures of 239 parliamentary members speaks for itself, evidence of this statement's significance and authority.

In the process of the divergence, two more parliamentary groups have formed. The group of deputies "The Democratic Platform in the CPU" proclaimed its declaration and also the group of deputies "For Consolidation, a common agreement and civic peace within the republic" presented its statement.

What is the essence of their positions: is it a political point of view of the state of affairs in the republic, and then—an exit out of the crisis situation in economic and social life? The deputies, who were present at the session, had a chance to explain it. The voters, the vast majority of the readers, do not have an adequate concept concerning the deputies' position. So therefore we are presenting this conversation by our parliamentary correspondent with the representatives of two aforementioned deputies groups.

Under the text of the declaration of the Democratic Platform stands, specifically, the signature of one of its co-chairmen—the deputy, I. Saliy. He was given a number of questions. First of all, how should the declaration of the Platform's principle be executed: "The

struggle for the sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR"? Second of all, what is the substance underlying the thesis—"The guarantee of political rights and freedoms of individuals, instead of a totalitarian state control?" To these questions Ivan Mykolayovych answered thus:

[Saliy] It should be taken into account that the Higher Council of the republic, like the parliament takes the first steps. And they got started with an unpleasant confrontation. That is, I voted "against" something, which the representatives of another group voted "for." Such a blocking tactic of opposing [other groups] has a lot of problems. First, it conditions a deputy's creativity; it is not an expression of his individual position, but rather a mechanical or arithmetical sort of voting procedure. So that is why the creation of yet one more deputies' group, independent of the majority and from the minority (The People's Council) is an objective process.

In regards to the declaration itself... I will allow myself not to make comments on account of its content. And this why. In my view I see a number of not completely clear formulations in it. Though as a whole the goals in it lead one to praise it more than disagree with it...

[Dmytrenko] In the declaration it is said that your group is a part of the opposition [the People's Council] on the basis of a coalition. What unites you?

[Saliy] Our group is in opposition to the parliamentary majority of today. I think that otherwise it would not be able to express its principle position. From this arises a gravitation to the People's Council. However, in conjunction with this our group is preserving a certain measure of autonomy. Personally, I did not join the People's Council... The group is really supporting, in accordance with its convictions, this or another of its positions. At the same time, when there will be no consensus among the members of the group, then each of the deputies votes independently, not being obligated to alter his way of thinking to that of other members of the group's position. Then, you will say, what is the point of the existence of our group? Now, as I see it, in the parliamentary minority, in the context of actually constructive work during the session, there are more possibilities to conduct this or another resolution. At the same time, the majority will no longer be able to mechanically pass every resolution. All this, I think, will work out for the best...

A conversation, as you see, has not come up: to concrete questions there have been answers which are too general and somehow evasive. As if intentionally stated so that no one would understand anything and so that comrade I. Saliy and his colleagues could not be accused of anything. I do not know, how it is for others, but such a "position of whispering" could not convince me of anything. So really, why then was it necessary to separate, once in your views [you have] such a individualistic-weathercock approach?!

[Dmytrenko] The contrast became stronger with a conversation with the representative of the group "For Consolidation," the deputy V. Lisovenko. So, the first question:

Vasyl Trokhymovych the motto of the work you do should be reflected in your name, which your group has taken—for consolidation. In this case, how do you view the fact that the parliamentary opposition has been created in the form of a People's Council?

[Lisovenko] The appearance of such an opposition is one of the phenomena of the democratization of society, a result which conforms to the politics of perestroika. One thing is that the opposition should not take on such a scowling type of attitude. At least we are aspiring to a constructive dialogue, a calculated measure of good understanding. Yes, it is worthwhile to assume an attitude of respect, so that the opposition will really be able to act by means of parliamentary methods; and with its objections, constructive measures, alternative projects introduce common sense into the parliamentary discussion. For it is really clear that the discussion can push truth aside. In addition to this, we are categorically speaking out against the application of non-parliamentary forms of work and association, against the use of excessive pressure.

[Dmytrenko] How do you view the fact that the opposition took on the name of the People's Council?

[Lisovenko] We oppose such a spontaneous appropriation of this name. Because, by simple logic, it turns out, that they are the deputies of the people, and the rest are not deputies of the people. Such a free and pretentious division can prompt us to discord, not consolidation. In regards to this we are expressing the presidium's remarks, which so lightly agreed to the division of the parliament to "one of the people" and "one not of the people," accepting the statement in the name of the opposition without any kind of comments.

[Dmytrenko] And final question: do you know what your electorate thinks about the issue touched on here?

[Lisovenko] Without a doubt. In letters and telegrams during meetings with voters they directly say that they are tired of empty chatter, that our newly formed council, its activity has still not provided an example of its effectiveness, constructiveness, a well thought out approach to resolving the most painful problems in the life of our people. They remind us that the parliamentary confusion, presenting negative facts does not resolve any problems, instead it engenders a lack of spirit and rash acts. The people in their wisdom are calling on the Higher Council and each of the people's deputies to leave behind ambitions and arguments, confrontations in the parliament, and to quickly move on to concrete, legislative work, taking advantage of the variety of thoughts and propositions and the constant dialogue with the electorate in areas. Let us, respected deputies, listen to the voice of the people...

The justness of this observation is obvious.

Tkachenko on Issues in Ukrainian Agriculture

90UN2608A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
21 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview with Aleksandr Tkachenko, first vice-president of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers on Agro-industrial Complex Developmental Issues, by correspondent A. Gorobets; date, place not given: "Everything Has Been Said. Now—To Business..."]

[Text] As is known, the 18 July meeting of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, by a majority vote, confirmed A. N. Tkachenko the first vice-president of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers on Agro-industrial Complex Developmental Issues. Our correspondent met with Aleksandr Nikolayevich and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[Correspondent] I firmly congratulate you, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, for your high position in the republic government, and, in a purely human way, I sympathize with you because today this is the most difficult area of work.

[Tkachenko] Yes, it is difficult. This is apparent, if only because in discussing my candidacy in the Supreme Soviet committees, an alternative president was not found for this post. But I am an optimist by nature. And there is a strong basis for my optimism—concrete business. Recently we have talked a lot about the destruction of the village. Unfortunately, these are not exaggerations; everything is true. But don't forget that our current village produces a ton of grain per capita. It was this way last year, and it will be the same this year, as is already known. It may be said, our long standing dream has been sold. And this is not simply luck or good fortune. I see a regular pattern in it. We expended a lot of energy in the matter. Scientific guarantee of grain production played an enormous role. Intensive gramineous cultivation technology not only proved its value, but also gave an indication of our new potentialities. If tomorrow we use it for 10 million hectares, we will harvest 55-56 million tons of grain. That is, we shall produce 1200-1300 kilograms of grain per capita.

[Correspondent] The question comes up: how much grain do we need in all?

[Tkachenko] Grain is the foundation of all agricultural production. For grain is milk and meat and eggs. Having become a sovereign state, we first of all will begin revision and creation of a new integral agricultural system with a change in the structure of the granular group. For years we have showed the center, that it is not profitable for us to produce so much wheat and that it is impractical to "burn" it in the stomachs of animals. An energetic crop, such as corn took a back seat. Alas, everything was strictly regulated; the state order was a heavy burden for the farms. Even if you gather it with a broom, send grain to the union fund.

Sovereignty is above all the gateway to common sense in land management. It is a new economic policy in agriculture and the yield distribution system. What do I have in mind?

By state order every year we supplied 17 million tons of grain to the union fund. In addition, we sent more than 600 thousand tons of meat dressed percentage and more than 3 million tons of milk products and 1.3 billion eggs. If all this were converted into grain, it would be 6-6.2 million tons. That means, in view of the state order we sent more than 23 million tons of grain, leaving ourselves a significantly smaller portion.

[Correspondent] The result is there is not even a ton of grain per capita...

[Tkachenko]...400-420 kilograms.

So now will a grain policy be drawn up? We are revising the structure of areas under grain in connection with how much bread and forage grain we need for ourselves and, of course, for the market. Do not forget that we have to buy a great deal. Oil products, building materials, tractors, farming machinery. For example, 80 percent of cars we drive are from beyond the republic boundaries.

[Correspondent] That means, the state order for grain, meat, and milk no longer exists for the kolkhozes and sovkhoses?

[Tkachenko] That is not completely so. We have to send grain to the government. But this government is a sovereign Ukraine. Don't let the readers interpret this, however, as verbal tightrope-walking. There is deep meaning in it. With its grain potential the republic government can conclude mutually advantageous agreements with the union republics for the purchase of different goods and products, placing the interests of Ukrainian workers above everything else. What happened before? The Ukraine produced 24-25 percent of the national gross output of the country and received 12-16 percent of its material provisions under it. I am not even speaking about purchase prices; those have always been set as the lowest for our republic.

As concerns the form itself of the state order, apparently it will have to be maintained for some time. This is why. We have grown accustomed to asserting that price stimulates production growth. But this is not always true. It seems that prices for sunflowers have already been increased to the maximum. But, strangely enough, the areas under cultivation have already been reduced. Price without a state order did not work out.

Conclusion: our economic leaders, specialists in it, are not prepared psychologically. In order to stabilize the economy, the village needs the state order. But,—and I am being specific—the republic state order. Its share in production must be no more than 60-70 percent. The rest is necessary, so to speak, for economical maneuvering of workers so that in the end they may work out approaches to a market economy.

[Correspondent] As is known, the republic produces about 5.2 million tons of sugar, and we use 1.7 million...

[Tkachenko] Apparently, you want to ask about the most painful item—the product rationing system. I think that now when we have changed from an ordinary sugar producer to a dominant one, the problem must be immediately resolved. What does it mean to abolish the rationing system?—It means to increase the maximum realized by 200,000 tons. The republic government has to take this step, I think, no later than September. To accomplish it will be the task of our conscience.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, do not forget that the Ukraine, while it is a sovereign state, is a country without boundaries. Besides the republic, it is unknown where to abolish sugar rationing as we have.

[Tkachenko] Do not forget another thing. Now we have councils, which have local authority. Their business is to organize production rationally in their territory.

[Correspondent] Soon the meeting of the Republic Supreme Soviet will turn to examining the issue of the priority of village development. What is your opinion on this issue?

[Tkachenko] We have now talked a lot about parity of prices between the city and the village. We still have to talk about parity of living conditions between the village and city inhabitant. The village inhabitant does not need a tramway or subway. He needs roads and a heating system. If supplying gas is difficult, domestic electricity must be supplied so that homes be heated, as is the case in all civilized countries.

[Correspondent] But how will this be achieved?

[Tkachenko] I think that the development of the village is not the business of Gosagroprom alone. It is the business of the entire sovereign state. And all the ministries, which will be formed must work for the city and for the village to the same degree. But today even more for the village. Let us suppose you are the minister of culture. You must take responsibility before the people that theaters, studios, and known masters of art appear before village audiences as often as they do before city audiences. Let us say that I am the minister of light industry; I must personally take responsibility that everything from socks to hats is in the village store. And that there not be state goods in the city, while in the village there are cooperative goods.

In short, in the near future, I want to unite the efforts of all the ministries and departments to raise the peasants' standard of living. I believe it will happen.

[Correspondent] A very painful question: part of the population lives in the village and works in the city. The village contains the cheap labor force of industrial enterprises.

[Tkachenko] I raised this question more than once at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, in the Central Committee Plenum.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, how will you act?

[Tkachenko] Everything has been said. Now it is time to get down to business. So-called pendulum migration in the republic is 1.6 million people. We have calculated that by the most moderate industrial prices, it is necessary to pay the village 2.5 billion rubles as compensation for the use of its cheap labor force. It is certain that these people, who live in the village, use schools, stores, hospitals and all the other institutions that were created by the resources of the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and village soviets. Through the Commission on Agrarian Issues of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, I shall strive for justice to triumph here.

[Correspondent] Do you remember that not long ago you came out for the division of the Ministry of Agriculture's Gosagroprom [State Agro-industrial Committee] system. What is your present position?

[Tkachenko] I look at all that differently now. The gosagroprom system has proved its value. In 4 years the APK [agro-industrial complex] has doubled its worth. Out of 12,500 farms we have in all 9 unprofitable ones. Four years ago APK profitability was 16 percent, now it is 32.5 percent. This says something. Now we are fulfilling all the plan indices.

The meeting of the Supreme Soviet proposed the creation of a Committee on Machinebuilding and a Committee on Social Development, which flow into the Gosagroprom system. I am convinced that once they are developed into full power these two large units will breathe the new life into the area. In other words I take the position that now, in connection with the conversion to a market economy, it is necessary to strengthen the integrational processes in every way; production must not be separated from processing. It must be a single, indivisible complex, which, while working for the market, would work for a living wage.

Proceedings of Lvov Soviet of People's Deputies Meeting Viewed

90UN1775B Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 19 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by M. Doroshenko, special correspondent of RADYANSKA UKRAYINA: "Don't Wait for the Opponent to Make a Mistake; On the Threshold of Cooperation Among Various Political Forces in Lvov"]

[Text] When the Soyuz is Painted Black

On an ordinary working day of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of National Deputies, the soviet was electing the soviet head. The day began with a conflict. Some deputies

insisted on changing the interior of the meeting room by removing the bust of Lenin.

It seems that Lvov residents would have correctly understood the intentions of the governing body, if it had simply removed the Lenin bust while continuing the meeting, which was being broadcast on an oblast television network. But this is the kind of disrespect some deputies of the "Democratic Bloc" showed towards the man who coined the slogan, "All power to the Soviets!", which the whole civilized world recognized as words of an exceptional thinker and humanist, and even buys up memorials which are no longer wanted by the new "democrats".

To the credit of the Communist deputies, who represent a minority in the Oblast Soviet, they were decidedly against the change. The long discussion at the start of the session ended with a compromise put forth by Deputy V. Chornovil. As a result, the bust remained in the hall, but it was covered by a cloth.

All this commotion cannot help but cause anxiety and amazement. Did the voters expect such bellicosity from the deputies? The region's population expected that the elections would result in a stabilized situation, peace. They expected agreeable, constructive approaches to the most pressing regional problems. In contrast, the oblast Party and the Communist deputies are championing cooperative efforts towards better living conditions, tangible rights and freedoms for the people, and for the political and economic sovereignty of Ukraine. Their goals coincide here with those of representatives of the "Democratic Bloc". So is there any purpose in creating conflicts at the outset?

Fortunately, passions which appeared in the session of the Oblast Executive Committee subsided when the deputies turned to the main agenda item of the day: how to form regional government organs, and, above all, how to select the head of the oblast soviet. The shift towards dialog and unity was due to members' interest in the top position. The seven interested individuals, with more or less success, proposed goals for the oblast soviet and how to attain them. The most response was accorded to program proposals made by V. Chornovil and attorney M. Gnativ; the latter fielded the most inquiries. Somewhat cautiously, responses were awaited from Chornovil about his attitude toward his election to the Communist Party of the Armed Forces of the USSR. He stated that he supports the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and declared that he was positively inclined towards the Soviet Army. Due to this clarification, the reserve of the deputies was alleviated.

But we cannot concur with the theory expressed by Chornovil that Kiev, in order to "rub salt into the wounds" of the new Lvov Soviet, might resort to economic blockades, and interruption of deliveries to the region. According to some newly elected deputies, the dubiousness of assertions such as this one, which have

become common in the Lvov area, is apparent; they cannot be justified with acceptable arguments.

Thus the refutation of these assertions fell to the plenum of the Lvov Oblast Communist Party, which took place last Saturday. The plenum specifically stated: The proclamation of the first session of the Oblast Soviet of National Deputies firmly confirms that the Lvov region has been brought to a state of economic, social, and ecological catastrophe. The population sees it as an almost apocalyptic picture of neglect and ruination. But objective and sober thinkers know this is far from the truth. Why the picture is being painted black is clear: to negate all the good of the preceding generation, the Soviet government and the Party; at the same time, to avoid the responsibility for the future.

We do not want to believe that current deputies struggled hard to win mandates in order to continue to duck responsibility. In any case, the winner by confidential ballot of the oblast soviet, V. Chornovalov, assured Lvov residents of his readiness to cooperate, negotiate, and carry on a broad dialog with everyone who yearns for constructive activity, including those who are currently his ideological opponents. In truth, this is not the time for complicating and aggravating the situation. People need accord and peace. The deputies' efforts are clear: work on providing food stuffs and housing, solve ecological problems, and increase efforts towards national and cultural renewal.

Majority and Minority

An acquaintance with whom I chatted between meetings told me that he handed in his resignation to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This decision is not surprising today. The variety of motives is mostly familiar; it ranges from material interests to political maneuvering and changes in viewpoints. Not infrequently, they include also covert or overt pressure on Communists. A deputy of the oblast soviet, pointing in the direction of the meeting hall, says, "How else can you get anything done here?"

For the Party, the election results of the Saturday plenary meeting of the Oblast Committee are considered a blow. It was noted that the Oblast Committee Bureau, in its pre-election tactics, recommended only cooperation and reaching compromise decisions using thought out, constructive methods in independent organizations. But simultaneously, the committee did not correctly estimate the need to strengthen the political struggle against those who are openly anti-Soviet and antisocialist. Moreover, some party organizations of the Region were not able to present themselves as an efficient political force; they seemed at a loss. They had no faith in the possibility of changing the course of events.

In this situation, it is not possible to disregard the region's unique historical conditions. Socialist changes in western Ukraine began later than in other Soviet republics. They were interrupted by war, then by a fierce

nationalistic terror, and struggles, all of which caused many human sacrifices and material losses. Massive repressions against the left wing in the western regions during 1939-41 had a most negative effect on social consciousness. Essentially, it was a destruction of the Communist Party of western Ukraine. The same effect was felt from massive deportations, nationalization of private wealth, and heavyhandedness in collectivization. Deep effects were felt as a result of religious persecution. Republic and central government agencies failed in their attempts to solve the newest problems of the nation by not solving them in time. All the "aces" - difficulties in the economic and social spheres - were utilized to their maximum by the political opponents of Communism. Elections were carried out under massive pressure and attacks on the Party. As we can see, they continue today, even at the meeting of the oblast soviet. Even in the soviet's hall resounded the calls for "all honest people to leave the Communist Party". In a number of local soviets, departure from the Party is demanded as a precondition for election to posts of leadership.

In spite of all this, political opponents were not able to push aside Party organizations and win a decisive victory. Reality is such that Communists can still consider themselves winners. On a oblast basis, more than 52 percent of the local soviet deputies are Communists. In a number of oblast soviets, Party members have absolute majority. Party positions are strong in rural soviets. In fairness, it must be stated that current soviets, in which representatives of the "Democratic Bloc" predominate, give appointments not only to new or non-Party members, but also to experienced (mostly Communist) leaders of executive organizations and heads of sections. The "Democratic Bloc" has a majority in the oblast soviet, the urban soviets, which are subordinate to the Lvov Oblast Soviet, Lvov urban and district soviets of the city of Lvov.

The Oblast Committee Overcomes Siege

Exactly two months ago, the Lvov Oblast Communist Party building was surrounded by picketers who demanded the removal of the oblast committee and made indelicate attacks on its first secretary, Ya. Pogrebnyak. Last Saturday, before the plenum of the oblast committee, which brought up the question of organization, started work, the picketers appeared again. As in the first instance, among the picketers appeared the odious figure of V. Furmanov. Only this time the slogans among the picketers had a different flavor: "We trust the Oblast Communist Party headed by Ya. P. Pogrebnyak". "We support Pogrebnyak." On the other hand, militant slogans were directed against possible candidates for the post of the first secretary of the oblast Communist Party. These political games could be regarded as humorous, if it were not a bitter situation. Based primarily on the fact that the Oblast Party organization recently has been giving up position after position, as was noted at the plenum with bitter irony, with this development Furmanov soon could be formulating the oblast committee composition.

The split opinion about the need to change Party leadership became significantly more important than a quick reorientation of slogans among picketers. This was confirmed at the beginning of the plenum, when a series of participants, in the name of entire Party organizations, took a position against the examination of the Party leadership question. Those who held this position firmly—it appeared several days before at the council of Secretaries of new Party organizations in Lvov—were on guard against a potential cooperation among independent associations after a possible change in leadership of the oblast committee, and against strengthening of conservative directions and administrative methods of action. All of these, under conditions of deepening democratic processes, could have consequences for the oblast Party organization. First secretary of the Lvov Party committee, V. Volkov, added his view, stating that the Party question had not yet been properly studied. As an alternative, the proposition was made to accept the decision of Ya. Pogrebnyak to step down from the post of first secretary of the oblast committee due to his retirement on the basis of health, but to ask him and the Bureau to prepare an election conference at which a new leader would be chosen.

Still a different thought prevailed, which was brought up both at the Council of the newly elected Secretaries and at the plenum: With the thought in mind that each week of delay causes further loss of momentum, the new leader of the oblast committee of the Party should be elected now. Pogrebnyak's notice was accepted.

Skeptics could, at least in part, dispel their doubts. The loser in the election of first secretary of the oblast committee of the Party, V. Sekretaryuk, continued work in an entirely democratic spirit, and decidedly spoke for rejection of stereotypes. He announced a package of initiatives which presented his fresh, original political views of politics in the Region, his ability to predict, see, and plan for the future. It seems that in this, too, it will be hard to find how the opposition could refuse to deal with this energetic, innovative Party leader.

V. Sekretaryuk's credo regarding the current political situation is: "Some people would like to see a boycott of new government while waiting on the sidelines for mistakes which this government might make. This is not the right approach. I think we should help the new soviets."

In a conversation with me, Vyacheslav Vasylovich also stressed the necessity for a constant dialog, a search for mutual areas of work, and help and support for the oblast soviet in attaining goals which unify. That these are not just words or a political trick, V. Sekretaryuk confirmed with his usual initiative, which the plenum of the oblast committee presented to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Soviet of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. Sharing the concern of the Oblast Soviet of National Deputies about providing the Region with food products and consumer goods, the oblast committee of the Party, in the interest of the Lvov population, expressed itself in favor of increasing the

grant for production of milk and decreasing contributions of meat from the Region to the Soviet meat bank. The desire to help new government bodies is witnessed by the fact that the head of the Shevchenko Oblast Soviet of National Deputies of Lvov spent the first days after being elected mainly in the office of the first secretary of the District Committee of the Party, gaining knowledge about organization and leadership. He learned that similar relationships are being established also on other levels, in various districts.

Undeniably, I was very interested in the question of Party tactics in the new circumstances. This topic was discussed among active members, in the city committee of the Party, and among urban newspapermen. A broad palette of approaches was presented. There will be, understandably, mutually agreed decisions, compromises, and criticism of the parliamentary majority. The latter will occur in cases where decisions will be made, which might be harmful to the interests of citizenry, when their rights, constitutional norms, and laws might be infringed upon.

The greatest amount of pressure will fall on the shoulders of the Party members in the oblast soviet. That's why the plenum of the oblast committee dealt with the question of its future work. As head of this Party group, the plenum recommended the deputy of the oblast soviet, the first secretary of the Buskyy District Party, S. Pavliv. The plenum discussed also the need to think about the historical experience of our Party, especially as seen through the prism of work of the opposition, in conjunction with other political forces.

This work, and the activities of the Party of the region in the nearest future, were given much attention during a plenum speech by member of the Politburo, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Yu. Yelchenko.

"The questions relating to the activities of Communist deputies should be dealt with separately. As time goes by, the need for a special program of Party committees to work with them will become more apparent. The program should anticipate the need to provide many kinds of assistance to the deputies through competent consultants, through frequent meetings with them. The work in soviets should be regarded as the most important assignment of the Party. It should be organized and directed accordingly.

"Today, as never before, it is important to work speedily, with a sense of future, quickly foreseeing political problems which will become central in the soviets. It is important to be well prepared to deal with the current situation, and to develop the necessary arguments, alternative approaches, reporting, solutions and other efforts, and finally, despite difficulties, to continue the Party line."

Since the hours long meeting of the plenum was accompanied by the picketing outside, and the air was filled with dissatisfaction with what was happening inside, the

newly elected first secretary of the oblast committee relayed a message to the picketers that, after the meeting, he and members of the bureau would come out to talk. Just the readiness for dialog in this electric atmosphere was a welcome move. V. Sekretaryuk also did not hesitate to present to the plenum conferees a resolution from the picketers phrased in sharp ultimatums and blanket accusations, which were aimed at, among others, the newly elected first secretary.

After the declaration of readiness by the leadership of the oblast committee for a dialog, the agitation among the picketers decreased somewhat. They stopped waiting for him and soon they dispersed, lifting the siege. An even more effective way out of the psychological siege is for the oblast committee to turn to an active, innovative approach to satisfying vital daily needs of the Lvov residents.

The plenum of the Party announced that it will do everything possible to help the new Party organizations to strengthen their positions in collectives, to increase their authority, defend them from attacks, and strengthen the relationship between all branches of the oblast Party organization.

Uzbek Komsomol Explains Disappointing Election Results

90US1194A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 26 May 90 p 1

[Article under rubric "Election-90: Comments on the Results:" "Why We Lost"]

[Text] For the first time the Uzbek Komsomol has gone to the election as an independent sociopolitical organization with its own political platform, which had been adopted by the Buro of the Central Committee of the republic's Komsomol. The platform included a statement concerning the support of the platform of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, and the Komsomol position in the area of political, national, and socioeconomic relations, and the effective state youth policy. However, the Uzbek LKSM [Komsomol], the Komsomol committees, and the youth mass media did not succeed in attracting the proper attention of the youth or the public to that political document or in carrying out a self-interested discussion of it. As a result, one of the first attempts at the Komsomol's political self-determination remained practically unnoticed, and did not receive broad response.

With the purpose of coordination, a working group headed by Second Secretary I. A. Bibikov was created at Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee. Secretary A. S. Kadyrov became part of the Central Electoral Commission from Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee. By way of methodological assistance, the "Youth Policy" provisional creative collective under Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee developed and sent special recommendations to all the oblast, rayon, and city Komsomol

committees. The functions of the methodology-information center for the Komsomol's election campaign were fulfilled by the Youth Movement Sector of the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee. On the initiative of the working group, a series of newspaper articles and television and radio broadcasts was organized, to present the positions of the Komsomol and the young candidates in the forthcoming election campaign. But...

One must include among the areas in which the Komsomol did insufficient work the insufficient attention paid to cadre training. There were no election "specialists" during the election campaign. A measure that proved to be relatively ineffective from the point of view of consultative, propaganda assistance was the special trip made by the Komsomolets Uzbekistana agitation train to Andizhan, Syr-darya, Kashka-darya, and Khorezm oblasts and Karakalpakia. No use was made of the opportunities available at the Refresher Institute under Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee.

The working group of the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee did not succeed in guaranteeing the effective interaction with the Komsomol's oblast committees in developing the tactics for the Komsomol's election campaign at the republic and local levels. On the whole, a passive position with regard to the election to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet was occupied by the Komsomol's oblast committees. Throughout the republic, only 86 young voter clubs were created under the Komsomol committees, and two-thirds of them were in Bukhara Oblast. It proved to be impossible to defend at the Uzbek SSR Tsentribirkom [Central Electoral Commission] or by legal procedure the right of the Komsomol committees to nominate one representative each to all the okrugs situated on their territory.

Unfortunately, within the framework of the 1990 election campaign it proved to be impossible to guarantee the sufficiently coordinated actions of the Komsomol and party organizations, or the party agencies' support of the Komsomol's political independence. The party press did not publish the Uzbek Komsomol's platform. There were instances of pressure exerted by the party agencies upon the Komsomol committees when nominating young candidates. Self-interested party support of the Komsomol candidates was felt for a very limited number of candidates.

The result of the participation of the Komsomol committees in the election campaign was the election to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet of 20 representatives of the Uzbek Komsomol (four per cent of the total number). Of them, three are Komsomol workers who have been freed from other duties; seven are workers; seven are kolkhoz members; and three are employees.

The greatest degree of success in the election campaign for Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet was achieved by the Syr-darya Oblast (12.5 percent of the deputies represent the Komsomol); Surkhan-darya Oblast (10.0 percent);

Namangan Oblast (5.5 percent); and Tashkent (4 percent) Oblast Komsomol organizations. The Bukhara and Khorezm oblast organizations worked without any results.

In a number of instances the Komsomol deputies proved to be in very serious competition with well-known and authoritative persons. For example, A. Timoshenko, secretary of the Komsomol committee of the Tashkent Aviation Production Association imeni Chkalov, won 40.0 percent of the votes, as compared with the 48 percent won by V. Zhuravlev, the association's general director; B. Madumarov, secretary of the Komsomol committee of the Sovkhoz imeni 50-letiya Uzbekistana, Rishtanskiy Rayon, Fergana Oblast, won 48.6 percent, as compared with the 48.8 percent won by N. Kasymov, director of the Kommunizm Sovkhoz.

To a considerable degree the election results are linked with the activity rate of the Komsomol organizations when nominating the candidates. For example, in Syrdarya Oblast, the Komsomol nominated its candidates in 50 percent of the okrugs; and in Surkhan-darya and Namangan oblasts, in 30 percent. At the same time, in Karakalpakia candidates from the Komsomol were nominated in only 14 percent of the okrugs; in Khorezm Oblast, 21 percent; in Bukhara Oblast, 22.5 percent; and in Andizhan Oblast, 22.7 percent.

Unsatisfactory use was made of the opportunities for making nominations at the plenum and at conferences. As a minimum, it would have been possible to nominate 195 candidates there, but in actuality only 66 persons (or

34 persons of the number potentially possible) were nominated. The candidacies from the primary Komsomol organizations found support in only 62 labor collectives throughout the republic. The lack of election campaign tactics led in a number of instances to the nominating of several Komsomol deputies for a single okrug. That occurred in the electoral okrugs in Samarkand, Fergana, and Namangan.

In addition, the Komsomol organizations suffered losses when registering their candidates. That reflected the insufficiently high level of their legal training and their lack of readiness for the consistent political defense of their positions. For example, whereas the Syrdarya, Surkhan-darya, and Namangan oblast Komsomol organizations did not lose a single candidate during registration, the Khorezm and Bukhara oblast Komsomol organizations lost almost half, and the Andizhan, Fergana, and Kashka-darya oblast Komsomol organizations lost one-third of their candidates.

The poor results are also linked with the fact that the Komsomol committees did not have at their disposal a sufficient reserve of young candidates for election as deputies. Many well-known youth leaders did not participate in the election. A considerable number of Komsomol candidates proved to be unready to define their own sociopolitical position in the pre-election competitive struggle. Ten of them withdrew their candidacies on the eve of the election.

The overall results of the election to the local soviets, as compared with the 1987 results, look as follows:

Category of soviet	Young people under 30 years		All-Union Komsomol members	
	1987	1990	1987	1990
Oblast soviets	30.3	7.2	22.7	3.8
City and rayon soviets	33.3	10.5	21.7	5.6
Settlement and kishlak soviets	33.1	14.0	20.4	8.6

Thus, in percentage terms, the number of young deputies to oblast soviets was reduced to one-quarter, and the number of Komsomol-member deputies to one-sixth. In city and rayon soviets, the reduction was, respectively, to one-third and one-fourth, and in the settlement and kishlak soviets, to less than one-half. Thus, there was a substantial lowering of the political "weight" carried by the Komsomol in the agencies of Soviet authority.

All this attests to the fact that the oblast, city, and rayon Komsomol committees and the republic's primary Komsomol organizations have not been distinguishing themselves as a first-priority trend in sociopolitical activity in the local soviets and have not been directed at using the political mechanisms in defending the interests of youth.

Department of the Socioeconomic Problems of Youth, Youth Policy Sector, Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee.

Khakass People Uphold Sovereignty At Congress

90P50069A Moscow *LESNAYA PROMYSHLENNOST*
in Russian 23 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by P. Romanov from the Khakass Autonomous Oblast: "Khakass Peoples' Congress"]

[Text] The Congress of Khakass People was held in Abakan where 450 deputies unanimously decided to remove the autonomous oblast from its administrative subordination to Krasnoyarsk Kray and to change it into a republic within the RSFSR.

The forum did not take place without the conflicts which have already become traditional. When the question of creating a socio-political organization of the Khakass people was discussed, the chair "democratically" dismissed more than 300 invited guests from the hall. In the course of the work, the Congress of the Khakass People was transformed into a constituent congress of the socio-political association which was named "Tun", ["First"].

According to the accepted by-laws, members of the CPSU and other socio-political formations cannot belong to the association. Expressing their disagreement over such a regulation, about a third of the deputies, mainly members of the CPSU, left the conference hall.

The established program of the association states that it is founded on the principles of preserving the development of the Khakass people and maintaining their sovereign rights in the political, economic and cultural spheres. The congress announced that the indigenous population (63,000 out of 573,000) intends to build relations, based on fraternity and friendship, with representatives of other nationalities living in the oblast territory.

Armenian Political Scientist on Republic Politics, Infighting

90US1165A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
6 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with Andranik Migranyan by T. Akopyan: "We Need a Strong Russia"]

[Text] Andranik Migranyan's brilliant article in NOVYY MIR, which demonstrated the need for an authoritarian period in the transition from totalitarianism to a democratic society in our country, evoked accusations of "a longing for an iron hand." Nonetheless the logic of events in our country develops precisely "a la Migranyan": The institution of the presidency has been approved in our country together with extremely broad powers, and the understanding that the path to democracy is extremely long and thorny is growing.

Today A. Migranyan, a leading scientific associate of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, is believed to be one of our most serious political scientists. For the last six months he taught in prestigious educational institutions of the United States, where a number

of American newspapers published his articles on the present internal political situation in the USSR and his predictions of the development of events; with the touch of sensationalism typical of Western journalism, they declared that by his assessments and recommendations, Migranyan is giving Gorbachev a chance. Furthermore the journal SOVIET OBSERVER, a serious publication put out by the leading center for study of the problems of the Soviet Union—the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, named an article it published analyzing the latest works of A. Migranyan "Andranik Migranyan: The Soviet Machiavelli?"

Disturbed and angered by the situation developing in Armenia, Migranyan flew directly to Yerevan from America: "In the States, the mass media reported the events of 27 May as the possible beginning of civil war in the republic."

Some of his statements in this interview with our correspondent may seem excessively rough and categorical, and sometimes unusual, but we feel that the time has come for us to learn to also listen to unflattering assessments of the national movement, since they help us realize our mistakes and omissions, and develop the correct strategy on the path of national and state rebirth.

[Akopyan] Andranik, by the time our interview is published, this article before us will probably have been published in the LOS ANGELES TIMES and, it seems, in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. Besides other things, in it you examine possibly extremely alarming development of events in the country, which you describe by two terms—collapse of the center and a period of anarchy. How might this reflect upon our republic?

[Migranyan] Everything that can lead the country to collapse (the crisis of legitimacy, possible processes of uncontrollability, chaos, and powerlessness of the center, which has become an object of criticism both from the right and from the left) increases its destructive potential many times over in Armenia. Here as everywhere else in the country, the old structures have lost their authority, but in contrast to many other republics and regions of the country, in Armenia there are no new structures that have received the people's mandate of trust. Informal groups (to be more accurate, let's now call them opposition forces) are waging a struggle for power without having a positive program. Their activity is "reactive," it is directed against the official structures of power in both the republic and the country, as well as toward confrontation with Azerbaijan.

I cannot see a basis for consolidation today in Armenia—neither ideological nor organizational. One of the causes of such a situation lies in the fact that a large part of the national intelligentsia has withdrawn from the society's political struggle. It is being said that the intelligentsia has discredited itself here by its flirtation with the old structures. But this is the way it was in all of

the republics, and despite this, their intelligentsia prepared the soil for national rebirth and a positive program out of the material of the old.

I also heard the opinion that the intelligentsia was simply left out of the sociopolitical movement. One sober-minded individual admitted to me here that he was ready to criticize the informal structures, but he was afraid to do so. On one hand this part of the intelligentsia wants to control the people, but on the other hand it does not want to vie for the people with the formal and informal structures which it feels are unworthy of representing them. Another part of the "servile" intelligentsia, which had lived for decades by the "what may I do for you?" principle, simply lost its bearings.

[Akopyan] But at least the ideological core of our people's unity did exist, after all. I am referring to the all-out support given to the national liberation struggle of Artsakh by the Armenian people. However, the total opposition of two republics created a truly dead-end situation, and this is forcing informal structures to seek new paths and approaches. And, for example, leaders of the Armenian general national movement have recently declared that unification of Artsakh and Armenia would be possible only after achieving independence or on the road to it, and without reliance on a "third power" (R. Ishkhanyan's term).

[Migranyan] Objectively, sooner or later the idea of independence will have to be declared in the programs of the informal structures. But I see this declaration in its most general form. Talking about independence is not enough (on one fine day this independence might knock on our door irrespective of our wishes): We need to consider the socioeconomic situation and the geopolitical position of Armenia. And I do not see any specific programs around: what objectives must be sought on priority along this path, what obstacles there might be, what the disposition of forces in the republic and in the country is, and so on. Incidentally, democratic movements in the Soviet Union are moving from words to implementation of their programs. We, in the meantime, have stopped where we began. It is easy to scold the party structures, and to shout at the "apparatchiki" and the "mafiosa." It's easier to "work" when there is someone to scold.

[Akopyan] But it is hard to implement a program when Armenia is suffering a real paralysis of power—something that is admitted even by the republic's leadership. Can we hope for productive work by the new parliament?

[Migranyan] I can't say, because I'm not very familiar with its makeup. But all the grounds exist for fearing that the parliament may transform into a battlefield between different political forces.

But let's return to the previous question. Independence is also defined as independent national and state thinking, and many of our misfortunes stem from the fact that we have never had such a thing. The dogma of

"permanent friend" and "permanent enemy" did poor service to the formation of our national consciousness. We have driven it into our heads (more accurately, it was driven into our heads) that we can make certain demands, though not on the basis of our real possibilities but with reliance upon the strength of Russia and the Union. That is, someone else must realize our national goals and aspirations.

It is for this reason that a turn to real politics can only be welcomed. And R. Ishkhanyan's articles, which essentially call for "reliance upon our own strengths," contain healthy and sober-minded thoughts. But there is a bad tendency here—going from one extreme to another, and namely, blaming Russia for all of our misfortunes. First of all, this is not so. To portray the role of Russia in the "Armenian question" only in negative terms would be an act of historical illiteracy. Moreover this would be politically harmful, since no matter what path the development of events takes, we need a strong Russia with a friendly disposition toward us.

A totally unnecessary debate has flared up in recent months between the AOD [not further identified] and the "Dashnaktsutyun" party, and it is getting angry on both sides. I spoke at rather great length about this with Dashnak officials in America. And their position is understandable. The Dashnaks cannot be accused at all of love for the USSR, and the activity of this party has always been directed against the totalitarian regime in the USSR—something which the present leaders of the state, headed by Gorbachev, are trying to bring down. But judging from certain statements we are led to believe today that the Dashnaks are bosom-buddies of Russia. Such statements are the fruit of dilettantism. "Dashnaktsutyun" was and is based on the interests of its people. And in the opinion of "Dashnaktsutyun," these interests dictate the need for a strong alliance with Russia. Meaning that all of this rhetoric in the Dashnak press and in the AOD press is in fact concealing the actual contradictions and conflicts existing between these organizations. The reality is that the AOD is making claims on complete political power in the new Armenia. In the meantime the Dashnak leadership is somewhat divorced from today's realities, it is constrained by age-old dogmas, and it has a hard time accepting any deviation from the political scheme to which it is accustomed.

[Akopyan] Nonetheless, our appeals did have sufficient basis in fact. It was Russia, after all, that signed the treaty by which Karsk Oblast was torn away from Armenia, and it was under the Soviet structure that Karabakh was transferred to Azerbaijan, and we couldn't count on any understanding of our demands from the center.

[Migranyan] This is so. But every regime has its own logic of action. In the beginning of the "Karabakh movement" the regime was incapable of solving the problems which were raised without its participation. The regime wanted only one thing—to maintain the status quo. All the more so because at that time it did not have a strategy of perestroika, it did not have—and it

still doesn't have—~~e~~ mechanism by which to resolve such interethnic disagreements. A pro-Armenian or a pro-Azerbaijani position may be said to be a derivative of this logic of the regime, but this would be naive. We need not seek a conspiracy against the Armenian people, or blame everyone and everything in order to relieve ourselves of the responsibility for the many mistakes, and for the inaction.

[Akopyan] But even our interview is proceeding somehow along the lines of criticizing the present views and actions of formal and informal structures in the republic. What, then, should be the essence of a positive program, what actions should we take henceforth?

[Migranyan] I am purposely avoiding discussion of the actions of the center and of the neighboring republic—enough has been said about these things in the republic's press. And whether we criticize them or not, each side will act on the basis of its own interests. This is why we need to develop the strategy of our own struggle.

I am certain that we need to opt for contacts, for negotiations with Azerbaijan. Perhaps by way of a presidential liaison. Negotiations do not mean that you are losing, or conceding (this is a false opinion circulating in Armenia). Public opinion must be shaped in a certain way, the people must be shown that we are exercising good will, and this will be perceived positively both in the country and in the world. We need to go into negotiations on the basis of current realities, including the social consciousness, with tentative terms, qualifying possible concessions and the principles that are fundamental to us. After all, the fact itself of negotiations means that a problem exists.

I have heard some highly placed officials of the republic say that after everything that has happened there, there is nothing to talk about with Azerbaijan. Yes, Sumgait did happen, as did the deportations, the blockade and Baku. And we need to continue to fight for the condemnation of the organizers of these actions, for political assessment of what is being done in the neighboring republic, introduction of economic sanctions and so on. Except that our wounded national ego should not lie at the basis of our policy. There is a corresponding term in the English language—"bargaining," which is a constant process, roughly speaking making a deal, conducting negotiations accounting for a changed situation, new factors and ratio of forces, a process of consolidating one's positions and competently capitalizing on the weaknesses of the opposite side. But people here do not often understand this. The impression is created what we really need is a course in political maneuvering.

A strategic line intended for the long term cannot be discerned in the actions of either the republic's leadership or informal structures. It is said that the "Karabakh problem" is special, and it needs to be solved specially. But a problem is solved "specially" only by force. But in the channel of constitutional settlement, which is what people are striving for both in Artsakh and in Armenia,

we need to try to solve the problem on the basis of a new union agreement, as part and parcel of solving the problems of all ethnic administrative formations. And we must fight for the principle, one acceptable to us, which through our efforts must be laid at the basis of a new agreement. This is something we need to work on daily, hourly. But the meantime we are pursuing a "reactive" policy, we are responding to attacks from Azerbaijan, and we are being distracted by senseless debates. We can't keep chasing the train forever after it has left the station.

As far as urgent problems facing Artsakh are concerned, we need to ensure observance of individual rights and freedoms, and of international legal rules. We must demand withdrawal of troops from population centers. We must declare for all to hear that it is time to put an end to discrediting the army; it must not be transformed into a punitive corps.

The army must be withdrawn from population centers and concentrated for a certain while along the border. Let the troops carry out functions for which they are suited: They should be keeping the roads clear, for example, and not managing the oblast. We also need to restore Soviet power in Artsakh.

Also, we need to make contacts with Turkey, though here as well we should not go to the extreme. This is an extremely delicate matter, and we should never simplify it, as some informal publications do. We must account for the experience of history, and for the currently existing social consciousness. We cannot forget that Armenian political parties, and in general the entire Armenian Diaspora, channeled all of their material and moral resources into recognition of the "Armenian question," and that they have achieved considerable success. Take for example just the resolutions of the European parliament and the World Tribunal of Nations, the hearings in the American Congress and so on.

But some informal structures in Armenia have a tendency to exclude these so to speak "historical parties" from solution of the political problems, and to count only on the economic assistance of the Diaspora (incidentally, its possibilities are exaggerated in Armenia, which generates parasitic sentiments), forgetting the sacrifices that these parties have suffered in fighting for international recognition of the "Armenian question." And this was in a time when Armenia had not the slightest possibility for involving itself in this matter.

This is why we need to perceive the position of foreign Armenian parties with understanding and gratefulness, and gain from them the experience of political action.

And finally, we need to strengthen ties (not just in words!) with the West, with our neighbors, and we need to create a strong economic infrastructure in the republic. This is something which we can do. It is astounding how certain representatives of our people, relying on the gene pool of their nation, achieve outstanding results in economics, politics and culture on the

basis of other cultures. And it is painful to see that together, in their own native land, they are incapable of such actions. Let me repeat, we need to learn to listen to one another, we need to free ourselves of the "syndrome of the infallibility" of all political forces and leaders.

Chairman Explains Purpose of Armenian 'Sasun' Union

90US1165B Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
7 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Armenian SSR State Publishing Committee Chairman Stepan Pogosyan, by an Armenpress correspondent: "Union of Persons of Armenian Descent From Taron"]

[Text] Societies and unions of persons of Armenian descent are being created in the republic in recent times. Their purpose is to unite fellow countrymen residing in different regions on the basis of common ethnic interests. There are many in Talinskiy, Aparanskiy and other rayons whose ancestors were deported from Taron and Sasun. And just recently a union of persons of Armenian descent from Taron, called "Sasun," was created. Armenian SSR State Publishing Committee Chairman Stepan Pogosyan was elected chairman of the union's board. In an interview with an Armenpress correspondent he related the motives behind the union's creation, the organization's objectives and other matters. This interview is presented for the reader's attention below.

[KOMSOMOLETS] What premises and principles served as the basis for creating the "Sasun" union?

[Pogosyan] The first and most important premise was the current state of the Armenian people, which evolved in response to the will of history and destiny. Armenians of Taron, who see better than anyone else that the guarantee of reaching our common national goals lies in national unity and consolidation, were living witnesses and the immediate bearers of this history and destiny. Consequently in order to resolve the complex situation that has been created in the republic, they are also obligated to use their collective possibilities. In this sense "Sasun" is a union formed on the principles of voluntary membership and independence, the basis of which was laid at meetings of senior and new generations of Taron Armenians (Sasun Armenians primarily) conducted regularly over the course of a number of years. These meetings were not very organized or businesslike. The new "Sasun" union differs in its structure and the criteria of its formation from the various social and political organizations existing in Armenia.

[KOMSOMOLETS] If the goal of the "Sasun" union of persons of Armenian descent is to implement our common national programs by way of consolidation, how do we explain creation of the new society of Taronians in Armenia, which is already abundant with numerous organizations and parties, and why was the name "Sasun" chosen?

[Pogosyan] The society's name is essentially symbolic. "Sasun" does not at all mean a society of Sasunians. We need to distinguish the name from the program of its actions, from the goals and objectives of the society. It stands to reason that the society, which involves itself in many activities associated with rayons and towns inhabited by Taronian emigres, does not suffer in any way from the name "Sasun." From the standpoint of its program, the activities of the society are divided into basic goals and current objectives, which are interdependent. The essence of every newly created or existing organization and society reveals itself in the national sociopolitical atmosphere depending on its basic goals. The goal of the "Sasun" union is to fight for resolution of the Armenian question, of which the Artsakh problem is the most important stage today, to assist development and implementation of a program to restore the disaster zones in every possible way, to fight against trends that weaken the unity of the Armenian people, to promote attainment of the republic's economic and political sovereignty, on which the nation's total independence could be based, and to do practically everything to ensure the security and protection of Armenia.

[KOMSOMOLETS] Almost all groupings and organizations operating in Armenia have the same and perhaps even larger assortment of goals. Nonetheless what is the union's ideological and political orientation on the road to achieving these goals, and what in your opinion is the primary condition for attaining the economic and political independence of Armenia?

[Pogosyan] Redundancy of goals is fully acceptable. And it could not be otherwise, inasmuch as an Armenian nation exists with common national goals, and with Armenian organizations, the society and the party all serving these goals. But the approach and principles of achieving common national goals—in other words, the means of action—are another matter. In an atmosphere of national awakening and in the course of our present struggle for survival, self-determination and satisfaction of daily requirements, the regrettable fact has become obvious that from the standpoint of national ideology and historical thinking, we Armenians have suffered the greatest losses and shortcomings. And it is no accident that having endured so many trials, and having been taught such bitter lessons, we are able to once again heed the experience of others, we are able to use the "assistance" and "advice" of others without even a glance at our own history. This is doubtlessly a demonstration of the loss of national ideology, it is an example of a nation bent on survival relating to its future without historical thinking. This is why it is the duty of each person who joins our union to promote, through his activities, formation of Armenian national ideology, and a return of the people to historical thinking. In this aspect the "Sasun" union consistently, constantly and purposefully maintains a desire in every Armenian to achieve just resolution of the Armenian question. We talk too much as it is, and as the great Komitas said, it's a pity that we like to talk so much. And the primary condition for

transition from words to realizing the people's essential demands and the motherland's economic and political sovereignty is in my opinion a national parliament. No one appeal or motto, no demonstrations and noisy campaigns can henceforth safeguard the idea of national unity and of economic and political independence. The foundation of national economic, ideological and political sovereignty can be laid only by the will of the state. And such a state we do have. The thing we need to do now is to rescue the national countenance of which it has been deprived. Only a national state program, drawn up at a high professional level by a national parliament at this key point in Armenian history, and shaped through free expression of will, can become the primary prerequisite of our practical unity. The "Sasun" union can participate only in a program of such a national state body.

I should note that the society also has some narrow objectives which we hope to achieve through philanthropic channels. These are to be practical activities in places where Taronians live, and not only there. Considering the traditional and historical features inherent to Taronians, the union has made it its goal to collect accurate information on emigres from Taron.

One objective is to carry out construction work in certain regions depending on the needs of the population, to provide material assistance to large and needy families and to individual citizens, to reveal especially gifted students, to support them materially and morally, to provide them orientation, and to deal with the problems of expanding their knowledge and improving their capabilities. A significant part of the work that will be done on a philanthropic basis is to be devoted to the Armenians of Artsakh and the disaster zone, and to our compatriots deported from Azerbaijan.

[KOMSOMOLETS] Protection of Armenia and the Armenian people and the problems of military-patriotic indoctrination of the young have an important place among your objectives. How do you see the work of the society in this direction, given the present structure of national armed detachments?

[Pogosyan] To be an Armenian by nationality, to share in the national destiny that has fallen to the lot of the Armenians of Taron, and to not think constantly about defense and security in all conditions is impermissible and criminal. From the day that the need arose for ensuring the security of our people in the border zone and for preventing surprise attacks, the young descendants of Taronian Armenians, who genetically inherited the honesty and incorruptibility of the guerrilla fighters, expressed their readiness to serve as the motherland's protectors. However, the advent of numerous armed groupings in the republic in recent months and the dishonest behavior of certain armed individuals elicit serious apprehensions. A most negligent and purposeless mode of action is evident in this most important matter in our country. Obviously we can expect the greatest tragedy to occur, or an appeal for unification from the

highest authorities. Whatever the case, reason must prevail: We have but one path—activating the national defense factor by voluntary unification on a common national statewide basis. As far as military-patriotic indoctrination of adolescents and the young is concerned, we are beginning it from ground zero, and we foresee great difficulties. Nonetheless, the first steps are encouraging. All that remains is for this matter to become an object of state concern, beginning in schools of general education.

[KOMSOMOLETS] What are the organizational and material possibilities of the union?

[Pogosyan] The union conducts its activities through commissions for resolution of the Armenian question, for military-patriotic indoctrination and self-defense, for science and culture, for contacts with the internal and foreign Diaspora, for philanthropy and finances, for construction and production, and for organizational and legal work. The "Sasun" union is creating its primary organizations in the towns, rayons and cities of the republic, as well as in Armenian colonies of the internal and foreign Diaspora. The organizational structure of the union consists of the society's board, territorial councils and primary organizations.

The society possesses its own symbol and periodical, YERKIR AVETYATS (THE PROMISED LAND). The first issue of this periodical, which is to be published three times a month, will be out in July of this year. The society's members will have membership cards.

The union of persons of Armenian descent gets its assets from initiation and membership dues, donations from state enterprises, public organizations, the Armenian church, foreign companies and organizations the society's members and other citizens, and from bequests.

Lists of union members and information on them have already been received from a significant number of regions populated by Taronian emigres, and programs of activity of the union's commissions have been drafted. Many problems are still under administrative examination.

Difficulties still lie ahead. But every good thing begins with a sober and honest understanding of all of the complexities. Let these words serve as the creed of the "Sasun" union: "I, a Sasunian, a Mushets and a Taronian, wish to speak peace. My pain has become resolve, my eyes seek visions of home. The spirit of guerrillas wandering the mountains of Sasun summons me to the struggle. The road I travel is one which I have selected for myself, grant me a safe journey."

Glasnost Editor Ter-Grigoryants Comments on Transcaucasus Issues

90US1255A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
24 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview with S. I. Ter-Grigoryants by Samvel Makaryan: "On Yeltsin, Independence, and Ayrikyan"]

[Text] The 31 March 1990 issue of KOMSOMOLETS ran an interview with the editor of the magazine GLASNOST, leader of the union of independent journalists, activist in the country's human rights movement, and former dissident, our compatriot Sergey Ter-Grigoryants. This publication struck a chord. Many letters with questions were sent to Sergey Ivanovich in care of the magazine. Recently our correspondent met once again with S. I. Ter-Grigoryants at his apartment in Moscow.

[Makaryan] Sergey Ivanovich, more than three months have passed since our first conversation. In your interview then you tried to give a prognosis about certain aspects of the country's domestic political life. The picture you painted was far from optimistic. What is your opinion today of the political situation in the country?

[Ter-Grigoryants] The current situation in the Soviet Union is approximately what it might have been, say, hypothetically, in Poland, if there hadn't been a Solidarity in the country and all its supporters had "struggled" on the side of Jaruzelski against Gierek. In that situation, Jaruzelski might have won out, but it's hard to say to what degree the democratic movement would have won.

[Makaryan] Many consider the election of Yeltsin as chairman of the Russian parliament two steps forward but one step back. . . .

[Ter-Grigoryants] I think that Yeltsin's election is unlikely to correspond in full to many people's views—those who, by voting for him, were expressing their negative attitude toward the existing apparatus. If we're talking about the team that supported Yeltsin, then it's hard to tell for certain, because apart from the military, which supported him openly and actively, I don't see any other real force behind him. You have to keep in mind that mass support for him has fallen substantially this year, as I'm sure Yeltsin's further activities will show. Within a year (if we have that long), his alternativeness is going to start looking pretty suspicious. . . . That's why it's so important for leaders of the truly democratic movement to come forth now.

[Makaryan] Has the story about some supposed agreement, some big political game, going on between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, gotten spread around a lot lately?

[Ter-Grigoryants] I don't think their private agreement is at all relevant. Although I wouldn't exclude the possibility of that story. Someone I respect a lot, the philosopher M. Ya. Geller, for instance, is sure of it. Yeltsin undoubtedly has supporters in the upper leadership. Some are unconditional, and some simply think events might develop to where it will be easier and more profitable to follow Yeltsin. You may remember an incident that occurred during Boris Nikolayevich's campaign, when he was nominated for deputy in Sverdlovsk and simultaneously forbidden by the Central Committee to travel to that city. The military stepped in. All of us

remember too the speeches of five generals at the Russian Congress of Deputies. After all, it was their support of Yeltsin that played one might say the deciding role in his election. Yeltsin himself has said more than once that our army is "worthy of the greatest respect." I'm expressing not only my own opinion, I think, when I say that today the army has concentrated in it the most reactionary and conservative part of society. The majority are people who are isolated from their surroundings, who have a poor understanding of it, and who moreover have been brought up in an atmosphere of malice and cruelty. Testimony to this is Tbilisi, Yerevan, and so forth. . . .

[Makaryan] Sergey Ivanovich, let's go back now to the question of Armenia. As we know, a new parliament for the republic is about to be elected. What do you think is the possibility of forming a coalition government in Armenia, and what party or public organization has a real possibility of becoming a genuinely national party?

[Ter-Grigoryants] I must admit I'm poorly informed about the course of elections in Armenia since I recently came to Moscow, and I don't think anyone yet can judge what the future parliament will be like. But one thing is clear: not long ago in Armenia there was an entire pleiad of people who could have become genuine national leaders. Marvelous people worthy of admiration. Unfortunately, now, during Armenia's most difficult period, these people, fighters, have become the parliamentary opposition. It may be liberal, left-radical, perfectly respectable, but in the process Armenia has lost its national leaders. In my opinion I'm close and most positively disposed toward the movement whose leader to this day is Paruyir Ayrikyan. Your question demands an unambiguous answer. Recently I was talking with the editor of the newspaper FRANCE-ARMENIA, Mr. Muradyan, who told me that he'd left the Dashnak party because it wasn't the same party it was when it was conceived.

Today in Armenia people finally have to understand that if they don't take decisive, bold, radical steps, if they don't make a decisive break with the old and reject the endless half-measures and half-steps, the movement will not make any progress.

[Makaryan] You must know that Gdlyan and Ivanov have also been elected to the Armenian parliament.

[Ter-Grigoryants] I look on that fact as a harsh reality. As someone who has spent nine years in prisons and camps, I know full well what Soviet investigators represent, especially those who have successfully advanced up the service ladder. Our magazine GLASNOST published a report of the interrogation of Usmankhodzhayev, and to counterbalance it, a story about someone who Gdlyan forced to provide false testimony in the Khint case. . . . In the Gdlyan affair one thing is clear—it's a fight between one part of the apparatus and another. About one thing I have no doubt: neither Gdlyan nor Ivanova ever took bribes. After all, otherwise that would have

been used to discredit them. By the way, this fact distinguishes them favorably from their colleagues.

[Makaryan] Sergey Ivanovich, today in Armenia, as in many other republics of the Union, the idea of independence has found increasing support among the masses. In particular, recently the concept of the possibility of peaceful coexistence between an independent Armenia and, say, Turkey, has become widespread.

[Ter-Grigoryants] I'll start with the second part of your question. In principle, I'm sure that nevertheless, despite everything, peaceful coexistence is possible and is by no means a utopia. Although, unquestionably, if Armenia were independent, the initial period would be burdened by old insults and problems. In order to get through all that, the Armenian people simply need internal moral preparation—to a significant extent a Christian preparation. We cannot forget that all the same, sooner or later we're going to come to this, for this is the only way: the Armenians aren't going to go to Australia, and the Turks aren't going to leave Anatolia. We should already be preparing ourselves now in this respect, seeking out support in neighboring countries. There are precedents, especially in Iran. Moving toward independence, we cannot overestimate or attach great hopes to support from the West either. The Lithuanian example should be a lesson. Politics is a cynical business. Every government is created primarily for the defense of its own interests, the interests of its own people, its own state. It might sympathize with someone somewhere, but that's as far as it goes. As for the other part of the question, it seems to me that here we must proceed with caution. If, for example, in Lithuania again, the chance to raise the standard of living is what is linked primarily to a democratically independent future, then in Armenia the idea of independence bears more of a national character and is more politicized. In addition, Armenia is a much less self-reliant country than, say, Lithuania again, which took a step backward under pressure from the blockade, declaring a moratorium.

[Makaryan] In the last interview you touched upon the question of Ayrikyan. Today P. Ayrikyan has been elected deputy to the Armenian Supreme Soviet, but at the same time he still lacks Soviet citizenship. What's next?

[Ter-Grigoryants] Galina Vasilyevna Starovoytova has submitted a request to the appropriate offices to rescind the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet depriving P. Ayrikyan of Soviet citizenship. Much has been said about the incompetence of that decree. Nevertheless, to our great regret, G. Starovoytova received a categorical refusal. But I'm certain that in this matter, as in that of Manucharov, common sense and logic will prevail and we will see Paruyir in the Homeland. I know him well and I'm certain he could become a genuine national leader. That's what's so terrifying to someone like Ayrikyan.

[Makaryan] Do you have information as to how many political prisoners there are today in the Soviet Union?

[Ter-Grigoryants] According to the lists compiled by our associates and members of the Helsinki Group, there are somewhere around 150. It must not be forgotten, however, that camp information has always been quite incomplete, and many people have been placed in psychiatric hospitals. And it's very hard to get information from there.

[Makaryan] How do you, a journalist, the leader of the union of independent journalists, and editor of a popular publication, regard the law recently passed by the country's parliament "On the press and other media of mass information"?

[Ter-Grigoryants] I would note with satisfaction that the new "Law on the press" is better than any previous legislation we've known.

[Makaryan] Even better than the alternative drafts?

[Ter-Grigoryants] Yes. Better than the Fedorovskiy bill. Although, certainly, it's far from ideal.

[Makaryan] And a last question. You are the only Soviet journalist to have won the Golden Pen award from the International Federation of Publishers. Why is this prize awarded and to whom?

[Ter-Grigoryants] The Golden Pen is an annual award of the International Federation of Publishers. They're awarded to journalists working in the riskiest, most perilous situations.

[Makaryan] Thank you.

Manucharov on Imprisonment, Karabakh Movement, 'Krunk' Committee

*90US1207A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
18 Jul 90 p 4*

[Interview with Arkadiy Manvelovich Manucharov, chairman of the Krunk Committee, by Em. Mkrtchyan: "...So That the Goals of the Nation Be Clear and United"]

[Text] On 28 November 1988, he was arrested. Early in the morning of the following day, in an armored personnel carrier and wearing handcuffs and dressed in a soldier's overcoat and escorted by 20 submachine gunners, he was convoyed to Agdam. A crowd of thousands greeted the convoy with joyous cries and shouts of gratitude to the USSR Procuracy. Then he was awaited at Shusha Prison, then Lefortovo, back to Shusha and again Moscow and Butyrki.

For a year and a half and one day, Arkadiy Manvelovich Manucharov the leader of the Krunk Committee was in prison. He did not conceal his innocence enduring all the hardships and not giving way to provocations. Now, A. Manucharov is free, in Yerevan, and again people, fellow

Karabakhs, are coming to see him, but now in a hospital ward. They are seeking advice, sharing their thoughts, and describing the situation in Artsakh. Arkadiy Manvelovich agreed to meet with us and answer a number of questions of interest to the editors.

[Mkrtychyan] Arkadiy Manvelovich, you have been at the very sources of the struggle for a just resolution of the Karabakh problem. There are few others who would be able to accurately describe how precisely the Karabakh Movement arose and what forces have appeared as the driving ones? And what was the first response of Baku and Moscow?

[Manucharov] As you know, over the 70 years the Artsakhs have repeatedly raised their problem before the central authorities of the nation. I personally took a most active part in this in 1963-1966, and paid for this by being expelled from Karabakh and only many years later did I succeed in returning to my homeland. To the Artsakhs it has seemed that the perestroika and glasnost declared in the nation would eliminate the historical injustice and the process of outright discrimination against the Armenians in Karabakh, and would overturn the tall wall which had been erected between Armenia and the NKAO [Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] by the supporters of Stalinist policy.

For this reason, at the end of 1987, on behalf of the intelligentsia and various strata of the public, this question was raised again. Groups of messengers as individual delegations traveled to Moscow with specific proposals.

When the Azerbaijan leadership learned of this, on 12 February 1988, the former Second Secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Kononov traveled to Stepanakert. The aktiv was summoned and in front of all those present it was stated that there was no hope in turning for aid to the center.

Instead of somehow soft-pedaling the situation, the First Obkom Secretary Kevorkov began to beat his chest and declare that Karabakh was, is and would be part of Azerbaijan. "I will not allow Karabakh to unite with Armenia," he said, "and this is the credo of my life."

I mention this only to dispell the rumors that from the very outset our movement had a guarantee of success. No one had given these guarantees to the Artsakhs and after the words of Kevorkov, spontaneously but in a very organized manner, the people began to go to protest meetings.

[Mkrtychyan] At what stage of the movement did the "Manucharov Affair" arise and what was the causative motive for this?

[Manucharov] The Azerbaijani leadership was already preparing the plans of its aggressive policy and which developed into the Sumgait genocide. After the fateful decisions of the oblast session a crowd from Agdam

moved toward Stepanakert with a request of the annexation of Karabakh by Armenia.

The situation grew more complex. It was essential to master it and head the nascent movement. We took a decision to establish a political body and at the next meeting the Krunk Committee was formed with 65 members. I, as a person who had long been involved in the Karabakh problem, was entrusted with the leadership of this committee.

We carried out a policy which completely excluded any violence but after Sumgait, we were convinced that the center did not wish to resolve the Karabakh problem and we adopted a program for its gradual resolution. On the agenda was an alternative approach of temporarily turning over the NKAO to direct subordination to the USSR or even the RSFSR government.

At the obkom plenum on 17 March 1988, of the 24 speakers, I was the only one who made such a proposal, being certain that an uncompromising posing of the question would not help things. There had to be a flexible, well thought out and well balanced line of conduct. By this I probably frightened the Azerbaijani authorities.

Soon thereafter we, a group of six persons, flew to Moscow to be received by the Chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, V. Vorotnikov. He received us, he heard us out and promised to provide aid and turn over our written appeal to the Politburo. Incidentally, in this document even at that time we predicted what happened in January of this year, when Soviet power was actually overthrown in Azerbaijan and anarchy reigned.

Our visit to Vorotnikov was soon learned about in Baku. The content of our appeal alarmed them and a reaction followed immediately. For the leadership of Azerbaijan I became an avowed enemy. It was certain that Karabakh would not be annexed to Armenia and for this reason did not fear such slogans. As for alternative approaches to resolving the Karabakh problem, these worried official Baku.

For some reason, neither in Karabakh nor in Armenia did the leaders of the national liberation movement at that time want to hear about such an alternative. In insisting on the reannexation of the Artsakh, they put the center in a completely stalemated position. But you cannot go back and the opportunity was missed.

[Mkrtychyan] Now you are quite close to explaining to the reader the reason for your arrest.

[Manucharov] Yes, of course, I already started about this. The former First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Central Committee Vezirov started earnestly to seek out a meeting with me as the leader of Krunk. The reason for

this was clear and I refused. However, after long consultation with the First Secretary of the Karabakh Party Obkom G. Pogosyan and certain Krunk activists, I agreed to the meeting.

On 12 June, I was admitted to the office of the First Secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee A. Vezirov, where the chief of the republic KGB was also present. The discussion commenced with adventuristic proposals even a proposal to appoint me to the post of first secretary of the party obkom. Then there were talks about my benality, then there was intimidation, a dispute broke out and I returned to Stepanakert empty-handed.

Soon thereafter a group appeared in the oblast from the Azerbaijan procuracy with a "case" commenced against me. Under public pressure, the group was quickly replaced by workers from the Union procuracy. Only then did I learn that in Yerevan I supposedly had a three-story house with a swimming pool and that for maintaining the "extremist" spirit in Karabakh each inhabitant received 100 rubles a month from me, that I was a corrupt element and so forth, and so forth.

On 16 November, my family learned that an action was being prepared for my kidnapping. And in truth, during the night they began to break down the door and in the street were tanks and submachine gunners. These people did not have an order for my arrest and we did not open the door for them. People assembled on the street in my defense. As a result of the clash with soldiers, 12 persons were hospitalized. That ended things this time, but the Special Control Committee did everything for me to leave the NKAO. So it was easier to arrest me. Soon thereafter, I flew to Yerevan. Here in the office of the public deputy minister of building materials on 28 November two years ago I was arrested as a person under investigation.

[Mkrtychyan] Please describe briefly the details of your case: what did the center want from you, and what forced it with such moral and political cost to keep you so long in prison?

[Manucharov] Much has been written about this. However, I would again like to point out that these 18 months were a major experience for me. It was difficult to control yourself when they wanted to destroy you as an individual, to grind you in the mud, and when it seemed to you that any belief in justice and in the triumph of truth had been lost.

The investigators from the USSR Procuracy who were in charge of my case endeavored by all methods to "squeeze" false evidence from me. Their main goal was with the aid of the "Manucharov affair" to confirm the notorious thesis of "corrupt elements interested in exacerbating the interethnic conflict over Nagorny Karabakh." I recall well how they "advised" me to admit that I had a home in Yerevan and I replied: "Let us assume I confess, but it does not exist...." The answer came: "Don't worry, the house will be found."

The investigator for particularly important cases of the USSR Procuracy, Maydanyuk, who was in charge of my case, threatened to arrest the members of my family. "You are in a hopeless situation," he said, "and if you are stubborn and do not provide the required evidence, you can be executed." I was convinced that the arguments of reason and justice over flagrant tyranny were impotent. And then I took a desperate step, a hunger strike. This was in Shusha.

Soon thereafter, I was transferred to Moscow, to the KGB Lefortovo Prison. Here the tactics were changed. "You are not guilty," the same Maydanyuk declared to me. "The 'bigwigs' are to blame for everything and you should help us. You write that you gave a bribe to Kevorkov, to Pogosyan (then the new first secretary of the obkom) and Movsesyan (the first secretary of the gorkom). By my evidence, as they explained it to me, the investigation would endeavor to reach G. Aliyev.

I accepted this farce. After this, I was sent back to Shusha. This was a psychological ploy, a harsh game of nerves and a hope that I would not endure.

I felt the even greater pressure of the investigation when I was elected a deputy to the Armenian Supreme Soviet. When a group of deputies from Armenia turned to the nation's General Procurator Sukharev with a statement showing the injustice of holding a deputy under guard, he resorted to a trick and stated that I would be released at the very hour I had become acquainted with my 24-volume criminal case. However, I was not only not released but, on the contrary, my case was hurriedly forwarded to the nation's Supreme Court.

Manucharov had to be quickly condemned and thereby show my social danger as a criminal element.

At this time, there began the second act of my "tragic-comedy." The accusations brought against me, with their very first serious examination, fell apart like a house of cards, and not a single oblast judge in the nation, wherever they were sitting, could find even grounds for a court investigation.

[Mkrtychyan] What is your assessment of the situation in the NKAO at present?

[Manucharov] A. Volskiy began the work of the Special Control Committee by promising that in a month several approaches for solving the Karabakh problem would be on the table. By this, he endeavored to calm down the population, to halt the strikes, although he was perfectly aware that he had not been empowered to resolve such complicated problems but was merely to work as much as possible for a stabilizing of the situation.

Further events, as you know, led ultimately to a situation where a state of emergency was declared in the NKAO, the party obkom and the oblispolkom ceased to function, and in essence the oblast is now deprived of local leadership.

All of this plays into the hands of the Azerbaijan side. The military authorities either are silent or are providing it with outright aid. Baku has set as its aim to decapitate the Karabakh people, depriving them of leaders.

Literally, on the 20th of last month, a commission arrived in Gadruskiy Rayon or a so-called orgburo which in essence began to eliminate the raykom and the rayispolkom. Thus, in Gadruskiy the First Secretary G. Bagiyev was released from his position. He was expelled from the party and in his place they appointed an emissary from Baku, the former Second Secretary of Nasiminskiy Rayon, Zubkov. Simultaneously, a follower of Baku was in the second slot.

The main goal of the Azerbaijan leadership is to break up the forces of Karabakh and in dealing gradually with the rayon authorities, to take over the entire oblast. So by such terrible methods of terror and intimidation, it has rushed to subordinate the unconquered Karabakhs before the oblast democratic bodies are restored.

Incidentally, Zubkov who has been appointed to the position of the secretary of Gadrut is already carrying out the line indicated to him from above of intimidation and blackmail against the leaders of the enterprises and organizations who do not wish to submit to the Azerbaijan authorities. Thus, recently the Second Secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Polyanichko turned to the First Secretary of Shaumyanskiy Rayon Agadzhanian, demanding unswerving obedience to Baku, threatening him otherwise that Shaumyanskiy Rayon would suffer the same plight as Gadrut.

As you can see, the completely illegal actions of the Azerbaijan leadership in the NKAO are creating a very difficult situation. It is essential to immediately restore the oblast party and soviet bodies and then continue the further work of achieving the just aspirations of the Artsakh people.

[Mkrtchyan] How can one currently assess the Karabakh Movement against the background of the centrifugal attitudes in the nation and against the background of the actions in Armenia?

[Manucharov] We are aware and clearly understand that the national leadership has taken a simplistic attitude toward the Karabakh problem.

Karabakh has become that issue which if it is not taken up and not conquered then all the discussions and attempts to break with the old and build a new society will suffer a fiasco. We are told: "Figure it out yourselves, agree yourselves," thereby further fanning the reciprocal impatience and hostility between the two neighboring peoples.

How is it possible to run a nation along a civilized course, if the fundamental right of a people to self-determination is completely ignored?

How is it possible for one people to subordinate another by violence?

During this time, I have been convinced that the sympathy of Russia, the regular Russians and particularly the intelligentsia, is on the side of the Armenian people, the Karabakh people, their just struggle for national independence. We should not arouse the alarm of the Russian people by our at times poorly thought out statements and actions and in no instance should we confuse the people with the Union leadership.

Yes, the general state of the nation is known to us. We are aware that in the near future there may be an abrupt weakening of the Union. Just ask yourself: If this were to happen, under what conditions would the Armenian people end up? Who would come to our defense? In these hard times, it would be extremely shortsighted and dangerous to isolate ourselves and cut ourselves off from good neighbors.

Often now we hear about the need to develop good neighbor relations with other neighbors. Of course, it is essential to live in peace and mutual understanding. But in sitting down at the negotiating table with these neighbors, we undoubtedly will be confronted with the harsh condition of abandoning the just struggle for Karabakh. One does not have to be an expert in history to realize that there is and will be no other way out. So, now we must not lose our historical, traditional orientation and we must learn to seek flexibly and wisely ways to resolve the fatal questions for the nation.

We now are at the most crucial stage of our history, the stage of creating a qualitatively new parliament of Armenia. We need a very strong, politically intelligent and farsighted democratic body. Certainly, an infinite number of immediate tasks has built up in the republic.

And the parliament should first of all unite all the people, all the formal parties and groupings in a commonness of ideas and interests and assemble the will of the people in a single fist. The parliament should outline a program of actions so that the national tasks and goals be clear and unified for us, the Armenians. Only in this manner will we overcome the difficult path chosen by us.

Interview With Chairman of Azerbaijan's Democratic Union

90US1180A Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 29, Jun 90 p 8

[Interview with Nizami Mamed-ogly Suleymanov, chairman of the board of the Democratic Union of Intelligentsia of Azerbaijan, by UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA correspondent A. Useynov, dateline Baku: "Free Rein to All Ideas"]

[Text] A notable phenomenon: within the span of a few months a group of Baku scholars and scientists has joined together broad segments of the population into the Democratic Union of Intelligentsia of Azerbaijan. This new public organization demands nothing of anybody and makes no claims on anything. The union's program embodies no political ambitions, and particularly contains

no claims or pretensions to power. Sincerity of intentions—to utilize intellectual potential for the benefit of the people in a reasonable and intelligent way, with greater return on effort—in the union's program is the most attractive element, which wins one over.

The chairman of the union's board, corresponding member of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences Nizami Mamed-ogly Suleymanov, plays the role of unifying and consolidating element.

[Correspondent] The Democratic Union's area of involvement is immense—national rebirth. One sometimes hears the following question raised, however: does it make sense to set oneself apart when a policy of revival and rebirth constitutes the underpinnings of the activities of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, governmental and academic structures, and unions of creative artists?

[Suleymanov] Just look around you: there is practically no domain of daily life, production, science and education without difficulties and problems. Is it not high time to realize that it is not only shameful but unworthy to walk about a gold-strewn land with held-out hand, as they say? It is this motif which has served to bring the union together. The events which have been taking place on Azerbaijan soil for three years now have greatly intensified in our national self-awareness a great sense of responsibility for the destiny of Azerbaijan, as well as the no less acute desire to obtain a new quality of life as quickly as possible. At a time when various parties and unofficial organizations were extolling their own slogans, we were quietly and without fanfare engaged in a useful cause. What idea do we profess? That which is capable of feeding the people, of ending shameful poverty, of bringing about the socioeconomic prospering of Azerbaijan.

[Correspondent] Other political movements also subscribe to this idea. Wherein lies the distinction or difference?

[Suleymanov] Distinction or difference? The like-minded members of the Democratic Union are united not by slogans, not by platforms, but by a specific idea, embodied in a specific cause. We must proceed with business: entering the world market with the "Azerbaijan miracle." Our people has its share of talent, intelligence, and ability.

Let us recall the segment of history traversed by this republic in the last seven decades. It is characterized both by progress and by accumulation of considerable potential. This cannot be ignored or negated. But the world has changed, and the stimuli of life are changing as well. It is true that kerosene lamps were imported to Baku before the revolution, but are the people of Baku today prohibited from competing with foreign companies in the production of superhard alloys? The specialized physical metallurgy technical design bureau which I

head, with the Kristall experimental plant, is not a poor relation in the world market.

Specialists have developed advanced technologies. But we are going further: we want to advance our position in technological policy. We want to propose our own technologies, rather than following the lead of foreign companies.

Is this achievable? It certainly is. The Democratic Union first of all worked on training research specialist personnel of a new type. After the first examination period at the polytechnic institute, the ten most gifted students were selected. They are continuing their college studies with the normal curriculum. They are receiving in addition a graduate-level course enriched with the latest physical metallurgy theory and practices. They have at their disposal a modern laboratory, computers, a data bank, and shops. These graduate-level course students have prominent scientists as advisers, who get them involved in research on the latest and most advanced topics, including from the standpoint of world applied science. We anticipate that our charges will submit candidate dissertations in place of a senior thesis. For the doctoral dissertation they will already have had experience in scientific research, at the age of 25, not at the edge of retirement, as is frequently the case today.

[Correspondent] That sounds rather costly. Couldn't the same program be carried out right within a higher educational institution or at an academy scientific research institute?

[Suleymanov] Maybe so. Let them try. Let them go out into the world market and compete. Nobody is objecting. But the cost of training researchers for developing advanced technologies is very small in comparison with the anticipated return on investment. The Democratic Union has financial resources at its disposal. In addition to the stipend, 150 rubles apiece is paid out. Add to that an additional 1,500 for wardrobe replacement. The scientific advisers are also paid—at the very highest rate of compensation. When necessary we can send a student to a foreign company for practical, hands-on work experience; we shall pay for this with hard currency. What new elements are involved? The fact that new relations are formed between student and science in the person of a professor, a prominent scientist. The student's scientific intellect undergoes an appropriate process of forming and shaping according to a preselected program, pursuing a specified goal. Here, as you see, the professor is dependent on his charge. This is the way it should be at any higher educational institution, and not the other way around, where the student wanders around for five years as if in the shadows, between grade card and lecturer, without ever meeting his idol or proving himself. This explains the poor level of engineering thinking on the part of graduates of higher technical schools, which are not very choosy in selecting applicants for enrollment.

[Correspondent] But what about in other cases—with other ideas? Is anybody implementing them?

[Suleymanov] I shall note that the Democratic Union is not a union of scientists. Its body of activists includes machine tool operator and writer, academician and teacher, shepherd and engineer. Intelligentsia status does not reside in ranks and titles but in level of cultural sophistication, in a creative intellect, in wisdom. One of the attractive features of the union is that it does not preach a caste system by profession or class. The democratic essence of the movement brings together all those who serve the national interests of rebirth and revival.

We are encountering a curious phenomenon: those who advocate revival are legion. But they also include persons who accept neither innovative plans nor gifted ideas.

[Correspondent] Recently the Democratic Union established a national creative kurum—a unique academy of popular talent. What are its functions?

[Suleymanov] The same: sharply to boost return on intellectual labor. 32 academicians have been elected to the kurum, who also include foreign scientists. This is a new self-governing, self-financed organization, independent of the state. Initial capital totals 2 million rubles. Revenues derive from the performance of contracted work projects and the publication of scientific works, works of literature and art. Plans for next year include boosting work project volume to generate a profit of not less than 30 million rubles. A method of contact with individuals whose professionalism in any area is widely known and has been put to the practical test is being used. And it is by no means mandatory that a specialist possess a lofty scholarly degree. Specialists from other republics and abroad can also be enlisted.

[Correspondent] Will your kurum not constitute a kind of competitor to the republic Academy of Sciences?

[Suleymanov] There is a firm principle in science and technology: honors go to those whose work is best. We do not compete with institutions but with ideas.

[Correspondent] What has surprised you the most since establishment of the Democratic Union?

[Suleymanov] Since a certain TV program was aired, we have been regularly visited by teachers with their gifted pupils who cannot get into a higher educational institution. These are individuals with real natural gifts. Higher educational institutions show a bountiful indifference to the treasures of the intellect. Let us observe at entrance examinations the circumstances under which this generous gift of nature and labor "trickles off" into the sand. Would you like to take part in our experiment?

Role for Georgian National Congress Outlined

90US1221A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
6 Jul 90 p 5

[Article by Iliko Khaindrava, Tbilisi Political Club: "What Do We Stand to Gain From a National Congress?"]

[Text] The fact that rather sharp opposition has developed between the two directions of Georgia's national liberation movement validly elicits concern among those who are participating in it in some way or following its development. Under the conditions of freedom and democracy, and a normal political life, there would be nothing especially alarming in this. But in our reality, in which all of the levers of power remain in the hands of the CPSU, which is hardly in any hurry to part with its monopoly on power, this alarm is fully justified. On this background, and more likely in keeping with someone's intent, another no less important event, and from the standpoint of the future an even more important one, has been glossed over: the hitherto unprecedented unification of "radical" and "liberal" forces in the Coordinating Center of the National Liberation Movement. The quotation marks are used on purpose because such a division seems rather arbitrary to us. It was based to a significant extent on the attitude expressed by particular parties and sociopolitical organizations toward the elections to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet. The "liberals" insisted, and continue to insist, on the need for the most active participation in official elections, and achieving, by this means, a makeup of the Supreme Soviet which would transform it into a permanently acting, creatively thinking, competent organ that is strong enough to engage in constitutional disobedience in relation to the center, and to bear this difficult burden honorably, wholly on the basis of the interests of Georgia and its population. The split in the "radical" camp essentially occurred on the basis of the same grounds—part of them made a seemingly unexpected but actually predictable turn and expressed support for participation in official elections, camouflaging the change in their position with the artificial and unconvincing term "non-Soviet elections." Others, who would not align themselves definitely with either camp and who occupied an ambiguous position in relation to the elections, also expressed clear support for participation in them, on the basis that the fall elections to the Supreme Soviet would be multiparty elections, in contrast to the failed "non-party" spring elections. But such verbal equilibration is once again not very persuasive, since they could have participated in the "nonparty" elections, attained access to the Supreme Soviet, hastened the adoption of a law on a multiparty system, and after this, acted in the name of their party on a fully official basis. But anyway, let this be on the conscience of those who themselves created artificial barriers on the road to the Supreme Soviet. The "liberals" stick with the opinion that no matter what this body calls itself, refusal to participate in it would only retard our movement toward our goal.

In short, what we obviously have is a situation where most of the opposition forces have concluded that participation in the Supreme Soviet through their own representatives is necessary and useful to the common cause. It should be noted here that the position of those who continue to feel participation in the presently existing governmental organs remains unacceptable is also not as categorical as it sounds, and the form of their boycott of the elections will apparently change.

This, it would seem, is a cause for celebration among the "liberals": The correctness of the course they chose is confirmed by the times, and the need for participating in elections to the Supreme Soviet is recognized. But in behavior which seems contrary to logic, they are expressing active support to the radical organizations which refuse to participate in Supreme Soviet elections and insist on electing a National Congress. The forces are unifying into a Coordination Center, called upon to hold elections to a National Congress, a National Congress is being convened by joint effort, and its 6,000 delegates approve of the Statute on Elections to the National Congress. What is going on?

First of all we need to emphasize that the "liberals" have not conceded in the slightest from their fundamental position of support to Supreme Soviet elections, and they have reserved the right to participate in them no matter what the outcome of the elections to the National Congress. This is stated directly in the resolution of the National Congress. Next, the "liberals" are apparently so liberal that they are not as categorical and uncompromising as to try to cram the rather quickly changing political realities into a scheme developed once upon a time. The idea of a National Congress was never alien to them, and at the present stage it appears to be vitally important to attaining national (and interethnic!) consensus, to planting and developing real democracy, and to really unifying all progressive forces in the struggle for the liberty and independence of Georgia. After all, as was mentioned above, a rather sizable and influential faction of the national movement continues to reject the possibility of participating in the Supreme Soviet as being a subdivision of a unitary imperial structure having no legal basis for being in Georgia (or in all of the Soviet Union as well). How justified such a position is politically is another matter, but we must agree that from a moral standpoint it is not devoid of grounds. But were this platform to be ignored, and were everyone else to rush into the Supreme Soviet, within its walls we might arrive at a unified, active, extraparlimentary opposition within the republic, disregard of which would be both immoral and unreasonable. But is this something we need? It is our deep conviction that this state of affairs would be to the liking only of the center and of conservative forces in Georgia, since it would be a hundred times more difficult to fight them without first surmounting our internal disagreements. And the National Congress is precisely what is capable of preventing such a thing. Everyone can and must take part in its elections: "radicals" and "liberals," Georgians and non-Georgians,

Christians, non-Christians and atheists, monarchists and communists. It is no secret that many elected to the National Congress will also run for the Supreme Soviet (or vice versa). Those who obtain seats in both bodies will serve as the buffer which not only will prevent a collision of views but will also ensure cooperation and mutual understanding between them. Those radical parties which in view of their convictions will not participate in the Supreme Soviet will remain apart from its work, and they will be unable to render pressure upon it from without, in the way possible today, while through members of the National Congress with seats in the Supreme Soviet they would realistically have a corresponding influence in it.

There is one question here that may raise concern among many: Wouldn't presence of two elected bodies lead to opposition and dual power? This question has already been partially answered: The focus is precisely on cooperation and agreement, and not on confrontation and struggle. To persuade ourselves of this, we need to first of all get a clear answer to this question: What is the Supreme Soviet, and what is the National Congress?

The Supreme Soviet is an organ of local self-administration of the Soviet imperial system: It is essentially a colonial administration. It is endowed with limited functions of power; they are limited to the extent that it is under the constant control and pressure of the center and is incapable of exercising the entirety of its power over the territory under its jurisdiction in view of the presence of Soviet Army and MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) troops, KGB organs and other institutions directly subordinated to the center and not under the Supreme Soviet's jurisdiction. The struggle to expand its powers and to achieve the possibility for exercising the complete breadth of its power over Georgian territory, and ensure the rights and freedoms of each of its citizens, is the most important and ultimate goal of the Supreme Soviet. And if at some point in time noninterference in the internal affairs of Georgia, the possibility for it to conduct its own foreign policy, the country's defense capabilities, the guarantee of a democratic internal structure, and preparation of the soil for international recognition of Georgia as an independent state are ensured, the Supreme Soviet will be able to say that it has served its function completely.

But what is left for the National Congress in such a case? First of all it cannot be endowed with functions of power—and this has been emphasized by all of its proponents on several occasions. It cannot participate in the approval of laws, although it may draft and propose them. The National Congress is the coordinating organ of the national liberation movement, and it is called upon to ensure coordinated action of all political currents and directions, and to prevent the anarchy and uncontrollable insubordination. It may be thought that such a body might have been created on the basis of parity, without any sort of elections, but in such a case the responsibility of the members of the congress would

be immeasurably lower, which could bring about complications, given the instability of our political life. Of course, each party preserves its freedom to act in accordance with its own program and its own strategic and tactical objectives, but it will have to think twice about its responsibility to the voters and to other members of the congress before embarking upon an action that is not coordinated with them, and all the more so that is not approved by the congress. Next, it would not be difficult to imagine a situation where the center's dictatorship will have to be opposed by massive popular demonstrations and by the threat of universal disobedience. The Supreme Soviet would then look pretty silly as supposedly the supreme organ of power, inciting its people to, for example, a universal strike. This would be equivalent, after all, to admitting one's own helplessness. This is a situation where the National Congress could prove itself useful. Not being restrained in any way by the center but existing as the expression of the will of the people who elected it, it will be able to assist the Supreme Soviet in achieving the centrifugal aspirations of the latter. Outwardly, everything will appear fully "constitutional" and there wouldn't be anybody to pick on, and owing to cooperation and mutual assistance in attaining the main goal, the situation will never go out of control. We believe that certain difficulties Lithuania is currently experiencing are associated with the fact that a significant part of the Saiudis leadership felt that its objectives had been reached, and moved camp over to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, thus to a certain extent depriving the society, and even the Supreme Soviet itself, of a compass which was immune to any external magnetic fields.

Given the distorted state of our affairs we observe today, the National Congress could become a knowledgeable advisor to the Supreme Soviet in drafting the laws and constitutional principles of the future Georgia. While the Supreme Soviet will apparently devote its main attention to dismantling antidemocratic social structures and to dealing with the daily concerns of normalizing our life, the National Congress will be able to devote more attention to developing and bringing up for public discussion the strategic conceptions of an independent Georgia in the areas of foreign policy, education and culture, ecological problems, territorial administrative structures, the rights of the non-Georgian population, local self-management and so on—that is, it would spare the Supreme Soviet of the daily dirt while feeding it new ideas and well conceived and analyzed plans. There is no redundancy here; there is only joint labor in behalf of coming closer to a common goal. Once again we emphasize that there will be no place for competition and rivalry: No one is about to transgress upon the legislative power of the Supreme Soviet; this would be impossible even if all of the desire to do so was there, since executive power would remain under its control. The National Congress would be a political, informative body of the national liberation movement, called upon to put our sociopolitical life in order and raise it to a higher level.

Finally, presence of two elected bodies would provide us more freedom of movement, and the possibility for everyone to speak in the language which is closer and more understandable to him. The Supreme Soviet is an official body recognized by the center, but concurrently it is also restricted by the former in its possibilities; given the continuing occupation, it is not beyond reproach from a legal point of view, but in reality it is the sole bearer of power. The National Congress would not be restricted by anyone or anything in expressing the will of the people. For practical purposes it would be the conscience of the nation.

The statute on elections to the National Congress is democratic—the doors to it are open to all who receive support from the electorate. Servicemen of the Soviet Army and MVD troops serving in Georgia but not living in it permanently are the sole exception (the same restriction will apparently be applied to the Supreme Soviet as well). To those who are disturbed by this, we recommend asking whether or not servicemen of the English Rhine Army participate in elections to the Bundestag. No matter what other forces we discuss in today's Georgia that are not bent on violence and terror, if they exist, we must not close our eyes to their existence; instead, we must patiently conduct a dialogue, and seek and find mutually acceptable solutions. It is precisely through the National Congress that the path to stability and national consensus in Georgia lies. He who fails to understand this is either not making the effort to understand, or has no desire for consensus, democracy and liberty!

There remains one last question. Let's assume that both the Supreme Soviet and the National Congress have fulfilled their objective—that conditions have actually been established both within the country and in the international arena for restoration of Georgia's real independence. What then?

Then the Supreme Soviet and the National Congress would conduct their first and last joint meeting, at which they would declare their self-abolition and announce the date of elections to the sole democratic parliament of an independent Georgia, legal in all respects and irreplaceable from a legal point of view.

God grant that we all live so long!

Kazakh Supreme Soviet on Sovereignty

Draft Declaration Considered

90US1283A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 27 Jul 90 p 1

[KazTAG announcement: "Session of the Presidium of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] On 26 July, at a session of the Presidium of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet, the question was discussed of preparing the documents for the autumn session of the superior legislative body of the republic. In particular,

drafts of the "Declaration on Kazakh Sovereignty" and the document "On the Union Treaty" are to be submitted for its review. There are also proposals to submit the draft laws "On the General Concept for Converting to a Regulated Market Economy," "On Employment," "On the Indexing of the Population's Income in Line With Increased Prices for Consumer Goods and Services" and "On the Freedom of Economic Activities and the Development of Entrepreneurship in Kazakhstan."

Simultaneously, the Supreme Soviet is to ratify an agreement on economic, scientific-technical and cultural collaboration between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenia.

Information was heard on the work of the Kazakh State Committee for Television and Radio and the editors of the newspapers KHALYK KENESI and SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA on discussing the republic draft laws. It was proposed to the journalist collectives that they pay more attention to taking up the activities of the permanent committees and commissions and the work groups of the Supreme Soviet in working out the drafts of new laws and the course of the public discussion of the documents reviewed by the first session of the Supreme Soviet and more widely involved in this lawyers and specialists from the various national economic sectors and make fuller use of letters from citizens.

Reviewed were the draft laws "On the Permanent Commissions and Committees of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet," "On Constitutional Oversight in Kazakhstan," "On the Organization of the Kazakh Judiciary" and "On Incorporating Amendments and Supplements to Certain Legislative Enactments of Kazakhstan." It was also resolved to turn over for review by the republic Council of Ministers the instructions of voters given to the Kazakh people's deputies.

In line with the broadening of the international ties of Kazakhstan and the establishing of joint enterprises and free economic zones, the question was discussed of the training and retraining of personnel for foreign economic activities and international relations.

Work groups were formed to prepare the draft laws "On State Youth Policy in Kazakhstan" and "On Enterprises in Kazakhstan" and a deputy group for supervising the course of reconstruction work in the rayons of East Kazakhstan Oblast which were hit by earthquake.

Other questions were also reviewed in the activities of the Supreme Soviet and its permanent committees and commissions.

Adoption of Law Favored

90US1283B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (First Edition) in Russian 15 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by Col A. Ladin: "What Should Sovereignty Be?"]

[Text] Last Sunday on the Square imeni Lenin in Alma-Ata, there was a sanctioned demonstration the organizer

of which was the Coordinating Council of the Civil Movement Azat (Freedom) established at the beginning of July. In comparison with others, this demonstration was not large. It was attended by around 1,500 persons.

The Chairman of the Committee of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet on the Questions of Legislation, Legality and Law and Order, N. Akuyev, who spoke here stated that the work group which included people's deputies from the republic, members of the Presidential Council, representatives of the government, the trade union and Komsomol organizations, had been working on a legislative enactment concerning the state sovereignty of Kazakhstan. Many letters had arrived from the citizens of multinational Kazakhstan. There had also been different versions of the draft declaration from the Presidential Council and from the Council of Ministers. As well as from the Civil Movement Azat. The representative of the republic parliament emphasized that the proposals from the civil movement had been used in the process of legislative work.

The members of the Presidium of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet feel, in the words of Comrade N. Akuyev, that it would be advisable to adopt not a declaration on the state sovereignty of Kazakhstan but rather a law. This would provide the opportunity to establish juridically standards which would be obligatory for execution.

Kazakhstan's State Language Program Supports Kazakh, Russian

90US1240A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jul 90 p 2

[State Program for the Development of the Kazakh Languages and the Other National Languages in the Kazakh SSR for the Period Up to the Year 2000]

[Text] Introduction

In accordance with the Kazakh Law "On Languages in Kazakhstan" adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet, the Kazakh language has been given the status of the official state language. Russian has been recognized as the language of interethnic communication and it has been granted free functioning on all territory of the republic equally with the official language. The law envisages also the protection of the interests of the representatives of each people in the language sphere.

The adopted Language Law was caused by life itself and by the necessity of restoring social justice and by the spiritual renewal of society.

Like many other national languages in the USSR, in recent decades the Kazakh language has virtually ceased to be an equal language on the republic territory which is the historical motherland of the Kazakh people. A real threat arose of its degradation and gradual disappearance and the national culture along with it.

There has been growing neglect of the mother Kazakh language among the younger generation and intelligentsia and a reduced demand for using it in various spheres of life. All of this has led to the withering away of the linguistic milieu, to the destruction of the moral traditions of the people, to the rise of new generations who do not know the mother tongue and are alienated from the spiritual sources and to the appearance of an inferiority complex among a portion of the Kazakh youth.

At present, of the 50 social functions which are essential for any language for its normal functioning, the Kazakh language realizes in practice only around ten. Over 60 percent of the Kazakhs have a full mastery of Russian and only one percent of the Russians has the same fluency in Kazakh. Such a situation related to a definite decline in the sphere of use of the national languages has caused legitimate alarm and concern in society, while the healthy attempts to delve more deeply into them and find rational solutions were often described as nationalism with all the ensuing consequences.

As was pointed out at the 17th Kazakh CP Congress, the adopted Law "Governing Languages in Kazakhstan" will make it possible to change the public attitude toward language and will become a guarantee of their free development, and here it is important that each people themselves be profoundly aware of the moral essence of the very difficult work in maintaining their language, without forgetting respect for both the language and the culture of the neighboring people.

The constitutional recognition of the Kazakh language as the official state language of the Kazakh SSR demands that the republic assume concern for its broad use and all possible development in the state bodies, public organizations, institutions of science, culture, education and public health and the service sphere.

Recognition of the status of the official language for the Kazakh language in no way encroaches on the right of the citizens of other nationalities to use their mother tongues and does not impede their free development. Any restrictions in the use, for example, of German, Uzbek, Uygur, Korean, Polish or other languages are inadmissible. The republic assumes concern for their development as is stated in the Kazakh Constitution.

At the same time, a number of acts should be adopted which would put beneath the law the appropriate material-technical, financial, personnel and training procedural base.

The legal positing of the question is an obligatory but insufficient aspect of linguistic development in the republic. Of decisive importance in this matter is the effective activities of the state bodies.

In the course of the discussion and after the adoption of the Law "On Languages in Kazakhstan" by the Kazakh Supreme Soviet, work started in the republic to prepare for putting it into effect.

The ministries and departments have worked out measures aimed at implementing the law and creating the necessary conditions for organizing office work in the Kazakh language, teaching the Kazakh language to specialists and establishing the official status of the Kazakh language in practice.

In accord with the Decree of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet "On the Procedure for Implementing the Kazakh Law 'On Languages in Kazakhstan'," the republic Council of Ministers has worked out the "State Program for the Development of the Kazakh Language and Other National Language in Kazakhstan for the Period Up to the Year 2000."

The basic aim of the program is to create favorable conditions for the development of all the republic's languages.

Special sections are devoted to measures to broaden office work in the Kazakh language, to develop Kazakh-Russian and Russian-Kazakh bilingualism, as well as social functions of other national languages.

The program contains a system of measures which includes sections on the functioning and development of the Kazakh language in the republic as the official one, Russian as the language of international intercourse and the languages of the national groups living compactly in Kazakhstan, beginning with languages having a republic-wide distribution and ending with languages represented basically by one or several population points.

The program poses concrete practical tasks: to raise the social functions of the national languages in the republic, contributing to the harmonious development of interethnic relations; creating the most acceptable model of linguistic coexistence between peoples and nationalities in Kazakhstan; to establish the primacy of spiritual culture; to raise the prestige of the humanitarian sciences and so forth.

The program proceeds from the concept of linguistic policy and linguistic development in Kazakhstan as adopted by the Ideological Commission of the Kazakh CP Central Committee on 4 October 1989.

Its introduction will strengthen the need for more profound research on a broad range of problems of linguistic development in the republic. In implementing the provisions of the program, it is essential to bear in mind the factors of time, territory, the particular features of national traditions and customs as well as social conditions.

The Kazakh Language

The Functioning of the Language

The program envisages broadening the functioning of Kazakh and other national languages in all institutions, enterprises and organizations, it defines their role in the

sphere of public education, culture and mass information media, and outlines the basic directions for scientific research on the national languages.

There is to be a gradual introduction of the Kazakh language as the official language and as the language of office work in the state bodies, the state administration and public organizations. In all the institutions and enterprises, specific measures relating to financial and training support are to be worked out for the voluntary study of the Kazakh language by citizens who reside on the territory of Kazakhstan and have not mastered the Kazakh language.

Appended to the program is a sample schedule for converting the rayons, cities and oblasts to office work in the official language (at present, it is carried out in Kazakh in 46 rural rayons); the schedule provides for the introduction of office work in the official language in 1991 in 31 rayons and 1 city, in 1992, in 42 rayons, 6 cities and Kzyl-Orda Oblast, in 1993, in 44 rayons and Guryev Oblast, in 1994, in 38 rayons, 10 towns and 6 oblasts, including Aktyubinsk, Dzhambul, Dzheskazgan, Taldy-Kurgan, Ural and Chimkent, and in 1995, in 9 rayons, 25 towns, including Alma-Ata, and 9 oblasts including Alma-Ata, East Kazakhstan, Kraganda, Kokchetav, Kustanay, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk, and Tselinograd (Appendix No 1).

Everywhere the staff schedules of the enterprises and organizations will include the positions of translators and teachers of the Kazakh language to be paid from the budget funds of the local soviets and internal allocations. In transport, in institutions and organizations the operation of which involves serving the public, reference informational support will be provided in Kazakh and Russian.

The State Commission of the Kazakh Council of Ministers for the Economic Reform in 1990 has been instructed to define a system of measures for material and moral incentives for employees who have mastered the Kazakh language. A knowledge of the official language should be considered in personnel certification. In the first quarter of 1991, the Kazakh State Committee for Labor and Social Questions, Kazsovprof [Kazakh Trade Union Council] and the Kazakh Academy of Sciences should define the scope and level of knowledge of Kazakh and Russian necessary in performing professional duties for the leading workers of the state bodies, the public organizations, as well as the workers of the enterprises and institutions of the service sphere.

A very important question contributing to the introduction of the Kazakh language into daily life is its broad use at the communications enterprises. The republic plans to equip the communications services with telegraph devices handling Kazakh alphabet.

On the basis of a contract with a foreign firm, in 1991, there are plans to organize a joint enterprise for producing electronic typewriters with the Kazakh alphabet for supplying them to the republic enterprises and organizations.

The Kazakh Language in the Sphere of Public Education

Public education is a very important sphere for the use and the development of the language. In this context, the program provides a qualitative improvement in the study of the Kazakh language in the children's preschool institutions, the general education schools, the vocational-technical schools, specialized secondary and higher institutions of learning. There are plans:

Everywhere in accord with the needs of the population to open up nurseries, schools and groups with the Kazakh language of instruction, to staff them with skilled pedagogical personnel, and to broaden their training in the pedagogical VUZes and specialized secondary institutions of learning;

The Kazakh Ministry of Public Education together with the republic's creative unions are to introduce curricula designed to increase the hours spent studying the Kazakh language and also the moral and aesthetic education of the schoolchildren;

Moral and aesthetic education is to be focused on the national cultural particular features and traditions, and acquainting the children with national art from an early age; broadening the network of schools with a thorough study of the subjects of the aesthetic course, as well as the bases of the national musical and poetical culture (aytys, terme, mukamy [types of Kazakh poetry]), folk dances, applied folk arts and the organizing of folklore-ethnographic children's ensembles and classes of national instruments;

In accord with the Language Law, the list of disciplines to be included in the document for completing the secondary general education schools, the vocational-technical schools, the specialized secondary and higher institutions of learning is to include the Kazakh language;

The vocational-technical schools, the specialized secondary and higher institutions of learning are to train specialists in the Kazakh language of instruction primarily for agriculture, the medical and trade specialties as well as the specialties of domestic services for the public, culture and art;

To work out and develop original textbooks in the Kazakh language for the general education schools, the vocational-technical schools, the specialized secondary and higher institutions of learning on a competitive basis and involve in this creatively working authors. For increasing the prestige of the very process of creating original textbooks, there are plans to review within the established procedure the question of instituting a

Kazakh State Prize for creating textbooks and teaching aids for the republic's institutions of learning.

In the program particular attention has been given to the questions of training the pedagogical personnel capable of teaching in the Kazakh language in the VUZes [higher education institution] and the specialized secondary schools. In 1990-1991, there are plans to incorporate in the teaching plans of the VUZes of all specialties special courses for training the best prepared students of the indigenous nationality in the principles of pedagogics, psychology and teaching methods for the appropriate subjects in the aim of their further use as teachers in the higher and specialized secondary schools in the divisions teaching in the Kazakh language. In accord with the demand, there is to be a significant increase in the admission to graduate studies in the linguistic specialties.

The Kazakh Language in the Sphere of Culture and the Mass Information Media

In considering that a significant number of the republic rayons does not receive programs of the Kazakh Television and Radio (the coverage of the population by the Shalkar Program is around 30 percent and for the Alatau TV Program, around 17 percent), the program envisages the development of the physical plant of the sector, an increase in the amount of broadcasting both in television and radio in the Kazakh language and the languages of the republic's other nationalities. An independent channel of Kazakh Television is to be established with broadcasting in the Kazakh language.

The following are planned:

In 1992-1993, to organize radio broadcasting to 41 remote rayons and in 1992-1995 radio editorial offices in 30 towns. In addition, TV and radio broadcasting is to be commenced in German, Uygur, Korean, Tatar and Dungan languages in areas where these nationalities reside compactly. The subjects of the TV and radio broadcasts for children are to be broadened in the Kazakh language;

From 1991, to begin producing a series of training video films on the Kazakh language and literature;

To provide simultaneous translation into the Kazakh language for the broadcasts of Kazakh Television developed in other languages; from 1990, to begin producing documentary, popular scientific, feature and animated films in the Kazakh language with subsequent dubbing into other languages;

Considering the numerous requests of the Kazakh population residing outside the republic, to continue the leasing of transmitters for relaying the broadcasts of the Kazakh Radio;

For ensuring fuller coverage by the republic public of the programs of Kazakh Television and Radio, radio broadcasting and television stations as well as the radio relay lines to them are to be built along with the satellite TV stations;

All the movies of the Film Studio Kazakhfilm are to be produced, regardless of in what language they were filmed, with subtitles in Kazakh or Russian; up to 50 percent of the films from Union rentals are to be dubbed or subtitled in Kazakh.

There is to be the systematic supply of the republic libraries with literature in the Kazakh language considering the existing needs and composition of the population;

In the aims of further raising the role and prestige of the official language in the area of book publishing, there is to be the annual publishing of printed product in the Kazakh language of at least 55-60 percent of the total output in terms of volume and run and including the departmental literature.

The basic areas for the development of book publishing are the following:

Satisfying the increasing reader demand for literature of diverse subjects (the publishing and republishing of classics, textbooks and educational literature, references, encyclopedic and other publications);

Studying the real demand of the readers for literature in the languages of the peoples residing compactly in the republic (from 10,000 persons and more) considering their placement over the oblast and the necessity of purchasing books for these categories of readers in the other republics and abroad;

Ensuring the reciprocal influence and enrichment of the national literatures by broadening the publication in Kazakh and other languages of the finest works of the writers of the USSR and foreign countries;

Collaboration of the publishing houses with the representatives of the creative intelligentsia in the national cultural centers on the problems of improving the planning and publishing of literature in the national languages and its dissemination in the republic;

Carrying out comprehensive programs for the publishing of literature for a thorough study of the Kazakh and Russian languages, books on the Kazakh-Russian and national-Russian bilingualism and ensuring a further quantitative and qualitative growth of these publications.

We plan a significant increase in the output of textbooks and teaching literature in the Kazakh language based on the orders of the Kazakh Ministry of Public Education and the other involved departments. We are to increase the activities of the Rauan Publishing House and the other republic publishing houses. In 1991, the Kazakh University Publishing House will be established with a

specialized editorial office for eastern languages in publishing teaching materials in Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, Korean, Chinese and other languages; in 1990, there will be the Publishing House Anatili; and in 1992, a children's publishing house.

Measures have been provided to realize and disseminate literature in the Kazakh language in the republic and beyond it where a Kazakh population resides.

The Kazakh Gosplan and Gossnab have been instructed to carry out a range of measures to further strengthen the physical plant of the publishing houses, the republic, interrepublic and local newspapers, to improve the supply of paper, computer equipment and imported equipment, to broaden the training of engineer-technical and creative personnel and improve their housing and service conditions.

The Kazakh Language and Science

There has been serious concern over the functioning of the Kazakh language in the sphere of science, particularly in the area of the economy and technology.

The Linguistic Institute of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences imeni A. Baytursynov and the collective of the Kazakh Soviet Encyclopedia have been instructed to create a series of fundamental research on the official state language (in Kazakh and Russian) in 1990-1995.

The following are planned:

- The elaboration of a special scientific program for a thorough study of the status, standards, sphere of social use, stylistic differentiation and developmental patterns of the Kazakh language;
- The creation of a multivolume academic grammar (in Kazakh and Russian) in 1991-1993;
- The preparation and publication of a series of monographs on the individual problems of the official language in 1990-1995;
- The preparation and publication of an encyclopedia of the Kazakh language in 1990-1992.

The Kazakh Academy of Sciences, the Kazakh Goskompechat [State Committee for the Press], the State Terminological Committee Under the Kazakh Council of Ministers, the Kazakh Gossnab, the Kazakh Tili Society and the Kazakh Ministry of Public Education have been instructed to establish a scientific-technical base for a linguistic and sociolinguistic study of the Kazakh and other languages of the peoples of Kazakhstan in 1990-2000.

Centers for scientific-technical lexicography and applied linguistics are to be organized and these will be concerned with the following:

- The preparation and publishing of a series of different (Russian-Kazakh, Kazakh-Russian, translation) sectoral terminological and special-subject dictionaries in 1990-2000;

- The creation of textbooks, teaching aids and reference materials on various areas of knowledge as well as linguistics (frequent use, reverse frequent use, alphabetic, synonymic, antonymic, special subjects, stenographic, training, orthographic and other) dictionaries in 1990-1995;
- The preparation of phrase books and special educational aids for the intense study of the Kazakh language in 1991-1996;
- The creation of a typewriter font for the Kazakh language and computer support for the processing of text (in the given instance entry in the machine memory for the file of a dictionary, a training-terminological vocabulary and so forth) in 1991-1995;
- The problems of organizing the video and audiovisual study of the Kazakh language and other languages in 1991-1999;
- The Kazakh Goskompechat, the Kazakh Soviet Encyclopedia, the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, the Kazakh Ministry of Public Education and the creative unions have been instructed to organize the publication of works and literary monuments which are the spiritual heritage of the Kazakh people as well as the heritage of world culture in the Kazakh language.

There are plans to publish in Kazakh:

- Works of world philosophy, works on natural and technical sciences including physics, mathematics, chemistry and biology in 1991-1998;
- Works of classic literature and linguistic thought in 1992-2000.

The Kazakh Academy of Sciences and the Kazakh Ministry of Public Education should organize the training of bilingual (mastering Kazakh and Russian languages) scientific and scientific-technical personnel through graduate studies and other forms of instruction (around 300 persons) in 1990-2000.

The program envisages the establishing of a Kazakh language chair for graduate studies at the Kazakh Academy of Sciences.

The Goskompechat, the Kazakh Academy of Sciences and the Kazakh Ministry of Public Education together with the Kazakh Tili Society and the State Terminological Committee Under the Kazakh Council of Ministers will prepare series and periodic scientific and scientific-popular publications in the Kazakh language.

A whole series of measures is planned aimed at the practical implementation of the Law "On Languages in Kazakhstan," the dissemination of scientific and technical accomplishments in the Kazakh language and linguistic knowledge as well as the propagandizing of the national creative heritage, culture and art:

- Publishing, beginning in 1990, the scientific-practical journal KAZAK TILI by the Linguistics Institute of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, the State Terminological Committee and the Republic Kazakh Tili Society;

- The publication of the journals **KHALYK ONERI**, **ETNOGRAFIYA** and others in 1990-1995.

The republic public organizations are to play an important role in carrying out the Language Law.

The Republic Kazak Tili Society together with the public education and cultural bodies, the creative public organizations should assist in the thorough mastery of the official language primarily by the Kazakhs so that each person is profoundly aware of the moral essence of the very difficult work of preserving one's language;

To contribute to the development of a favorable attitude toward the representative of other nationalities endeavoring to study and more fully assimilate the official language of the republic and provide all the necessary conditions for this;

Together with the national centers (Greek, Dungan, Jewish, Korean, German, Tatar, Uygur, Ukrainian and others) to assist in the free development of their languages and the languages of other nations and nationalities residing in Kazakhstan and outside the republic;

The soviet, economic and other bodies must provide daily assistance and create conditions for the beneficial work of the Kazak Tili Society as well as the national-cultural centers and their local divisions.

The Kazakh Gosplan and the Alma-Ata Gorispolkom have been instructed to review the question of building in Alma-Ata a scientific-cultural complex Til Sarayy (Language Palace) and in which there will be:

- A people's university Art of the Word in 1990-2000;
- An educational training center in 1991-1995;
- An institute for the full-time instruction of Kazakh and other languages (with affiliates in the oblast centers and towns) for the republic population in 1990-1992;
- A movie and video studio and other centers for the technical support of the intensive study and training of specialists for translation in 1990-1992;
- There are plans to purchase equipment for the society to carry out linguistic and sociological research on the linguistic situation in the republic in 1990-1991;
- The organizing of linguaphone labs in 1990-1991 and a library in 1990-1995.

In addition, the facilities should house all the cultural-national centers (associations) and the public organizations involved to one degree or another in resolving the cultural and linguistic problems in the republic in 1991-1996.

There are plans to hold scientific-practical, theoretical conferences, symposiums and congresses on the Turkic languages and providing constant exchange of delegations from foreign countries.

There are plans to organize a cultural center in the town of Turkestan with the involving of foreign firms in 1991-1993.

There are plans for the publication of scientific and popular scientific literature on onomastics of the Kazakh language and onomastic dictionaries; the elaboration of scientific principals and practical recommendations on the toponymics of Kazakhstan as well as the compiling and publishing of dictionaries of toponyms of the Kazakh language.

A Thorough Study of Russian—The Language of International Intercourse

An equally important aspect in the state program is a thorough study of Russian which has become the traditional language of international intercourse and has gained world recognition and the status as the official language of the USSR. In this context, the program provides that all the children's preschool institutions with a non-Russian language of instruction in 1990-1995 will be provided with skilled specialists for conducting exercises in Russian in accord with the current curriculum.

For these purposes during the current year, they will study the demand of the children's preschool institutions with a non-Russian language of instruction for the personnel of Russian language teachers and when necessary make adjustments in the plan for admission to the higher and specialized secondary schools.

The possibility is being created of dividing the groups into subgroups in the study of Russian in the preschool institutions with a non-Russian language of instruction and education, and extending to the Russian language teachers working in these groups the wage system for teachers of the Russian language and literature in the national schools.

In the 10th-11th grades of the general education schools with Russian, Kazakh and other languages of instruction, Russian language lessons are to be introduced on a level which considers the specific features of the school and provides a firm knowledge of the language. The network of national general education schools with the intensified study of Russian is to be broadened, bearing in mind their organization in each oblast and major industrial center of the republic as well as establishing in Alma-Ata and the oblast centers general education schools with the intensified study of the humanities in this language for the students of the national schools evidencing a particular inclination for the Russian language and literature.

In all the higher and specialized secondary schools they will systematize the study of Russian in the Kazakh departments with the obligatory incorporation of this subject in the curriculums of all the courses considering the preparation level of their students, their knowledge and skills with Russian conversational speech. The network of faculties for skill improvement is to be broadened under the republic pedagogical VUZes for the teachers of Russian language and literature in the national schools. Particular attention is to be given to raising the effective teaching of the Russian language to

preinduction youth who have a poor knowledge of Russian conversational speech.

In the area of scientific research on the problems of the Russian language, the Kazakh Academy of Sciences has been instructed to make a study of the Russian language under the conditions of Kazakhstan in its sociological-linguistic and comparative-typological aspects.

The Development of Languages of the National Groups Residing Compactly in the Republic

The program envisages the use of the languages of the other nationalities in the republic in the places of their compact residence for satisfying national-cultural needs. For these purposes, it has been considered advisable that the state authorities and the public organizations carry out measures as well as adopt the corresponding enactments in places where a majority is comprised of the population of one or another nationality in the language of this nationality, if it has been given the status of a local official language.

In accord with the needs of the population in places where the various nationalities reside compactly, children's preschool institutions, general education schools, groups or classes are to be opened, the existing network of these institutions with instruction and training in the national languages is to be broadened, and teachers are to be trained for the preschool institutions and special subject teachers for the schools and nurseries providing instruction and education in the national languages as well as specialists in the music and cultural institutions.

The Kazakh Ministry of Public Education has been instructed to review the question of organizing a Language Institute in Alma-Ata, having concentrated in it the training of personnel, the methodological and scientific research work, improving the skills of the pedagogical workers in the philological disciplines as well as opening a republic boarding school with a German language of instruction for children of German nationality.

From 1990, the taking of entrance exams for the higher and specialized secondary schools of Alma-Ata and Taldy-Kurgan Oblasts will be given when necessary in the mother tongue for the graduates of schools with instruction in the Uyghur language.

In places of the compact residing of the Dungan population, as of 1993, in individual schools they will begin work on organizing the intensified study of the Dungan language from grades 1 through 11.

Work will be continued on further improving the study and teaching of Polish, Kurdish, Azeri, Chechen, Turkish, Greek, Crimean Tatar and other languages as the mother tongue and broadening the network of such classes in the general educational schools in accord with the needs of the republic's population.

The Kazakh Gosplan and the oblispolkoms in 1990 are to conclude interrepublic agreements with the RSFSR,

the Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, the Tajik, Moldavian, Kirghiz SSRs, the Bashkir, Tatar and Checheno-Ingush ASSRs on assistance in satisfying the national, cultural, spiritual and linguistic needs of the population.

The oblispolkoms prior to 1 January 1991 have been instructed to review the question of giving the status of a local official language to the language of the nationality groups residing compactly in the region.

There are also plans to provide effective aid to the Kazakh schools and groups studying the Kazakh language outside the republic (sending teachers, providing the appropriate literature, holding traveling training seminars).

In 1990, the Kazakh Ministry of Public Education plans:

To open up at the Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogical Sciences imeni I. Altynsarin, a department for teaching methods for the mother tongues of nationalities not having their own state-territorial formations,

To organize the publishing of the journal RODNOY YAZYK for examining the questions of the methods and content of teaching native tongues and a children's journal for the nationalities residing in the republic and not having their own territorial formations.

The program envisages the annual publishing of literature in the national languages (in printers sheets) of 700-800 in Uyghur, 100-200 in German and 30-100 in Korean.

To more fully satisfy the growing demand of the republic's multinational population through the inner-Union exchange of literature in Ukrainian, Tatar, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Kirghiz, Kurdish, Belorussian and other languages as well as resolve the questions of providing the schools with textbooks and teaching aids.

To broaden the delivery to the republic of literature in German, Polish, Korean, Chinese and other languages through the International Book Association and by the purchasing of literature by the Kazkitap Association and the Kazakh Consumer Union.

In considering the important role of the national languages in the sphere of culture and the mass information media in 1990-1991, there will be an increase in the time for relaying the republic radio and TV broadcasts in Uyghur, German and Korean languages as well as expanding the local radio and TV broadcasting in Uyghur, German, Dungan, Korean and other languages in areas of the compact residing of the population of these nationalities as well as strengthening the appropriate creative and physical facilities.

During the current year, the question is to be settled of publishing materials in the Uyghur language in the journals KAZAKHSTAN MEKTEBI and BASTAUYSH MEKTEP. In 1992, there are plans to open an Uyghur editorial office at the Nauka Publishing House, and to

review the possibility of publishing from 1991 weekly appendices in Russian to the republic journals coming out in other national languages. A study is to be made of the possibility of publishing a newspaper in the Uzbek language in Kazakhstan and in the Kazakh language in Uzbekistan.

There are plans to hold regularly in the republic days of national cultures, competitions and festivals of amateur artistic activities, and weeks of friends of the national theater, contacts will be broadened with the existing national cultural centers and work continued to establish new national cultural centers.

Financial and Organizational Support for the Program

The resolving of these questions is assigned to the Kazakh Gosplan and Ministry of Finances, the ministers, departments, local soviets, labor collectives and public organizations.

The necessary budget plans will be provided for carrying out the measures envisaged in the program.

In addition, significant capital investments and material resources will be channeled into strengthening the physical plant of public education, science, culture and the press. In the next few years, there are plans to build general education schools with 800,000 student seats, children's preschool institutions with 300,000 places. Significant funds will be allocated to strengthen the educational facilities and physical plant of the higher and specialized secondary schools and scientific institutions, to build dormitories and residences and there will be further development for the network of cultural and artistic facilities and printing industry enterprises. Particular attention will be given to creating the appropriate physical plant for the sociocultural sphere in places of the compact residence of nationalities which do not have their own national territorial formations in the USSR.

The Kazakh Gosplan and Ministry of Finances is to study the possibility of creating a republic fund for the development of languages in Kazakhstan with the tapping for these purposes of money from the general-Union fund for socioeconomic and cultural development of the small peoples and national groups residing in Kazakhstan.

For effective propaganda and support of the state program, the mass information bodies must organize work of acquainting the public with the content of the state program. Here particular attention must be focused on the questions of improving interethnic relations.

The ministers, departments, the oblispolkoms, the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, the creative unions, the Kazakh Tili Society and the national cultural centers on the basis of the state program must work out their own measures to implement it. The realization of the state program is a most important task for the soviets, all the ministries and departments, the public and creative organizations of the republic.

Responsibility for the gradual implementation of the program is assigned personally to the first leaders.

Considering the scope and complexity of carrying out the state program for daily supervision over the personnel, material-technical, financial and educational support, a special republic coordinating center is to be established.

Appended to the program are specific measures with the indicating of the basic areas of work, dates and executors and prepared on the basis of the proposals of the ministries, departments and oblispolkoms [oblast soviet executive committee].

Implications of Tajik as Official Language Examined

90US1216A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 18 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by G. Papyrina: "A Dialogue on Language: With an Adjustment for Reality"]

[Text] No matter how much we talk today about renewing the society and party, consolidating healthy forces and signing a new union agreement, the desire to understand one another remains paramount. But in our common home, this is transforming into another kind of scarce goods. No matter how we look at life in our republic for example, we would have to admit that the Language Law created a fissure in the mutual relations between people. We would wish not to think so, but a fact remains a fact: The Russian-language population is continuing to drain away. And the well-known, unfortunate events of February only hastened the process.

Yes, that's how it all started, asserts everyone with whom the loss of qualified specialists was discussed. The Tajik Civil Aviation Administration is no exception. Our correspondent asked its workers to answer these questions:

1. What is the mood in the collective today?
2. In your opinion, what will be the upshot of translating documents into the state language in sectors important to the republic's development—a blessing or a loss?
3. What do you see as the solution to the problem?

The discussion that occurred in the TUGA [Tajik Civil Aviation Administration] did not get to the ultimate truth. Nonetheless it suggests that not all is lost. There is a chance for reestablishing peace and consensus in multinational Tajikistan.

A. Larenok, VOZDUSHNYY TRANSPORT correspondent:

When the language debate was going on, I feel that Russian-language publications, including central ones, were not consistent or principled enough. Everyone had

his say, references were made to Lenin, but few linguists stated their point of view. And they should have.

What was the result? We were told about the rich traditions and deep roots of the Tajik language. Even prominent writers attempted to suggest this to us "from afar" (to me, Ivan Mashin, who signed that letter from Dushanbe, is not an authority). But for God's sake, we're not against its development. What is essential is how it is to develop further. This is something the intelligentsia should have troubled itself with—you might remember, it suggested writing a few dozen textbooks on the Tajik language. Instead, it came out with the "Language Law" as a stop-gap measure. What has come of this, we all know. People are leaving, and enterprises are finding themselves without specialists. The problems in the republic's economy, of which there are a multitude already, will now grow even more. And this is with the market economy drawing near.

I carefully studied this issue; I sorted through and read a great deal of literature in the Firdousi library. My conclusion is that the USSR language should become the state language. Is it right for the Soviet Union to be the sole country in the civilized world remaining without a state language? And the fact that Russian has been adopted for official communication is not enough.

A. Yusupov, chief of the department of labor and wages:

I agree. People feel that they have no future in the republic. I myself don't understand what kind of state I'm living in. If I'm living in a multinational state, then there should also be a state language for all nations (rights must be respected, of course), one which would be understood by all—from the Baltic to Kamchatka, and from the Far North to the country's south. Then even non-Tajiks would take to studying Tajik more eagerly. No one has ever become a polyglot by force.

I was in Khorog recently. There's a sign at the airport in Tajik that reads: "Welcome to Khorog!". One acquaintance of mine joked dourly: "I guess that makes you free settlers now." He felt uncomfortable with the position in which people of nonindigenous nationality have found themselves.

And there is something else that troubles everyone. While the economy is worn so thin in the republic, we are being asked to "tighten our belts" in order to create a Tajik language fund. While we can't seem to restore just the one Sharora, we are also being asked to make colossal expenditures on translators and equipment for simultaneous translation. And if we add the expenses associated with the departure of specialists,....

V. Avidzba, deputy chief of the administration for flight organization:

My position is that the Tajik language needs to develop. Without its language, a nation dies out. But things must be organized in such a way that this language could live

and work within the framework of a state language, and other nations could try to learn it themselves.

I agree that there is sense in considering what language is to be used for teaching in the agricultural institute, most of the students of which are youngsters from rural areas, who will return there as specialists. The balance has certainly been skewed here in the direction of Russian. This fact is an indication that we are harvesting the fruits of the past. But restoration of the language's prestige should not transform into political speculation, into a game played upon the national sentiments of the people, such as suggesting that if you know the state language, you then deserve a high position, while what you are as a specialist is only secondary.

No, that won't do. We would once again find ourselves starting all over again. Closing ourselves off (this would happen inevitably, because we would be physically unable to translate the accomplishments of world civilization into Tajik in time), we would roll backward. Sooner or later even those who argued for having one language will understand this as well. And it is my deep conviction that the possibilities for growth and development of the Tajik nation depend in many ways on a knowledge of Russian, and the most favorable conditions must be created in the republic for it, in addition to Tajik, by amending the adopted law.

I mandated our engineer from Kulyab, USSR People's Deputy B. Safarov, to propose making Russian the state language of the country's entire territory during discussion of the new union agreement.

There is one other problem calling for our attention—the children of mixed marriages. The weakness of family ties is already saddling the society with negative consequences. "Fatherlessness" has literally become a scourge, you see. Think about it: Where will the course toward purity of nations lead us? I would propose replacing passports altogether with ones stating that the individual is simply a USSR citizen.

V. Blashkevich, party committee deputy secretary:

I recall a certain lecturer from Moscow. He scrupulously analyzed the ethnic composition of the Tajik Civil Aviation Administration. During the lecture he "opened" our eyes to its ethnic composition. Then one Tajik got up and said: "I have worked several dozen years, and no one has ever given any thought to who's who. To me, all of us are comrades. Why divide us into Tajiks, Ukrainians, Russians and Tatars? We are all one family." It's a pity that in our common home, we can't seem to understand what language to speak to one another.

V. Gaydar, chief of staff:

The language in which to conduct business shouldn't be a problem to aviation. Specialists for us aren't trained in the republic. And the training of just a single TU-154 commander costs 150,000 rubles. Now there's some food

for thought for you. And here's some more—221 TUGA workers left the republic since February. If things keep going this way, next year civil aviation could cease to exist here.

Let me be so bold as to make one more prediction: Despite everything, reason will prevail. Because I can't imagine the Tajik people isolating themselves in their republic and "reinventing the wheel." We need to communicate, we need to learn new and better things. This is why the Language Law needs to be adapted to reality, which is a little too painful. These happen to be painful times.

A. Mosalev, party committee secretary:

To be completely honest, we are dissatisfied not only with the measures our government is implementing to stabilize the situation but also with the country's leadership in resolving the nationalities issue. We have here before us a letter addressed to M. S. Gorbachev and to the supreme soviets of the USSR and the republics, in which a collective warns insistently that only introduction of state bilingualism can eliminate ethnic discord and discrimination. Let me read one passage from the letter: "Exaggerating the term 'rebirth' in relation to Tajik culture and language, the republic's intelligentsia is unable to explain what it is that has hindered development of national culture and language...."

S. Mongolov, deputy chief of the aviation safety administration:

I can't seem to understand who would suffer more from bilingualism. The main thing is to respect one another. And how are we going to live and work, as "children of different nations," if the law allows the Russian language only the right to serve as a means of international communication while allowing other languages to develop freely? If we start with the fact that our country is one, then it should have a common state language as well. On the condition, of course, that all other languages are equal as well. Otherwise, for example, how is an Uzbek going to understand a Ukrainian, a Russian, a Tajik?!

M. Mastangulov, chief, flight safety inspection office:

We need to do everything to make the language a means of unifying the people living in the republic, and not of separating them. As I understand it, my comrades are not opposed to resurrecting the Tajik language and raising its prestige. But little depends upon us aviators in this regard.

This is a place where the intelligentsia can apply its efforts. And the people's deputies would find it worth their while to think about making our democratic Language Law even more democratic, about making the bilingualism it promises not just something on paper, but alive.

One idea ties all of the statements together: Russian has always been a guarantee of the unification of different

nations, and it must be protected by law. Then all nations and nationalities living in Tajikistan would acquire certainty in tomorrow.

Tajik Supreme Soviet Decrees 22 July 'Language Day'

*90US1216B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 21 Jul 90 p 1*

[Ukase of the Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet on Holding Celebrations Devoted to Language Day on 22 July 1990 in the City of Dushanbe]

[Text] The Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. Considering that the situation in the city of Dushanbe has stabilized, and considering the numerous wishes of the laborers, that celebrations devoted to Language Day shall proceed in the city of Dushanbe as an exception, under extraordinary circumstances.

2. That the Dushanbe City Soviet of People's Deputies and its executive committee shall maintain proper discipline and order during the celebrations.

3. That the commandant of the city of Dushanbe, Comrade M. Navzhuvanov, shall ensure strict public order and the safety of citizens in the city of Dushanbe.

4. This Ukase becomes effective on the day of its adoption.

Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Chairman K. Makhkamov.

20 July 1990, Dushanbe.

Commission Hears Problems of Germans in Kazakhstan

*90US1241A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 2 Jun 90 p 3—*

[Unattributed report: "State Commission Hears Problems of Soviet Germans"]

[Text] A state commission in its regular session heard a report read by K. S. Omerbayeva, deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers. The subject was work being carried out in the republic relative to: resolving problems peculiar to the almost one million Soviet Germans residing in the republic; maintaining and developing ethnic traditions, culture, and language; and promoting their political and social activity. More than 400 Soviet Germans hold leading positions in party and soviet organs in the republic. There are 169 of them working as sovkhoz directors; one in ten kolkhozes is headed by a German. Five persons have been elected USSR people's deputies; ten, to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet; 8,708, to local soviets of people's deputies. Soviet Germans enjoy daily German-language television and radio broadcasts and the newspaper FREUND SCHAFT.

The commission charged the USSR Gosobrazovaniye, USSR Goskompechat, USSR Gosteleradio, and the USSR Ministry of Culture with rendering necessary assistance to expand the publication of classical and instructional literature, increase the amount of radio and television broadcasting in the German language, training an ethnic cadre of teachers, journalists, and cultural workers. The Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers was made responsible for: cooperating in all possible ways to further the constructive activity of Vozrozhdeniye, the republic all-union society of Soviet Germans; resolving the problem of organizing a republic German cultural center; accelerating the preparation and adoption of an integrated program designed to develop German ethnic culture, language, and traditions; studying the feasibility of setting up ethnic areas, rural and settlement soviets at locations where Soviet Germans are concentrated.

The commission considered the problem of developing an integrated program - by means of the efforts of the USSR Goskomtrud, USSR Ministry of Culture, and USSR Gosobrazovaniye [State Committee for Education] - that would satisfy the requirements of Soviet Germans relative to providing and educating ethnic German cadres. In addition to setting up preschool- and school-level ethnic institutions, the program is to include: organizing secondary-level specialized schools and higher educational institutions; furnishing the schools with curricula, educational and training literature, and teaching personnel; and affording groups of German youth the opportunity of studying in schools located in countries where German is spoken. The proposal was made to open - as early as this year - German schools at locations where Germans are concentrated and to offer instruction in various specialties administered in the German language.

Also discussed was progress made in the preparation of proposals aimed at determining the status of labor soldiers, abolishing all legislation that restricts the rights of Soviet Germans, and organizing a congress of Soviet Germans.

The meeting was presided over by V. K. Gusev, state commission chairman and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Rukh Commemorates Battle of Poltava

90UN2525A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAYINY in Russian
12 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by M. Yakovenko: "What is Involved with the 'Battle of Poltava'"]

[Text] Last Sunday, 281 years passed since the time when the army of Peter I together with Semen Paliy's Cossacks, praised in the people's songs, near Poltava scored a famous victory against the intruding Swedish-conqueror Carl XII in our land and the hetman Ivan Mazepa who changed over to his side. The date, as one sees, is hardly a round sum, but nonetheless some political forces in our republic have once again decided

to observe it in their own manner, expressing a negative relation to the historical fact of the rout of the Swedish invaders.

Essentially, what happened one year ago was repeated, when 280th year of the Battle of Poltava passed (Cf. the report about the events in PRAVDA UKRAYINY on 23 July 1989). But it was repeated on a larger scale. Judge for yourself: 8 July in Poltava there arrived in excursion buses, in private cars, and in trains in large numbers "groups of support" from a number of other oblasts; by the count of the local authorities, on that day there appeared thousands of such "landing troops" with yellow-and-blue and black-and-red flags. Up to three thousand participated in a meeting organized by Rukh, the Ukrainian Republic Party [URP], and the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth [SNUM]. The deputies Levko Lukyanenko and Oles Shevchenko, the leaders of URP gave violent, anti-communist speeches against us, who it turned out to be among "guests." The former, called the Banderivite period a "great period of struggle for national rebirth," and the latter spoke out against the new, soviet treaty...

A notion of what the latest "landing troops" of Rukh and URP had to go through is given by some sources of information collected by the UVD [administration of internal affairs] of the Poltava Oblast.

An excursion bus "Icarus" came from Ivano-Frankivsk with 40 passengers for which 1,100 rubles was paid. From Lvov Oblast, also an "Icarus" bus also with 40 people for which was paid 1,200 rubles. From Ternopil, 120 people were conveyed by three buses of the local ATP-16127, for which a customer—a Ternopil town executive committee—put out 3 thousand rubles.

In the Vinnitsya Oblast such a generous sponsor was not found for the next "Battle of Poltava," but one appeared in the center of Volyn Oblast in the city of Lutsk: the representative of the local cooperative "Rabina," citizen Tsyukh, A. V. with a merchant-like gesture tossed a trifle—400 rubles for Vynnistian ATP-10701, so that 12 dear to his heart Vynnistians could in a small bus comfortably rush to get in the appointed time to the renowned field of the Poltava battle. The same type of small bus came from Zhytomyr Oblast: 12 people for 500 rubles. And a full "Icarus" came from Kharkov; a bus owned by the auto depot "Tourist": 40 people for 120 rubles.

Involuntarily, the question arises to whomever is concerned about it: who allowed this squandering in the heat of the moment when our agriculture and in particular the village are experiencing such a sharp need?

And still one more question. If one only adds up the payment for the buses, then it runs to more than six thousand. And how much did "someone" appropriate for train tickets? For gas for the petty "private traders"? For the travelling expenses of all the "landing troops"?

Yes, what's to be said, the current "Battle of Poltava" is being managed with a kopeck!

And actually the impression takes shape that the organizers of this all-Ukrainian action—Rukh, URP, and SNUM—are gathering annually to set up such expensive incursions into Poltava. And to only think—for what goal!

What are they struggling to attain, those who want to depict the historical fact in conjunction with the Russian and Ukrainian people's rebuff of the foreign invaders—as a "historical tragedy"? What are they struggling to attain, those who are hypocritically opposing the chiselled strokes of Aleksandr Pushkin about the Battle of Poltava with the angry strokes of Shevchenko about tsarism, which oppressed the Russian, and the Ukrainian, and other people? It is not clear whether objectively such actions are the kind of actions directed against the age-long friendship of the Ukrainian and Russian people?

We called the Poltava City Committee of the Party, and we were told that these days the city committee is constantly dealing with the workers, who, to wit, are estimating the expenses of what took place last Sunday in their city.

Leaders of Uzbekistan's 'Union of Free Youth' Explain Goals

90US1193A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 6 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with R. Dzhurayev, deputy chairman of the SSMU, and V. Inoyatova, senior secretary of the SSMU, by correspondent Yevgeniya Lamikhovaya: "The Troubles of the People"]

[Text] The founding conference of the Union of Free Youth of Uzbekistan was held on 10 June in the courtyard of a residential building in Tashkent. This meeting was not approved by the gorispolkom. Does that mean it was illegal? It was attended by about 100 representatives of this movement from nine oblasts. They approved a program and a charter for the organization, wrote an appeal to the people and youth regarding the events in Osh and sent telegrams to Yeltsin and Landsbergis supporting their political line. A Central Council and Chairman of the SSMU [Union of Free Youth of Uzbekistan] were elected at the congress.

Leaders of the union met with our correspondent, Yevgeniya Lamikhova, and answered questions for KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA.

We will introduce you to participants of the interview:

Ravshan Dzhurayev, deputy chairman of the SSMU, is 19 years old and a student in the History Department at Tashkent University.

Vasilya Inoyatova is a chemist. She is now engaged in professional political activity. She is senior secretary for the SSMU. She is 34 years old.

[Correspondent] The SSMU entered the political arena about two years ago. Why is it now deciding to become an independent organization? Why was the approval of its program delayed for an entire year?

[Dzhurayev and Inoyatova] Many things happened during this year that convinced us of the need to work out a special program—a program for solving youth problems in Uzbekistan. It includes questions concerning the republic's economic and cultural renaissance, military service, the place of youth in the political structure, and other questions.

[Correspondent] What political demands are made by your program?

[Dzhurayev and Inoyatova] The main task of the SSMU is the struggle for the republic's sovereignty.

[Correspondent] Haven't you gotten beyond this question yet? After all, the Declaration on the Sovereignty of Uzbekistan has already been approved.

[Dzhurayev and Inoyatova] Can that document really be taken seriously? It seems to us that it was passed only because it had become fashionable to declare one's republic independent. Also, some provisions in the Declaration make it possible for local authorities to hinder the introduction, on Uzbek territory, of progressive laws that will be passed by the all-union parliament.

Our movement is now for approving some piece of paper, but for the step by step transition of the republic to political and economic independence from the center.

[Correspondent] I cannot agree with your one-sided evaluation of the Declaration. Many of its provisions open up the pathway to genuine independence for the republic.

Recently there has been intensified Islamization of Uzbekistan. What is the position of the SSMU on questions of religion?

[Dzhurayev and Inoyatova] For many years religion was represented to us as a system of values harmful to people. As democratization proceeds, we should use what is enlightening in Islam for the rebirth of the morality of the people and of age-old ethical values. However, we are opposed to those religious figures who use their spiritual power for selfish personal goals. We will give one example. Everybody is familiar with the events of 26 April, when the body of a young man killed during service in army was brought into Tashkent. Representatives of "Birlik," "Tumaris" and the SSMU participated in his funeral. We asked Almazar, the person in charge of the Tashkent mosque, to stress in his last words over our dead friend that he died while in the Soviet Army and that he was one of many young men from Uzbekistan who died in such circumstances. However, not only did

he not say this, but neither was he too shy to remind the believers who had come to the mourning prayer about their duty to make contributions to the local mosque. A word from this spiritual leader could have made the authorities face the military problem.

[Correspondent] In your discussions you constantly place your organization in opposition to organs of power and the party apparatus. I would like to understand the attitude of the SSMU towards official political structures.

Let us begin with the Komsomol. A year ago, when your group had just been set up, in an interview with our newspaper other leaders admitted that you wanted to work with the Komsomol, although such a youth organization does not have the right to exist in a free society. During this time you made definite steps to approach the Komsomol and it has attempted to find a common language with the SSMU. However, in my opinion, this is no more than a disguise for the real situation. The Union of Free Youth is clearly challenging the Komsomol.

[Dzhurayev and Inoyatova] You are correct. We have information showing that most young people support our movement. We have not yet counted our members and we cannot exactly know how many adherents our organization has. However, we are certain that the SSMU is not an elite, but a mass organization.

Incidentally, many young people coming to us for the first time ask if they have to turn in their Komsomol cards to become members of the SSMU. We answer that it is not obligatory to leave the Komsomol. There is no contradiction in this. The Komsomol never had the power of the party apparatus. This means that it had no means of solving youth problems. We view our task as that of serving the interests of young people without copying the Komsomol and its bureaucratic system. To be completely frank, we see the fate of the republic Komsomol as follows: It should disband itself and not wait until its last members leave it.

Until then we will have to deal with the local Komsomol, if only because the first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee is a deputy to the republic supreme soviet. This means that he has political power.

[Correspondent] A presidency has been introduced in the republic. The directives of the President of Uzbekistan permit one to conclude that he is interested in absolutely all aspects of life in the republic, from animal feed supplies to the introduction of new titles for artists. What is the relationship of the SSMU to I. A. Karimov?

[Dzhurayev and Inoyatova] We met with the president several times. He received us when we were staging pickets protesting army service.

We should say that there is much that is attractive about Karimov. We listen to his speeches with great interest. They are inspired and full of ideas. But alas, in life many

of the president's declarations have not been supported by deeds. Here is just one example. On the final day of the session of the Supreme Soviet a group of women from the Tashkent Makhall "Kizil Shark" decided to appeal to the deputies to make the events at Osh a special entry on the day's agenda. A delegation of women approached the building where the party central committee is located. However, they were not allowed to enter the building. [Vasilya also participated in this march—Editors.] Twenty participants were retained by the militia. We were hauled to the Sergeliyskiy ROVD [not further identified] and kept there for more than three hours. Soon a court was held. Incidentally, there was no attorney.

[The court fined Vasilya Inoyatova for participating in an unsanctioned meeting and for hooliganism—Editors.]

Why didn't the president or the deputies want to listen to people?

[Correspondent] The "Erk" Democratic Party recently announced its creation. Informal groups tend to consider it "procommunist." What is your relationship to "Erk"?

[Dzhurayev and Inoyatova] We have nothing against this party. It has chosen its path for the liberation of the Uzbek people. We have no tendency towards its beliefs. However, as a political movement we cannot give ourselves the right to make a political evaluation of "Erk's" actions.

The Communist Party of Uzbekistan is now openly demonstrating its loyalty to the informal groups. Is it surprising that now, when there is more than one party, the CPSU will try to control the informal movement and even create organizations supporting it? Therefore, we consider "Erk" only the first move in this game.

By the way, we are adherents of pluralism and have nothing against "Erk."

[Correspondent] You have already described the militia's actions against one of you. Vasilya mentioned that she could not enter her house, as it was surrounded by members of the internal security forces. What is the attitude of the SSMU to other powerful agencies? I have the KGB in mind.

[Dzhurayev and Inoyatova] Understandably, KGB workers themselves do not approach us. However, they certainly observe our activities—we do not stand on the sidelines of a single political event in Uzbekistan. For example, a few days ago a group of young men who were serving in military units in Georgia came to us. They had been harassed in Georgia. The last straw was that they had been locked in a freight car for several days without food. Now the authorities are deciding where to send them to serve. The Union of SSMU is among the organizations with "Birlik" that are involved in this case. How can the KGB not be interested in our organization?

However, we are not afraid of such interest. Our weapon is glasnost. All measures are visible, nothing can be hidden from us.

[Correspondent] A last question, even though its importance should put it in first place. What is the attitude of SSMU towards the question of relations between nationalities, towards the growing emigration of the Russian speaking population out of Uzbekistan? Do you consider force as one of the methods for solving the problems of the region?

[Dzhurayev and Inoyatova] Our policy is that relations between nationalities can only be based upon a growth of nationalities' self-consciousness. In respecting our nation we will begin to respect others. This is the starting point in answering your question.

It seems to us that relations between nationalities must never be reduced to relations between races. The shedding of blood between people of different nationalities makes it easy to distract people from political struggles

and political problems. Keep in mind, we said Uzbeks, and not people of Uzbekistan. All nationalities should participate in solving problems of our region. The political and economic crisis of the republic, the death of the Aral Sea, infant mortality and the lack of democracy—these are all our common problems. We must solve them together.

From the Editors: Indisputably, this interview with members of the Union SSMU will cause varied reactions among our readers. Admittedly, we do not agree with many things said by the people interviewed. However, we are only beginning to live in an open struggle of ideas, opinions and various viewpoints that can finally be stated in all openness and in the press.

We think that genuine politics cannot be based simply upon a critical negation of the institutions of power. The protests that the SSMU occasionally holds can only heat up the social atmosphere. Unfortunately, this is often not taken into account.

USSR Justice Minister on Legal Reform

90UN2560A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 30, 25 Jul 90 p 12

[Interview with Veniamin Fedorovich Yakovlev, USSR minister of justice, by I. Gamayunov: "I Cannot Get Rid of These Feelings of Alarm": time, place, and date not given]

[Text] Legal reform is one of the regular topics of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. What paths is it taking? Is its pace adequate? How are the functions of the criminal law departments changing? LITERATURNAYA GAZETA observer I. Gamayunov speaks with the USSR Minister of Justice about this.

[Gamayunov] Are you satisfied with the course of reform?

[Yakovlev] In development of laws, perhaps yes.

[Gamayunov] And what are you not satisfied with?

[Yakovlev] Personnel and material support—that is an untouched mass of problems. And I cannot get rid of a feeling of alarm. There is so much to do here. Will we be able to do it?

[Gamayunov] Is something "closing in on us"?

[Yakovlev] We put an enormous load on the judges. And in July the Law on Appealing the Actions of Officials went into effect. It is a law that protects the ordinary citizen from arbitrary administrative actions! Can you imagine what a storm of cases may hit the judges?

[Gamayunov] I can guess. But let us begin with development of laws. What is the relationship of your department to this process?

[Yakovlev] We are really the primary professional organ on the governmental level that supports the process of developing laws. After all, the government has the right of legislative initiative. We realize it by formulating draft laws.

[Gamayunov] And the primary objective of this legislative activity?

[Yakovlev] To create a rule-of-law state.

[Gamayunov] Out of an administrative-police state? How?

[Yakovlev] Return social relations from the "vertical" to their natural place—the "horizontal." The essential feature of the market economy, for example, is commodity-money relations between the producer and the customer, that is, horizontal relations. Relations in the spheres of ideology, politics, and culture should be the same. We are replacing the command administration system with a system of legislative regulation.

A few words about the minister. He graduated from the Sverdlovsk Juridical Institute in 1953. He requested

assignment to Yakutia, to "plow" virgin legal ground. He worked in the procuracy, supervising civil trials. At the same time he taught in a juridical secondary school, later becoming its director. Returning to Sverdlovsk 7 years later, he finished his graduate study and became first a dean and later the prorector of the juridical institute. In 1973 he defended his doctoral dissertation. He worked as director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet Legislation. A year ago he passed through the "purgatory" of the Supreme Soviet before becoming minister.

[Gamayunov] Veniamin Fedorovich, what is the difference in the work of our specialists in drafting laws now and before?

[Yakovlev] Before they were given orders. Moreover, they mainly prepared government decrees. Today they are working directly with the lawmakers, that is with the deputies. The draft law is born out of debate.

[Gamayunov] I recall the clashes that occurred in the Supreme Soviet when the laws on land and property were being adopted. I had the feeling that a majority of our parliamentarians were afraid of radical changes. They are more used to the old way. And their statements indicated lack of legal preparation, sometimes even blatant ignorance.

[Yakovlev] As a professional I am fairly calm about what you are referring to. This is because by itself the clash of opinions, arguments, debates, and the struggle for the new law is already movement.

[Gamayunov] But the people, as they watched the parliamentary debates, called them "empty talk."

[Yakovlev] It is genuine struggle, although it does include a bit of what is called "empty talk." Really, there are deputies who, because of their training, act as pilots and show the way; others, criticizing the "pilots," express everyday public opinion, which is not so bad. After all, if the laws get too far ahead of established opinion they will be left hanging in the air. The law should be in accord with real life.

[Gamayunov] Then what is the difference between the, let's call it, normal law and the halfway law.

[Yakovlev] I wouldn't say "halfway," but would rather talk about stages. After all, there are processes underway. We are already prepared for some things today, while for others we are not. That means that we must patiently move ahead, creating real instruments of social relations.

You remember how it was a year ago, the Supreme Soviet, and what it has become today. Day and night! The level of understanding and the ability to make correct assessments has risen sharply. But of course, I would like to see a little more professionalism.

[Gamayunov] For that, it would seem, you need more lawyers. If we compare with the United States Congress, how many lawyers do they have, and how many do we?

[Yakovlev] About 60 percent there are lawyers. In our country you can count the number of parliamentarians who are lawyers on one hand.

Brief information note (data from the Institute of the United States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences): in 1988 there were about 660,000 lawyers in the United States, most of whom passed through a procedure for admission to the bar. A trial lawyer's license there is an essential condition for ANY practical activity by a lawyer. They are divided into three categories: practicing lawyers, lawyers engaged in academic and teaching work, and lawyers whose work is not directly linked with the law. So this category, those who have chosen business or politics as their sphere of activity, IS NOT COUNTED IN THE STATISTICS. But the sociopolitical role of this profession can be characterized as follows: of the 40 U.S. Presidents, 25 were lawyers (for example Lincoln, Roosevelt, Truman, and Nixon were lawyers by profession), as are two-thirds of the Senators and almost half of the Members of the House of Representatives. Half of the state governors and 40 percent of the diplomats have law degrees.

[Yakovlev] We are short not just of lawyers, but also of specialists in the humanitarian sciences and the sphere of human relations.

[Gamayunov] Sociologists, pedagogical scientists, and psychologists?

[Yakovlev] Yes, but first of all, of course, lawyers.

[Gamayunov] Won't the problem get worse in the next few years?

[Yakovlev] Yes, quite a bit worse! After all, today with the formation of the federation power is being redistributed. Legislative regulation is shifting, to a significant degree, to the Union republic level. And the USSR Ministry of Justice must help organize this work in the republic ministries. But all that is just in the first place. In the second place, following the development of laws it is the job of our department to ensure that they are carried out.

[Gamayunov] But that is what the criminal law organs do.

[Yakovlev] Yes, of course, but rather than criminal law organs I would call them law-applying organs. And I would add that what the Ministry of Justice is doing here, it seems to me, is paramount. After all, we support the activity of the court system, legal service and protection of citizens.

[Gamayunov] How does this square with the independence of the judiciary?

[Yakovlev] No, we do not govern the judges. We only organize the court system, support them with personnel.

[Gamayunov] Aren't you duplicating the work of the qualified court panels?

[Yakovlev] Not at all. On the contrary, we are cooperating with them. We select the candidates, those who from our point of view are best prepared, and the qualified court panel arranges a kind of examination for them: it sends one, say, to be a people's judge, while another is recommended for membership in the oblast court. In other words, personnel selection now involves a system of judicial self-government.

[Gamayunov] And who works on this in the local areas?

[Yakovlev] The departments of justice of the ispolkoms. But they do not have any decision-making functions. Our job is financial and material-technical support and methodological recommendations.

[Gamayunov] But after all, recommendations can also be like orders...

A few years ago when LITERATURNAYA GAZETA began publishing regularly on the subject of the rule-of-law state our authors wrote that in civilized states the adversary principle for the prosecution and the defense begins to operate in the first stage of investigation. The defense attorney is invited in as soon as the suspect is arrested; in our country there has been no such access. And now at last it has been accomplished. At the start of this year the Supreme Soviet decreed that the defense attorney should begin his case along with the investigator. A little earlier the Ministry of Justice canceled the ridiculous instruction on restrictions on defense attorney wages. And one more important change: LITERATURNAYA GAZETA has written many times of pressure on the court by local authorities. There is now a law which defines an attempt to influence the court as a crime.

[Yakovlev] As for departmental pressure on the legal process, it seems to me that that is a thing of the past. The authority of the telephone has been replaced by the authority of the public meeting. It is easy to infect the mob with enthusiastic support of the cause of justice, for example by giving your own version of unchecked events as if it were the truth. New myths arise in mass consciousness. There was a case where not only the managers of the enterprise, but the entire collective intervened in a housing dispute. It is good that the judges were steadfast; they withstood an attack by public meeting. And there is one more problem, personnel training.

I asked the minister to give some comparative figures. It turned out that the personnel problem is the most critical one. Judge for yourself: we have 1.1 lawyers and 0.7 judges per 10,000 population. In the United States they have 16.5 lawyers and 4 judges for the same population group. Our juridical colleges last year admitted 17,000 students, while in the United States the number was about 46,000-47,000. Moreover, the number of entering students in our country is dropping; in 1986 it was 19,000.

[Gamayunov] Are you going to open new VUZes?

[Yakovlev] There is one problem: legal education is managed by the State Committee for People's Education. But at present, it seems to me, our colleagues from this department do not fully understand the critical nature of the problem. All the same we have submitted our proposals—to increase the number of admissions, change the ratio of daytime and extension study, and concerning technical equipping of law schools. And the accent in training specialists needs to be shifted to training more lawyers for administrative systems, the national economy, and local soviets, in other words, civil specialists.

[Gamayunov] Can't the cost accounting mechanism be engaged here?

[Yakovlev] It probably can. Suppose that the Tyumen oil region, setting up a large concern, finds it has a shortage of lawyers and concludes an agreement with the Sverdlovsk Juridical Institute. The oil people provide the capital, the institute expands, and the number of students admitted increases, specifically for Tyumen. That is entirely possible.

[Gamayunov] Do you have other problems of equal seriousness?

[Yakovlev] Yes, development of the court system. We are loading it with such work now that it will not be able to endure and will break down. I have already mentioned the enormous workload on judges! Yes, we have already done a great deal by adopting laws on the status of judges and accountability for disrespect of the court. The legal reform has progressed quite far. But now it must be reinforced with personnel and material resources. We need new, comfortable buildings in which it is not shameful to conduct judicial proceedings (sometimes it is unpleasant even to enter the present ones: the halls are crowded and the plaster is falling); we need sound recording equipment. We need a lot!

We are creating a civil society in which the rights of each person must be reliably protected. And we must not economize our efforts in this matter!

Charter of RSFSR Lawyers' Association Published

90UN2255A Moscow SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA
in Russian No 11, Jun 90 pp 19-20

[Unattributed article: "Russian Lawyers' Association Established"]

[Text] The Russian Lawyers' Association was constituted at a congress of representatives of the republic lawyers' collegia, held in April of this year in the city of Saratov. The congress adopted the Regulations of the Association, and also an Appeal to the Lawyers of Russia.

Taking part in the congress were representatives of 26 lawyers' collegia (out of 73). Nine collegia supported its

resolution, while the collectives of two collegia appealed to the congress with a request to accept them as members of the Association. Lawyers from Belorussia and the Ukraine attended the congress in the capacity of observers.

Thus, for the first time in the country, Russian lawyers (and they number nearly 15,000; that is, more than half of the total number) and their colleagues created their own voluntary association, which operates on the basis of self-administration—the Russian Lawyers' Association, headed by A. Malayev, chairman of the Saratov Oblast Lawyers Collegium.

The purpose of organizing the Association is—to ensure organizational and legal guarantees of true self-administration and independence of RSFSR lawyers' collegia; to unite their efforts to support the process of forming and perfecting a Soviet rule-of-law state; to render legal assistance to citizens and organizations, defending their rights and legal interests; and also, to promote legal standards and knowledge of the law, and the professional mastery of lawyers and their legal defense.

The Regulations stipulate the right of legal initiative for the Association.

The Association was conceived as primarily a working organ. Therefore, its range of authority is broad: it includes coordinating the efforts of collegia in improving their professional and social activities; defending the interests of lawyers' collegia and lawyers from illegal and unfounded interference in their activity by any organs whatsoever; participation in the formulation and improvement of legislation and various normative acts; and, scientific-methodological work on improving the professional mastery of lawyers. The Association is also authorized publishing activity, representing the interests of its members in state organs and social organizations, and cooperation with lawyers and lawyers' associations in the nation, union republics, foreign countries, and others.

No less interesting are the forms of carrying out the activity of the Association. Primarily, this is cooperation with state organs and social organizations by means of introducing suggestions to union, republic and local organs of power and administration on questions concerning the Bar.

The Association will support permanent businesslike contacts with the commissions and committees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, take part in the election of people's deputies, and nominate candidates to republic and local Soviets of People's Deputies; that is, actively participate in the country's political life. The plans of the newly-created Association include the formation of various funds, and taking part in philanthropic activity.

The Association's Regulations recognize both collective and individual membership. Also regulated in this document are questions of the structure, procedure for organizing, and competence of the Association's organs.

The highest leading organ of the Russian Lawyers' Association is acknowledged to be the Congress, which convenes every five years; and during the period between congresses, the Association's Council, which convenes not less than once a year.

Regulations of the Russian Lawyers' Association

I. General Provisions

1. The Russian Lawyers' Association shall be a voluntary association of lawyers and their collegia, which operates on the basis of self-administration.

2. The main purpose of creating the Russian Lawyers' Association is to ensure organizational and legal guarantees of true self-administration and independence of the collegia of lawyers in the Russian Federation; uniting their efforts to support the process of forming and perfecting a Soviet rule-of-law state; rendering thorough and skilled legal assistance to citizens and organizations defending their legal rights and interests; elevating the Soviet citizens' legal culture and knowledge of the law; and raising the professional mastery of lawyers and their legal defense.

3. The Russian Lawyers' Association shall operate in accordance with the USSR Constitution, the RSFSR Constitution, and union and republic legislation, as well as the present regulation.

4. The Russian Lawyers' Association may join the USSR Lawyers' Union and other lawyers' associations as a member of the collegium, if no fewer than two-thirds the delegates of the congress support such a resolution.

5. The Russian Lawyers' Association shall enjoy the right of legislative initiative.

II. Tasks of the Association

6. In order to achieve its goals, the Russian Lawyers' Association shall:

6.1. coordinate the efforts of collegia of lawyers of the Russian Federation in improving their professional and social activities in conditions of democracy and glasnost; and shall support the strengthening of lawful contacts between juridical science and practice;

6.2. shall draw up recommendations on the organizational, methodological, financial-management and cadre questions of lawyers' colleagues; and shall study and disseminate positive experience;

6.3. shall concern itself with raising the prestige of the legal profession, improving the material and socio-domestic working conditions and the life and activity of members of the Association; and the material-technical

support of lawyers' collegia, also ensuring the legal basis of their activities in conditions of self-administration and independence; and shall draw up proposals for introducing to the collegia's activities the norms of professional ethics for lawyers;

6.4. shall defend the interests of collegia of lawyers and lawyers from illegal and unfounded interference in their activity by an organs whatsoever;

6.5. shall participate in the formulation and improvement of legislation and other normative acts, and studying the effectiveness and eliminating shortcomings in their practical application;

6.6. shall carry out scientific-methodological work on improving the professional mastery of lawyers;

6.7. shall carry out publishing activities;

6.8. shall represent the interests of members of the Association at state organs and social organizations;

6.9. shall cooperate with the Bar and lawyers' associations of the USSR and union republics; and shall promote the exchange of professional experience;

6.10. shall support cooperation with the organs of the Bar of foreign countries, and represent in their interests the RSFSR Bar; and,

6.11. shall resolve other tasks which proceed from the given Regulation.

III. Activity of the Association

7. In order to successfully carry out its tasks the Lawyers' Association shall carry out its activity in cooperation with state authorities and social organizations:

7.1. shall introduce proposals to union, republic and local organs of power and administration on questions of the activities of the Bar;

7.2. shall support permanent businesslike contacts with the commissions and committees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet;

7.3. shall participate, in accordance with existing legislation, in the election of people's deputies; nominate candidates to republic and local Soviets of People's Deputies; and take part in the pre-election campaigns;

7.4. shall independently, or jointly with other organizations and institutions, conduct conferences, seminars and other measures of a scientific-practical nature; and shall provide lawyers with methodological literature on all directions of their professional activity;

7.5. shall publish a periodical press organ;

7.6. shall organize funds of the Russian Lawyers' Association and engage in philanthropic activity; and,

7.7. shall establish and maintain socio-domestic facilities under conditions of collegia cooperation.

**IV. Members of the Russian Lawyers' Association,
Their Rights and Responsibilities**

8. The association shall be established on principles of collegial and individual membership.

9. Lawyers' collegia may be collective members of the Association.

10. Individual members of the Association may be:

—members of lawyers' collegia;

—legal scholars, writers and journalists whose works promote the propagation of lawyers' activities and raising their social prestige.

11. Reception of individual members of the Association shall be conducted by the primary organization on the basis of the applicant's statement, which shall be examined within a month.

12. Reception of collective membership in the Russian Lawyers' Association shall be conducted by decision of the board of the Association.

13. Persons applying to the Association shall pay an entrance fee in the amount of five rubles, and shall pay annual membership dues of ten rubles.

Entrance fees and annual dues of collective members of the Association shall be defined in the very same amounts, according to the number of members the lawyers' collegium.

14. Members of the Russian Lawyers' Association shall receive a membership card.

15. A member of the Association shall have the right:

—to participate in the formation of the leading organs of the Association and be elected to membership in them, and also take part in the work of the Association's elective organs;

—to participate in all measures (congresses, conferences, seminars and so on) conducted by the Association;

—to appeal for assistance to the Association in defense of one's own rights and legal interests; and,

—to enjoy the use of cultural and socio-domestic funds.

16. A member of the Association shall be obligated:

—to observe the requirements of the Association's Regulations and norms of legal ethics, and to pay his dues on time;

—to participate in carrying out the tasks of the Association and the decisions of its leading organs;

—to continually increase his professional mastery.

17. Membership in the Russian Lawyers' Association shall be terminated in case of:

—departure from the Association at one's own volition;

—dismissal; or,

—expulsion.

18. A member of the Association (Article 12 of the Regulation) who has not paid his dues within three months for unacceptable reasons, or who has committed an act incompatible with membership in the Association and which violates the norms of legal ethics, may be expelled from it by the primary organization (Article 16 of the Regulation) or by the board of the Association.

**V. Structure of the Russian Lawyers' Association,
Procedure for Formation, and Competence of the
Association's Organs**

19. The basic Association of Russian Lawyers shall be the primary organization, which may be formed with not less than three members.

A primary organization shall be headed by its chairman.

20. If a collegium of lawyers is a member of the Association, the functions of the leading organs of the primary organization shall be carried out by the presidium of the collegium.

21. Primary organizations of the Association shall carry out activity in accordance with the goals and tasks of the Association: they shall receive members into the Association; maintain the records of the primary association's members and ensure the collection and accounting of membership dues; dismiss and expel members of the Association; recommend their own members for nomination to membership in the leading organs of the Association; and present their active members for incentive awards.

22. The central organs of the Russian Lawyers' Association shall be:

a) the Congress (conference); b) the Council of the Association; c) the Board; and, d) the Auditing Commission.

23. The highest leading organ of the Russian Lawyers' Association shall be the congress, which shall be convened once every five years.

Extraordinary congresses may be convened by the council or board upon their own initiative, or upon the demand of no less than one-fifth the members of the Association.

24. In the period between congresses a Republic Conference may be convened annually.

25. Norms for representation and procedure for choosing delegates to the Congress and Conference of Russian Lawyers shall be established by the council of the Association.

26. The Congress of Russian Lawyers shall examine any questions pertaining to the Association's activity. The exclusive competence of the congress shall be:

- determining the place for convening the congress;
- approving and amending the regulations of the Association, and the statute on the auditing commission;
- electing the council and the auditing commission;
- electing the chairman of the Council of the Russian Lawyers' Association; and,
- introducing proposals on improving the procedure and conditions for lawyers' wages and social questions, the organizational structure of lawyers' collegia, and their interaction with state and social organizations.

27. The decision of the congress on questions of electing the chairman of the Council of the Russian Lawyers' Association shall be taken by secret ballot, and for the remaining leading organs—by open, simple majority vote of the delegates taking part in its work.

28. The Russian Lawyers' Association shall be headed by the chairman of the Council of the Association, who shall be elected by the delegates to the Congress for five years.

29. The procedure for electing a deputy chairman of the council and other organs of the Association shall be determined by the Congress.

30. The leading organ of the Russian Lawyers' Association in the period between congresses shall be the Council of the Association, which shall convene not less than once a year.

31. The working organ of the Council of the Association shall be the Board, which shall be formed by the Council from its membership.

32. The Council of the Association shall approve the budgeted income and expenditures, the staff structure, and the procedure for paying staff employees of the Russian Lawyers' Association.

VI. Finances and Property of the Russian Lawyers' Association

33. The sources for the formation of the monetary assets of the Russian Lawyers' Association shall be:

- initial and annual membership dues from members of the Association;
- voluntary donations from juridical persons and citizens; and,
- other receipts.

34. Collegia of Russian lawyers may concentrate their monetary resources at the Association's clearing house according to established procedure in order to render mutual assistance.

35. The Russian Lawyers' Association shall enjoy the right of a juridical person, and shall have its own press and clearing account in the bank at the location of its board.

36. The Russian Lawyers' Association may be liquidated upon the decision of the republic congress of members of the Lawyers' Association. All property and monetary resources remaining after liquidation of the Association shall be transferred to the organs designated in the decision of the congress.

37. The Russian Lawyers' Association, its property and financial resources shall not be subject to assessment by state, republic or local taxes or collections.

38. The Association and its regulation shall be subject to registration in accordance with procedure established by law.

COPYRIGHT: "Sovetskaya yustitsiya", 1990

Yerevan Internal Affairs Official Requests Public Support in Crime Control

90US1163A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
6 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by S. Atarbekyan, chief, Yerevan Internal Affairs Administration: "What Will We Reap?"]

[Text] Whether we like it or not, the alarming situation that has currently evolved in Yerevan is throwing not only the residents of our capital but also the republic's entire population into turmoil. And this is understandable, since Yerevan is not simply a city and a capital—it is perhaps the only firm ground upon which all Armenians rest, and from which they take their strength, faith and the hope for better days and better fortune, whether they live in the republic, in the country, or beyond its borders.

Have we, the citizens of Yerevan, the right to avoid this fact for even an instant, can we ignore the mission bestowed upon us, do we dare destroy the faith of thousands upon thousands of our compatriots in Yerevan and in the citizens of Yerevan?

Unfortunately, the alarming succession of events is capable of instilling pessimism: A day does not go by without a murder, a robbery, a theft. A day does not go by without operational summaries communicating more and more new violations: seizure of arms, their criminal use, violations of state symbols, destruction of monuments.... In six months of this year, 16 murders, 30 robberies, 20 thefts of the property of citizens and 155 apartment burglaries were registered. Six hundred fifteen motor vehicles were stolen, including 350 state-owned vehicles and 255 private ones, and 30 persons died in traffic accidents. The tragic events of May, which shook up the entire republic, are a special item.

When we add together all of the crimes reported in each daily summary, we find that in 180 days, various sorts of

tragedies, large and small, have befallen first one Yerevan family and then another. And this is in a time when the nerves of the people are strained to the limit by the perpetual uncertainty and anxiety (a consequence of an unstable socioeconomic life), when almost every Yerevan family has experienced, indirectly if not directly, the consequences of tragic December and the revelry of nationalism in the neighboring republic.... Given such a combination of negative phenomena, it's hard not to fall into despair.

We, the representatives of the Yerevan militia, are precisely the ones that are being reproached for all of this by the capital's residents. Is it right for us to turn control over the city to irresponsible persons, hooligans and criminals in such a critical time for our nation? The people are clearly right in demanding stability. Nonetheless, let's try to clarify the causes and consequences of such a tense criminological situation, and determine the share of responsibility borne by both the militia and the city's residents.

The rise in crime in the capital over the last few years is not an accident—it is a phenomenon to be expected. A crime wave is always observed in all places during and after great social cataclysms. I think that there is no need to comment on the cause of this—fish are caught easier in muddy water. Unfortunately this simple truth, which is known to every professional and even the nonprofessional, is not heeded for some reason by the central mass media. Armenia is portrayed to the people of the country as a center of extremism, terrorism and the revelry of criminal behavior, **although not one of the forms of crimes committed not only in Yerevan but in the republic as well is inherent today to only our republic alone.**

The vigilante detachments are also not a purely Armenian invention, but a phenomenon typical of the entire country. It has come into being in one form or another wherever conflict has surfaced on interethnic soil. Incidentally, while running down these detachments so consistently and energetically, and labeling them as terrorists and so on indiscriminately, without trial and investigation, the same mass media timidly kept silent about the activities of the bands, the formations in the neighboring republic, which were armed to the teeth and which not only committed mass murders of Armenians but also sowed panic in the ranks of the regular army, or they broadcast or printed retouched and sanitized versions of what they did.

Moreover a rise in crime in general, and in crimes committed with seized or stolen weapons in particular, is observed throughout the entire country, though the official organs of union mass media are not sounding the alarm vigorously in regard to this matter. To readers who are unfamiliar with operational summaries of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], I would advise reading the article "The Undeclared War," carried in the March issue of the monthly SOVERSHENNO SEKRETNOST. The article was written on the basis of materials provided by the RSFSR MVD. Not only the

criminal statistics themselves, which document an enormous increase in crime, and especially in serious crime, in just one month of this year—February, but also the details of these crimes astound the imagination: **In almost every case a silent weapon or firearm was used.**

It's another matter when criminal elements join the fray or inveterate recidivists pawn themselves off as people's protectors, capitalizing on the complexity of the situation and on the ineptness and disorganization of vigilante detachments.... Unfortunately, things like this happen. Things like this need to be fought, and primarily by us, workers of the MVD.

Let me say frankly that the Yerevan militia was itself not ready for such a fight. There were many reasons for this. But the main one was that **from the very moment these detachments were formed, state and law enforcement organs distanced themselves from control over their organization and activity. And they began showing uneasiness and concern only after they were confronted by the revelry of armed criminals who clothed themselves in the noble toga of people's protectors.** It will not be easy for law enforcement organs to separate the grain from the chaff, nor will it be easy to disarm the gangs of armed criminals. First of all because it took the authorities a long time to agree to make categorical decisions (because of the behavior of their aggressive neighbor, of course), and secondly because ours is a people's militia, and not a professional one. That is, there are many in the ranks of the militia who are prepared neither morally nor physically to offer resistance to armed bandits. We must of course decisively rid ourselves of such workers. But where are we to find better ones, given the unchecked lawlessness, the total defenselessness of the representatives of law and order before the law? Where are we to find personnel capable of assuming the hypertrophied responsibility at minimum pay (even after raises)? It is, after all, the rank-and-file, and not the leadership, that is the first to come in contact with violators of the law. The rest of the echelons join in for their neutralization later on, when the danger subsides.

Add to this the enormous stress—physical, nervous—experienced over the last three years (the militia was also affected by all of the woes, after all—the December tragedy, the crisis in interethnic relations, the price of an unstable sociopolitical situation), the times of unending, anxious daily work at the risk of one's life, the unending tension—and then you can come to at least an inkling of what the Yerevan militia is like today.

In sharing openly with Yerevan's citizens, in openly explaining to them the extremely difficult problems of the militia, and particularly of the Yerevan militia, I have absolutely no expectations of receiving any kind of indulgence from them for the errors in our work. My goal is but one—to win the understanding, help and support of our urban residents. Without such unification of effort, let me say frankly that we will not be successful.

I also hope for some understanding in another important matter. Cases of violation of state symbols and destruction of monuments have increased in frequency. Is this really the face of a civilized people? Is this really a means of expressing public activity and political convictions? And what is it that is being violated? Monuments of outstanding contributors to world culture, whose works have become the property of not just one specific nation but of the entire world community. Where is the line to be drawn between reason and emotion? All right, let's assume that we station a couple of policemen at each monument. But is this really the solution to the problem? Of course not. The solution lies in a greater propaganda effort, in which both formal and informal public organizations need to unite their efforts.

Let me mention one other area where the society's assistance and support are needed. Analysis of crimes committed since the beginning of the year shows that the militia was unable to take efficient steps to prevent many of them.

Thus, murders were committed at night in the home, at night in the street. But even crimes committed during the day were not registered immediately by police on duty at the time—because of the absence of information, and consequently the passiveness of the population. Here is another fact that causes us to ponder: Only a few murderers were former convicts; many murders were committed during acts of hooliganism, and on the soil of family and personal conflicts. This says that the murders were the culmination of fist-fights and arguments, and persons other than inveterate recidivists are resorting to murder. We have to conclude that raised voices were heard, that neighbors and passersby witnessed the fights, but no one made an attempt to separate and calm the adversaries down. Had any one of the unwitting witnesses performed his civic duty, at least by telephoning the militia, these tragedies may not have occurred, and probably many of the lawbreakers could have been cooled down.

Besides murders, other forms of crime have also grown in frequency—thefts of personal property and of motor vehicles, robberies and so on. And once again, without relieving the militia of the responsibility for solving such crimes, let me recall that every victim also bears a share of the blame and responsibility.

Sad as it may be, the impression is created that most of the city's residents prefer to maintain the illusion that things like this always happen to the other guy, and that they emerge from their state of tranquil indifference only when it finally happens to them.

I do recognize that it is not easy for people to do their civic duty, it is not easy for them to defend their own honor, when they are cognizant of the fact that the criminal is probably carrying a firearm. Unfortunately this probability is close to a certainty today.

It was precisely this tragic reality that touched off the crime wave, not only neutralizing the action of citizens

but also significantly increasing the number of tragic results of crimes, thus critically complicating the work of the militia.

However, let me assure the citizens of Yerevan that armed bandits will not be committing the malicious acts unchecked for long. Both the Communist Party Central Committee and the government of the republic have officially condemned all of this. Law enforcement organs have set a firm course toward disarming and neutralizing criminal groups.

Will the citizens of Yerevan be able to breathe more easily after the measures are implemented successfully? I can't give a definite answer to that, unfortunately, because the list of crimes being committed today is not limited solely to those of armed criminals. Many violations are also committed on the soil of alcoholic intoxication.

Unfortunately, the ideal conditions for this have been created in Yerevan. Despite the extreme food shortage, cooperative public food services are growing like mushrooms after a rain. With their immoderately high prices, they frightened people of modest means away from them a long time ago, but on the other side of the coin they have opened their doors wide to the unchecked, reckless revelry of various sorts of questionable elements grown rich from extremely doubtful sources. Moreover, no thought has been given to determining the places where such facilities would be permitted to open.

Drunken orgies often end with knifings, with murders. What is the solution? To return to the times of prohibition? Of course not. We need something else—local soviets must follow the principles of reasonable sufficiency when they give their "O.K." to the birth of a cooperative public food service facility, giving primary consideration to the crime situation within their region and heeding the opinion of law enforcement organs. Finally, the places where the sale of alcoholic beverages can be permitted, and until what hour, must be determined on a city-wide scale. Incidentally, informal organizations could provide considerable help to Yerevan's militia in eradicating crimes committed under the influence. In appealing for their cooperation and assistance, the militia consider the fact that during the days of national rallies and demonstrations in the city, not a single violation of public order due to drunkenness was registered. Why? Because the citizens of Yerevan opted for abstinence namely in response to an appeal from informal organizations. Meaning that the impassioned pleas of people's propagandists did reach the consciousness of the masses. Why can't they encourage the people to respect order and display civilized behavior today?

Let me summarize. Dear citizens of Yerevan! Your militia is doing everything it can to restore order in your city. But together with you, with your active assistance and support. We will be pleased to work together with all interested organs and organizations, city and local soviets,

formal and informal public associations, and labor collectives for the sake of one goal—peace in the homes and families of Yerevan.

The city's Internal Affairs Administration has put together an entire package of measures and recommendations on improving the personal and social conditions of the citizens of Yerevan, on improving the city's ecological environment, on solving the traffic problem, and on creating a healthy way of life for the city's residents. However, the extreme situation existing in the city is keeping us from focusing the attention of the militia on solving the urgent problems of Yerevan and its citizens. So let's tackle this situation together.

Turkmen Legislation on Disciplinary Action for Judges, Assessors

90UN2264A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 7 Jun 90 p 2

["Statute on Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges, Recall and Early Dismissal of Judges and People's Assessors of the Turkmen SSR Courts"]

[Text] I. Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges

1. In accordance with Article 18 of the USSR Law "On the Status of Judges in the USSR," a judge may be subjected to disciplinary responsibility in connection with guilty action or inaction:

- a) for the violation of legality in the review of court cases;
- b) for the commission of another official misdemeanor;
- c) for the commission of a defamatory action.

The abolition or change of a court decision in and of themselves do not entail the responsibility of a judge who took part in the pronouncement of this decision if, in so doing, he did not allow a premeditated violation of the law or carelessness entailing important consequences.

2. A qualified collegium of judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet reviews cases dealing with disciplinary misdemeanors:

- a) of judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court;
- b) chairmen and deputy chairmen of oblast and Ashkhabad city courts.

Qualified collegia of judges of the courts in the oblasts review questions of the disciplinary responsibility of the members of the oblast courts and the people's judges of the rayon (city) people's courts of the oblasts.

A qualified collegium of judges of the courts in the city of Ashkhabad reviews questions of the disciplinary responsibility of members of the Ashkhabad City Court and the people's judges of the rayon people's courts of the city of Ashkhabad.

A qualified collegium of people's judges of the rayon (city) people's judges of the rayons and cities of republic subordination reviews questions of the disciplinary responsibility of the people's judges of these regions.

3. The right to institute disciplinary proceedings belongs to:

- the chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court—with respect to all judges of the courts of the Turkmen SSR;
- the minister of justice of the Turkmen SSR—with respect to the judges of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts and rayon (city) people's courts;
- the chairmen of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts—with respect to the judges of these courts and the people's judges of the rayon (city) people's courts in the oblasts and the city of Ashkhabad;
- the chiefs of the departments of justice of the executive committees of the oblast Soviets of People's Deputies—with respect to the people's judges of the rayon (city) people's courts in the oblasts.

The chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court and the chairmen of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts may institute disciplinary proceedings with respect to the judges of the corresponding courts on all grounds indicated in point 1 of the present statute.

The minister of justice of the Turkmen SSR and the chiefs of the departments of justice of the executive committees of the oblast Soviets of People's Deputies may institute disciplinary proceedings on the grounds indicated in the sub-points "b" and "c" of point 1 of the present statute.

4. A judge may be subjected to disciplinary punishment no later than 1 month from the day of the discovery of the misdemeanor, not counting the time of the official examination or the absence of the judge from work for a valid reason, but no later than 1 year from the day of perpetration.

5. The person instituting disciplinary proceedings in a preliminary way verifies the information pertaining to the grounds for the institution of proceedings against the judge and obtains from him a written explanation on demand.

The institution of disciplinary proceedings is decided by the chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet and the chairmen of oblast and Ashkhabad city courts, and orders are issued by the minister of justice of the Turkmen SSR and the chiefs of the departments of justice of the departments of justice of the executive committees of the oblast Soviets of People's Deputies. In the decision and the order the grounds for the disciplinary proceedings, established by preliminary verification, must be indicated. The decision or the order, with the necessary materials, are sent for review to the corresponding qualified collegium of judges.

Before sending the materials of a disciplinary proceeding to the qualified collegium, the judge against whom it is being instituted must be acquainted with it. In so doing, the judge has the right to present additional explanations or petition for additional verification.

6. The decision or order concerning the institution of a disciplinary proceeding may be recalled by the person instituting it prior to the examination of the case in the qualified collegium.

A judge, with respect to whom a decision or order to institute disciplinary proceedings is recalled, has the right to demand the examination of his case on the substance by the qualified collegium.

7. Prior to the beginning of the examination of a case, if necessary, an additional verification of the grounds for institution of disciplinary proceedings against the judge is conducted, which is entrusted by the chairman of the collegium to one of the members of the collegium. In so doing, in the necessary cases additional documents and materials are obtained on demand, as well as the court cases, in the examination of which the judge committed a violation of the law.

8. The qualified collegium examines disciplinary cases with a complement of at least one-half of its members. During the absence of the chairman of the qualified collegium, his duties are carried out by his deputy or by one of the members of the collegium, who decides all the questions connected with the organization of the work of the collegium.

9. The disciplinary case must be examined no later than within a month from the day of its receipt in the qualified collegium.

10. In the examination of a disciplinary case by the qualified collegium, the participation of the judge against whom the disciplinary proceeding is being instituted is obligatory.

Other judges, as well as the official who instituted the disciplinary proceeding, or his representative, have the right to participate in the examination of the case.

11. The chairman announces the opening of the session and makes public the composition of the qualified collegium. The judge may reject members of the collegium prior to the beginning of the examination of the case. The question of rejection is subject to review by the membership of the collegium.

The examination of a disciplinary case begins with report of the chairman or one of the members of the collegium. The person instituting disciplinary proceedings has the right to set forth his opinion. The hearing of the explanations of the judge is obligatory.

In the course of the session, the judge against whom disciplinary proceedings are being instituted has the right at any time to petition and to give additional

explanations. At the discretion of the collegium, information of other persons, invited both at the initiative of the judge and the qualified collegium, may be heard, documents may be made public and others may be investigated that are available in the case, as well as materials presented in addition.

A protocol is kept in the session of the collegium.

12. The qualified collegium can decide concerning:

- the imposition of disciplinary punishment;
- the termination of disciplinary proceedings;
- the sending of the materials of a disciplinary proceeding to organs which have the right raise the question of the recall of a judge or the institution of criminal proceedings against him.

13. The collegium may impose disciplinary penalties:

- a) rebuke;
- b) reprimand;
- c) severe reprimand.

In the imposition of penalties, the character of the violation, its consequences, the seriousness of the misdemeanor, the personality of the judge, and the level of his guilt are taken into account.

14. The qualified collegium terminates disciplinary proceedings in view of:

- the groundlessness of the institution of disciplinary proceedings against a judge;
- the passing of the terms for the institution of disciplinary proceedings envisaged by point 4 of the present Statute;
- the inexpediency of the imposition of disciplinary punishment in cases where it finds it possible to limit itself only to the examination of the materials in a case in the session.

15. The decision in regard to a disciplinary case is taken by a majority vote of the members of the collegium taking part in the review of the case, is set forth in written form, and is signed by the chairman and the members of the collegium.

In case of disagreement with the decision adopted in the case by the members of the collegium, those who found themselves in the minority do not sign the decision of the collegium and set forth their separate opinion in written form. The separate opinion is appended to the case.

The decision in a disciplinary case is pronounced in the conference room.

The decision in a disciplinary case is made public in a session of the qualified collegium.

16. The following must be indicated in a decision in a disciplinary case: the designation of the collegium, its membership; the place and time of the examination of the case; the surname, name, patronymic and position of the judge, who is subjected to disciplinary responsibility; the position and surname of the person who instituted disciplinary proceedings; the circumstances of the case; the explanations of the judge and the information which characterizes his personality; the justification of the decision taken, with indication of the evidence; the measure of disciplinary punishment or the justification of the termination of the disciplinary proceeding, as well as the procedure for an appeal of the decision.

17. A copy of the decision in a disciplinary case, within a 3-day period from the time of its pronouncement, is sent to the judge with respect to whom it was pronounced, to the person who institute the disciplinary proceeding, and with respect to people's judges also to the minister of justice of the Turkmen SSR and the chief of the department of justice of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, with respect to the judges of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts—to the minister of justice of the Turkmen SSR and the chairman of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts.

A copy of the decision is joined to the personnel file of the judge.

18. If the organ before which, in accordance of the decision of the qualified collegium, the question about the recall of a judge, and/or the institution of criminal proceedings against him, is raised, does not find grounds for this, the disciplinary proceeding is returned to the qualified collegium and is renewed. The time from the moment of the pronouncement of the original decision to the return of the materials is not included in the terms of the institution of disciplinary proceedings provided for by point 4 of the present Statute.

19. The decision of the qualified collegium of the judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court concerning the imposition of disciplinary punishment may be appealed by the judge, with respect to whom it was pronounced, to the qualified collegium of judges of the USSR Supreme Court within a 2-week period from the day of its pronouncement, and the decisions of the qualified collegia of judges of the courts in the oblasts, the city of Ashkhabad, the rayons, and the cities of republic subordination—to the qualified collegium of judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court within the same period.

An appeal for review of a decision is examined by the qualified collegium of judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court within 1 month from the day of receipt. The person who made the appeal may be present in the session of the collegium. The decision of the qualified collegium of judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court on the appeal is final.

20. The qualified collegium of judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court has the right:

- to leave the decision without change, and the appeal without satisfaction;
- to repeal the decision and to accept a review of the question of disciplinary responsibility of the judge for its execution;
- to repeal the decision and terminate the disciplinary proceeding;
- to change the decision and to impose a milder punishment on the judge.

A copy of the decision pronounced on the appeal is sent in accordance with the rules of point 17 of the present Statute;

21. If within 1 year from the day of the imposition of disciplinary punishment, the judge is not subjected to new disciplinary punishment, he is considered as not having been subject to disciplinary punishment.

Upon presentation of the person who instituted disciplinary proceedings, as well as on its own initiative, the qualified collegium which imposed disciplinary punishment, may, upon expiration of no less than 6 months from the day of the imposition of the punishment, lift it ahead of schedule if the conduct of the judge has been irreproachable and he has been conscientious in the execution of his duties.

II. Recall and Early Dismissal of Judges and People's Assessors

22. In accordance with Article 17 of the USSR Law "On the Status of Judges in the USSR," judges and people's assessors of the courts of the Turkmen SSR may be deprived of their authority ahead of schedule for the violation of socialist legality or the perpetration of a defamatory action incompatible with their high calling, by none other than by recall of the organ which elected them, or by the voters, as well as owing to the verdict of guilty of the court having taken place and having entered into legal force.

The judges and people's assessors of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court, the judges of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts, the rayon (city) people's courts of the rayons and cities of republic subordination may be recalled by the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet.

The judges of the rayon (city) people's courts in the oblasts and the city of Ashkhabad and the people's assessors of the oblasts and Ashkhabad city courts may be recalled by the Soviet of People's Deputies which elected them.

The people's assessors of the rayon (city) people's courts may be recalled by meetings of citizens at the place of election of the people's assessors.

23. The right to raise the question of the recall of judges and people's assessors belongs to:

- the chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet—with respect to the chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court;
- the chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court—with respect to the judges and people's assessors of the courts of the Turkmen SSR on all the grounds provided for by point 22 of the present Statute;
- the minister of justice of the Turkmen SSR—with respect to the judges and people's assessors of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts, the people's judges and people's assessors of the rayon (city) people's courts for the perpetration of a defamatory action incompatible with the high calling of judge and people's assessor;
- the chairmen of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts—with respect to the judges and people's assessors of these courts and the rayon (city) people's courts in the oblasts and the city of Ashkhabad on all the grounds provided for by point 22 of the present Statute;
- the chiefs of the departments of justice of the executive committees of the oblast Soviets of People's Deputies—with respect to the judges and people's assessors of the rayon (city) people's courts in the oblasts for the perpetration of a defamatory action incompatible with the high calling of judge and people's assessor;
- the chairmen of the rayon (city) people's courts—with respect to the people's assessors of these courts on all the grounds provided for by point 22 of the present Statute;
- the meetings of voters—with respect to the people's assessors of the rayon (city) people's courts elected by them for the perpetration of a defamatory action incompatible with the high calling of people's assessor.

24. Persons raising the question of recall organize a careful verification of the materials that served as the grounds for raising this question, inform the judge or the people's assessor concerning the raising of the question of his recall and the reasons for the recall, and obtain a written explanation on demand.

The materials that served as the grounds for raising the question of the recall of a judge are sent for the giving of a conclusion: with respect to the judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court, the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts—to the qualified collegium of judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court, and with respect to the other judges—to qualified collegia of judges of the courts in the oblasts and the city of Ashkhabad, of people's judges of the courts of the rayons and cities of republic subordination.

The decision of the qualified collegium of judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court and the qualified collegia of the judges of the lower courts may be appealed by the

judges with respect to whom it was pronounced, respectively to the qualified collegium of judges of the USSR Supreme Court and the qualified collegium of judges of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court in accordance with the procedure provided for by point 19 of the present Statute.

25. Representations concerning the recall of judges and people's assessors are submitted for review of the organ that elected them, that is respectively the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, the oblast and Ashkhabad city Soviets of People's Deputies, and with respect to the people's assessors of the rayon (city) people's courts—for review of the meeting of citizens at the place of election of the people's deputy.

Representations about the recall of judges are submitted by:

- the chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court—concerning the recall of judges of the courts of the Turkmen SSR on all the grounds envisaged by point 22 of the present Statute. Representations are submitted with regard to the decision of the corresponding qualified collegium of judges, and concerning the recall of the judges of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts, the people's judges of the rayon (city) courts, for the perpetration of a defamatory action incompatible with the high calling of judge—also with regard to the decision of the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Justice;
- the minister of justice of the Turkmen SSR—concerning the recall of the judges of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts, the people's judges of the rayon (city) people's courts for the perpetration of a defamatory action incompatible with the high calling of judge. Representations are submitted with regard to the decision of the corresponding qualified collegium of judges and the opinion of the chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court.

The decisions of the qualified collegium of judges and respectively the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Justice with respect to the recall of a judge are appended to the representation.

Representations concerning the recall of people's assessors are submitted by the chairmen of the corresponding courts.

26. The representation concerning the recall of a people's assessor of the rayon (city) people's court is examined by the meeting of the labor collective being convened by the trade union committee or the council of the labor collective, or by the meeting of citizens at the place of their residence, being convened by the executive committee of the rayon, city rayon, city, settlement, and rural Soviet of People's Deputies. The decision is taken by the majority of votes in an open vote. The presence, at the session, of the people's deputy with respect to whom the question of recall is being raised is obligatory.

In the case a people's assessor fails to appear at the meeting without valid reasons, the question of recall may be examined in his absence.

The protocol of the meeting is presented to the executive committee of the corresponding local Soviet of People's Deputies, which reports the decision of the meeting to the chairman of the rayon (city) people's court.

27. The entry of the sentence into legal force with respect to a judge or people's assessor is an independent basis for the early deprivation of authority.

28. Judges and people's assessors may be released from the execution of their duties ahead of schedule:

- on the basis of the state of health preventing the continuation of work;
- as a consequence of their election to another post or transfer, with their consent, to other work;
- of their own accord.

29. The early dismissal of judges and people's assessors is effected by the organ which elected them, that is respectively by the Turkmen SSR Supreme Council, the oblast and Ashkhabad city Soviets of People's Deputies, and of the people's assessors of the rayon (city) people's courts—by meetings of citizens at the place of election of the people's deputy.

Representations concerning early dismissal are submitted:

- with respect to judges and people's assessors of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court—by the chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court;
- with respect to the other courts—by the minister of justice of the Turkmen SSR;
- with respect to the people's assessors of the oblast and Ashkhabad city courts and the rayon (city) people's courts—by the chairmen of these courts.

Decree of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet

On the Confirmation of the Statute on the Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges, the Recall and Early Dismissal of Judges and People's Assessors of the Courts of the Turkmen SSR

In accordance with Articles 17 and 18 of the USSR Law "On the Status of Judges in the USSR", the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

To confirm the Statute on the Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges, the Recall and Early Dismissal of Judges and People's Assessors of the Turkmen SSR (appended).

S. Niyazov, chairman,
Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet.
Ashabad [as published], 24 May 1990.

Gosteleradio Chairman Comments on Soviet TV Issues

90US0131A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 Aug 90 p 4

[Interview with M. Nenashev, chairman of USSR Gosteleradio, by S. Zavorotnyy: "Television Cannot Be Better Than Life"]

[Text] [Zavorotnyy] Mikhail Fedorovich, you are one of those leaders who have their own concept, a television philosophy, as you have called it. It can essentially be reduced to three functions: to inform, to persuade and to console. When it comes to information, it is doubtful that anyone would venture to argue with you. But the others.... It was not easy to eliminate Article 6 from our life, after all. In this situation, if persuasion is needed, just who is to be persuaded? And Why?

[Nenashev] What is it that frightens you? Propaganda and advocacy—words close to us in their primordial nature. I have my own point of view. One can agree or disagree with it, but in actual fact we not only inform people but also deliberately influence their minds.

Moreover, persuading does not at all mean imposing our own views. We increasingly represent diverse viewpoints today. It is the job of the viewer or listener to think and form his own opinion. Of course, one cannot fail to see the great influence we have on people. Let us be candid. Television is an enormous force today. It can rouse the nation in two days. It can also cause people to think about the fate of their nation, and calm them....

[Zavorotnyy] You maintain that television should "comfort," should be a sort of confessor, a mentor of the viewers. But could Central Television have claimed to do this only quite recently? Are people really drawn to you even today? They are simply forced to watch what is offered, because they have no other choice. And then, everyone is casting stones at you, from the left and from the right. Where is the confessor here?

[Nenashev] Yes, the gap between our intentions and the actual possibilities is truly great at this time. And our sick society's need for a confessor is therefore all the greater. Who can claim that role today? Who can influence the moral climate? Who can defuse the society's accumulated aggravation? Television does not have a monopoly on this, of course, but it can do a great deal. Something else: Propaganda and enlightenment were always among the best traditions of Russia's intelligentsia even before the revolution. Propaganda and enlightenment will always be needed. They must go hand in hand, persuading, advocating and shaping spirituality.

[Zavorotnyy] Judging from our mail, most of our viewers expect something else from television. They simply want to watch an interesting program or a film in the evening. Unfortunately, with the exception of a few programs—forgive me for saying it—there is nothing to watch.

[Nenashev] I consider this complaint, which has been around exactly as long as television, to be unprofessional. You will agree that the interests of the people (and we are talking about millions) are so diverse that even decades from now there will be critics saying there is nothing to watch. With respect specifically to our times, this is not the fault but the misfortune of television. Our society is politicized to the extreme. For weeks and months on end, all the channels carry broadcasts of congresses, sessions and conferences. Television cannot be better than life.

[Zavorotnyy] Who is forcing you to do that?

[Nenashev] The legislators.

[Zavorotnyy] And how are the television viewers reacting?

[Nenashev] At first they found it very interesting. Now they are increasingly calling upon us not to lose our common sense.

[Zavorotnyy] You have more than once spoken out for alternative television. What specifically has been done toward this? On 14 July the President of the USSR issued the ukase "On the Democratization and Development of Television and Radio Broadcasting in the USSR," which defines the rights of soviets at all level, public organizations and parties with respect to setting up television and radio studios with their own means or by renting air time from USSR Gosteleradio. Are you prepared to satisfy such requests from the public or from new political parties?

[Nenashev] No.

[Zavorotnyy] But you have the equipment, the channels....

[Nenashev] No, neither the equipment nor the channels. Unfortunately, until now the society has not been informed about the humiliating backwardness of our television. Only ignorance can explain the numerous demands for new television channels. And our nation still has only two relatively fully developed All-Union channels: the 1st and 2nd programs, which we broadcast from Moscow to four time zones. They are therefore loaded to the limit. In addition, local television operates on them. Cable television is therefore a realistic alternative right now. With respect to broadcasting to the entire nation, our present facilities do not allow us to set up television even for Russia with our own independent facilities, something we need very much.

[Zavorotnyy] Television promptly noticed that our vanguard needs assistance and support. Programs were started on party problems. I believe they helped to reveal trouble spots to the Communists. Do you not intend to provide the same kind of assistance with the development of a multiparty system?

[Nenashev] You must understand that prospects for the development of a multiparty system absolutely do not

depend upon whether or not the Communist Party Central Committee or television supports it. That is incorrect thinking. A multiparty system comes into being on the strength of a certain level of democracy and public-political conditions. This is a natural process. It cannot be implanted from the top. Certain democratic conditions have to mature. We still do not have them. Judge for yourself. The Law on Public-Political Movements and Organizations has not yet been passed. The society itself is not ready, and not all of the essential democratic conditions have been created for the emergence of these parties and movements. A political party apparently has to start at the beginning: begin with the press and then, perhaps, set up television and radio studios on a cooperative basis. For now, as the President's ukase indicated, we have to think about renting air time, about television and radio programs on which representatives of public movements and parties could speak.

[Zavorotnyy] It is no secret to anyone that the situation surrounding your department is far from tranquil. Do you not sometimes feel like a military leader who has to wage war constantly? I refer to the case of the "7 Days" program, the conflicts with the leaders of "Viewpoint" and "Before and After Midnight," and finally, the conflict with Leningrad Television....

[Nenashev] Our department is indeed receiving more than enough criticism. That is the only commodity today, however, which is not in short supply. There is a lot of criticism also in foreign publications. They are not ignoring us, which means that they "respect" us. And some of the comments are fairly strange. Quite recently, for example, I read this curious opinion in one of the foreign newspapers: In Russia they still have to understand the phenomenon of universal political hysteria which is instilled and maintained deliberately and in a fairly organized manner by the Central Television agencies. Kashpirovskiy and Chumak have been replaced with prolonged—week- and month-long—coverage of congresses and sessions of soviet and party organs. They have still not set up laboratories for tracing the effect on people's minds of prolonged televising of important public-political activities. And one can only assume that such programs not only encourage trust or intensify disappointment, but also sow discord and uncertainty and excessively irritate the viewers, many of whom want to see something else, want to be soothed and entertained.

There are also attempts by foreign colleagues to depict us as obtuse conservatives by taking arbitrarily and out of context from this or that speech such statements as "I am no longer afraid of the party monopoly but of the despotism of democracy." In response to numerous and contradictory comments on the subjectivism of our radio and television interviews and commentary at the 28th CPSU Congress, I said that subjectivism could be avoided and everything could be presented with total objectivity only "if no interviews at all are conducted and no commentary is presented." Radio Liberty picked

up on this sentence and quoted it out of context as my position. How does one object to this?

A few words about the "600 Seconds" program: I can say without deceit that it does not impress me. Why? Because it is based on information presented for its shock value. The producer himself does not deny this. I am against information for shock value, because it is frequently oriented toward the limited individual. Naturally, all of this grates on the nerves. And the Soviet people today are already galled by the numerous hassles.

And now something about "7 Days." I can frankly say that no one banned the program. Neither the government nor the Central Committee. There was a specific recommendation that we restore the Sunday "Time" program. And we did so, because we could see that there had developed a certain rivalry between the two programs and a shifting of the two genres. The general opinion is that "7 Days" consists more of commentary than of information. A shifting of genres occurred. This is always very punishable.

[Zavorotnyy] How will the fate of "7 Days" be decided? What will become of Tikhomirov?

[Nenashev] The "7 Days" program needs to be restored, but we must avoid the conflicts it evoked. How this is done will depend in great part upon us. With respect to A.N. Tikhomirov, since he has become a people's deputy he needs our support and tutelage least of all.

[Zavorotnyy] To my knowledge, 14 of your associates have been elected deputies of the RSFSR.

[Nenashev] Yes. Incidentally, in the West there is a rule that if a journalist becomes a deputy, he must give up his professional job during his term in parliament. Some of our commentators refused to participate in the election campaign, preferring television journalism.

[Zavorotnyy] In that case what awaits these 14?

[Nenashev] I do not know. You will have to ask them. Some of them will possibly want to become politicians....

[Zavorotnyy] You leave the choice up to them?

[Nenashev] Yes, of course. We want no discrimination.

[Zavorotnyy] How do you explain this phenomenon? Fourteen deputies all from Gosteleradio?

[Nenashev] Without belittling the merits of any of these deputies, I would say it is primarily due to the enormous popularity of television.

[Zavorotnyy] Judging from the mail from readers, the programs we have been discussing enjoy great popularity among the television viewers. But your relations with their producers are far from ideal. Perhaps our readers are mistaken. Does Gosteleradio have its own system for rating the popularity of television programs?

[Nenashev] I would answer this question with a question. Are relations between editors and journalists in your editorial office serene? I am convinced that the more professional a journalist, the more individual will be his work style and the more difficult it will be to define relations with him. This is how it has always been, and the way it will always be. It is entirely a matter of assuring that the interests of the job and not personal ambitions prevail in these complex relations, on both sides. Our rating system still has flaws. And we particularly need it for objectively evaluating the programs and producers.

In essence and structure we are a monopolistic system today. And the editorial boards are the monopolists in television. While for a newspaper the day begins with competition, with a screening of articles, there is no such competition in television. It is therefore particularly important for us to know the viewpoint of the reader or viewer? We try to reveal it by means of our Center for Sociological Studies and numerous letters from television viewers. According to the studies, the programs "Time," "Before and After Midnight," "Viewpoint," KVN, "A Soldier's Song," "This Was... It Was..." and "Music on the Air" enjoy consistent popularity.

[Zavorotnyy] Does your party position influence the content of the programs and Gosteleradio policy?

[Nenashev] It does to the extent that it reflects the interests of and serves the society and the people. But let us not play games. Like it or not, ours is state-run, Soviet, socialist television. And in this respect it has a specific public purpose. The main thing in this purpose of Central Television today is to protect the restructuring from pressure from both the right and the left. I am a proponent of M.S. Gorbachev's position, and I do not hide it. I view the restructuring as a revolutionary process. Just that: a process, and not a destructive avalanche. I believe that one should not trifle or improvise with a revolution, and I therefore do not support those who attempt to take the nation out of the crisis by means of extreme measures or shock therapy.

Fierce debate is underway in television, as it is everywhere else. Some say that we want to be like OGONEK; others, like MOLODAYA GWARDIYA. I believe that television should be neither the one nor the other, because it is too powerful an information weapon to take extreme positions.

[Zavorotnyy] Do you not regret taking on such a heavy burden? You are never home. At work there are nothing but problems....

[Nenashev] You know, in this life I am accustomed to being a camel, which carries its heavy burden, carries as much as is loaded onto it, carries it where it is supposed to go, never straying off the path and never floundering. And the little curs always bark at one with a load.

[Zavorotnyy] To what ideal, to what oasis would you like to take our television?

[Nenashev] To me, the ideal for television is not political. The ideal for my television is one of advocacy, spiritual, artistic.

Right now I am most concerned about... economic accountability. The State Committee for Cinematography has converted to a new system of renting out films. We now have to pay for everything, and no small amount at that. Where will we get this kind of money? An enormous amount, around 600 million rubles. We can give up renting films, but this would deprive millions of people of the opportunity to see films. Think of the small towns, settlements and communities where television is the only source of culture, the only theater. The state has no intention of giving us this money at the present time. I do not know what we can do.

[Zavorotnyy] But Gosteleradio has its own commercial channel. It serves only Moscow, to be sure....

[Nenashev] Unfortunately, the commercial channel is not yet earning anything. It has taken only the first step toward paying its own way. It also has some negative aspects. The commercial channel is crammed with tasteless programming, even out-and-out vulgarity. We clearly do not have enough taste. I see entertainment and cognitive activities as this channel's future, in which advertising's only purpose will be to cover all the other expenses.

[Zavorotnyy] How do you feel about the commercialization of television?

[Nenashev] We are all moving toward a market [economy]. This is an inevitable process. And then television is also an industry. Since it is that, it must earn. Even with the "Time" program... Why not? Last year we earned in the neighborhood of 40 million rubles with our commercial undertakings.

[Zavorotnyy] How much do you earn today?

[Nenashev] Nine hundred rubles.

[Zavorotnyy] And when you started to work?

[Nenashev] One hundred and five rubles as an assistant in a department.

[Zavorotnyy] Directing Gosteleradio is a difficult job even physically. Are you concerned about your health? How do you relieve yourself of stress?

[Nenashev] I jog in the morning. That is my salvation. I have to get up at 06:30. I arrive back home at 23:00-24:00.

[Zavorotnyy] Do you trust your children's evaluations of television programs?

[Nenashev] We have a lot of debate. Happily, my daughter did not follow in my footsteps. She is a doctor. With my son, it was not so good. He chose a career in the

humanities. I really catch it from the children for our television. They would therefore very much prefer that I not work in television.

[Zavorotnyy] You apparently do not take their advice, do you?

[Nenashev] And I am suffering for that.

Commentator Views Effect of Alternative TV on State Broadcasting

90US1271A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
No 33 in Russian 15 Aug 90 p 8

[Article by Yuriy Bogomolov: "Foundation Stumbling Stones". First paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Central television is at the end of a monopoly. How does it look on the threshold of a new age: coexistence with alternative channels?

An increasingly frequent aspect of glasnost is the collisions occasionally breaking out within Gosteleradio.

In general, the difficulties experienced by this complex are characteristic of any strong command-administrative system. Everyone has had more than enough of its faults. A hierarchical centralism euphemistically referred to as democratic centralism. The habit of monopolism. No matter how much they are chased out the door, they inevitably return through the window, and in returning they clash with the good, faultlessly progressive intentions of the founders of the system. The result is paradoxes, of which the main one is that almost every command-administrative agency struggles for the democratic foundations of some other agency.

The Party is concerned about democratization of the economy.

Television is concerned about democratization of the Party.

And it then turns out that both the Party and telecommunications have lagged far behind in reforming their own structures, that they do not correspond to the level of democratization of the society at large.

TV is completely uncontrolled by society. That's the first thing. And secondly, it is too controlled by government institutions.

In a favorable political climate, such an asymmetry is not too obvious. But as soon as the political situation becomes more tense the most important mass information media sharply restricts its informational function.

We see this today in the case of the Baltics. What can the TV viewer learn about the situation in this region from TV broadcasts? Only what he can guess without these programs, and only within the bounds of official positions and evaluations, regarding the confrontation of conflicting sides.

Television has ceased being a direct obtainer of news on the Baltics, an independent chronicle and researcher into the processes developing there.

Of course, the directors of Gosteleradio can and do say that this must be done for higher interests, that unrestricted information can pour oil on the fire of interethnic and social conflicts. And of course, it is impossible to argue with the management if its current monopolism is taken as an unshakable position.

Talks have been under way for quite some time on alternative television. Unfortunately, there is a great deal of misunderstanding here. In one case, alternative television is meant to be politically unorthodox TV; i.e., oriented towards ideological positions generally diverging from official ones.

In another, what is meant is television with different programming than in the first and second national programs.

In a third, a technological form is presupposed: broadcast TV in place of cable, cassette and satellite.

A design is now being drawn up for the "Vzglyad" [View] cost-accounting program.

I think that all of this has nothing to do with the idea of alternative TV.

An alternative begins with a choice between phenomena and items of a single type.

A hypothetical TsT-2 [central television-2] must be a means of communication which competes with TsT-1, rather than complementing it. It should compete with it in all areas of broadcasting: the speed of news and the nature of its delivery, the sharpness of its viewpoints, the variety and seriousness of its artistic reporting, etc.

And by the way, it's all fine to say "they should", "they must"... No one can be forced to compete if it is not a question of life and death. For competition to "earn its way" on the air, TV must be not simply decentralized, but also destatized, and as frightful as it is to say it: privatized.

A chill goes up one's spine at the thought of what could occur if television becomes a private business. The imagination conjures up images similar to those presented by Aleksey Tolstoy in the novel "The Hyperboloid of Engineer Garin." Some maniac, a billionaire cooperative manager, buys Ostankino from the state and broadcasts programs that are senseless, bad, and understandably, not of lasting value.

Before trying to imagine what would happen if TV were to pass into private hands, a report must be given on what happened when it was completely under state control.

We have probably attained the highest level of symbolization of daily life in the history of civilization.

One economic project is the banner of civilization; another, the personification of Communism; another, the unity of the part and the whole. No matter what one's gaze rests on, it is all emblems, banners, heraldic symbols. The Soviet Man apparently is in the position of the unhappy King Midas: no matter what he touches, everything is transformed into something noteworthy, but completely inedible: in this case, a symbol.

For 70 years, the symbolic stubbornly pushed out the utilitarian and, it must be said, did so with notable success. And television in the pre-perestroika period could not "work according to its skills." It did not inform, it mainly illuminated the authority of various levels. TV programs from dawn to dusk (except for certain artistic segments) were a sort of daily ritual, over and over confirming the legality of the existing hierarchy. "Vremya" was the apex of the religious rite. It was the main service, and again in the religious sense, not the practical one.

Is it surprising today that TV in the public consciousness is often seen not as a source of information, but as a symbol of power, something like a scepter? And TV interested the nation's leaders mainly not as a source of communication but as a visible mandate to power, visible and self-evident to everyone.

This is the source of the hostility towards central television whenever conflicts heat up between the public and state bodies, since in all these cases the TV cameras are identified with the alien state institutions.

The state's monopoly ownership of the media is a trap for both the media and the state.

There is only one chance to get out of this trap: to de-symbolize the media. But precisely this requires that TV broadcasting be separated from the state. More than that, TV must be brought into the system of market relations.

Our TV managing officials do not fail to mention when returning from assignments abroad that in the West the airwaves are also controlled by the state, but they have never uttered a word about TV's dependence on the consumer. Let me illuminate this side of the matter using the example of British television.

Two national companies dominate the British airwaves: the BBC and the independent TV, each of which has two channels.

The program structure of both TV companies is about the same: information, entertainment, education. The sources of financing are different. The viewer pays for the pleasure of the BBC. The independent company is free for viewers and very expensive for advertisers. I should note that the BBC channels have no commercials. Those are the rules imposed by the government. This understandably merely stimulates competition on the airwaves. And the viewer has the right not to a consultative voice, but to the deciding one.

Let's now put the question directly: which TV is more controlled by society: our state-monopoly TV or "theirs," based on private ownership?

Although the question is posed directly, it is very rhetorical. Of course, the answer is "theirs." British TV not only meets the viewer's demands, it also desperately and daily fights for the right and the honor to satisfy those demands. The personal interests and even political ambitions of various government bureaucrats and managers are trivial compared to the pressure of the market of viewers' interests. The case of the program "7 Days" is simply impossible there.

Of course, in discovering the relation between the airwaves and the market the question arises: how does this affect the artistic level of programming, its morals, its objectivity?

In the general opinion of all those who know British TV, it has a good effect on it: it is several hundred points ahead of our Gosteleradio.

The essential feature of a market is evidently that it creates a self-developing and self-adjusting system. But this is only possible where "everything is for sale." The creative staff, the technical personnel, the resources, the financing, and finally, the officials themselves, including the top management... If someone, such as the management staff, remains outside the market, then it will become worse than, more monstrous than the traditional command system.

The chairman of Gosteleradio, M.F. Nenashev, once supported the idea that popular programs be made on a contest basis. For instance, two teams would prepare "Vzglyad" by a certain deadline. The one which the chairman liked better would be aired.

Of course, any administrator would like this type of competition, since his own command position would be strengthened many times over. It goes without saying that the journalist in this instance, independent of citizens' interests, of intellectual abilities, must adapt to the tastes and interests of the boss, who for him also becomes God.

Many, including liberals, see the solution to this in putting Gosteleradio in its present form under the control of a democratic institution such as the USSR Supreme Soviet.

But such a "solution" is another illusion, which can still deceive us. It still appears that if a superdemocratic public institution is placed over the state monopolist, everything will be all right.

It still appears that if TV stations are placed under the control of elected Soviets of various levels that this will inevitably promote the further democratization of our life. But if we are fully logical, we cannot fail to admit that we will not move a step in this direction. A public

body placed over a state one sooner or later becomes a state body. The solution lies in occupying a position not "over," but to the side.

Let's assume that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet takes from the national Gosteleradio its piece of the airwaves... What will this change in the programming itself? Certain informational emphases will understandably change: certain meetings and conferences will be shown more, others less. But I dare to think that there will be no sudden jumps in the freshness of the news, objectivity or artistic level. There were no grounds for such jumps during the monopoly power of the executive committee over the airwaves, and there will be none during the equally monopolistic ownership of an elective body. The fragments of a broken mirror do not lose their reflective properties.

There are now indications that we are not defeating the command-administrative system so much as we are breaking it into fragments. God forbid that this is all that happens.

It is dangerous to break a dishonest mirror. The storyteller Andersen warned of this.

The solution is to create honest mirrors. One of these is the market.

There is a widespread opinion that the arts are just the field which must be freed from the pressure of market mechanisms.

Such a conviction is based on the idea that first of all, the market is pure commerce: a game to lower true values and to raise false values; and second, that the arts are something artificial.

But both the market and culture are essentially organic, natural phenomena. As we have seen, nature can only be regulated and patronized within very limited boundaries. It is possible and necessary to adapt to the elements, but more expensive to abolish them.

All our passions and fears regarding the commercialization of culture stem from our experience with a crippled market.

It would be very useful for high and low culture to "look at themselves" in the mirror of an able-bodied market.

The state bureaucracy, like a shadow, must know its place. It can soften the action of natural forces, but it must not try to direct them: again, that is more expensive.

And the state must "know its place" with respect to the media. It can retain only one right: licensing the airwaves under conditions common to the civilized world. For the rest, it must trust the interplay of private property instincts, which possess an irrational capability to guess conscious and unconscious needs.

A famous play written in the 1930's and dealing with the October revolution contained praise for the man with a gun.

It said: "Don't be afraid of the man with the gun."

For 70 years we were told "Don't be afraid."

Whether we were convinced or not is another matter. But we now face the necessity of convincing each individual and society in general: don't be afraid of the man with the wallet.

'Radio Moscow' Announcer Removed From Air in 1983 Interviewed

90US1230A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 25, Jun 90 p 12

[Article by Sergey Romanovskiy: "He Was Considered 'Andropov's Man': What Became of a Soviet Announcer Who in 1983 Called the USSR's Military Action in Afghanistan 'Aggression'"]

[Text] *He arrived at SOBESEDNIK without warning. Many petitioners and people with complaints come to the editorial office.... This unknown man did not reach into a briefcase for documents on some old lawsuit, however, but only smiled shyly and said: "My name is Danchev. I once worked in foreign broadcasting in Moscow. Do you remember me?"*

Foreign listeners of Radio Moscow's World Service in English who turned their radios on at 11:00, Greenwich mean time, were quite shocked. Something unheard-of was on the air: "Reports from Kabul say that tribes residing in the eastern provinces of Kandahar and Paktia have joined the struggle against the Soviet invaders." An hour later Radio Moscow reported: "The population of Afghanistan is playing an important role in the defense of the nation's territory against the Soviet occupiers." The most curious of those hearing the news report at 13:00 became further convinced of Radio Moscow's boldness in criticizing the Kremlin's policy with respect to Afghanistan. The West had never before seen such daring on the part of a Soviet government radio station. Just how was one to assess this unusual statement read by announcer Vladimir Danchev on Soviet radio? Did it not herald changes in Soviet policy?

The Paris-based RUSSKAYA MYSL wrote at that time: "Some Western commentators have expressed the supposition that this unique incident indicates a desire by a part of the Soviet leadership to remove their troops from Afghanistan in the very near future. There has also been talk to the effect that what occurred has something to do with a struggle for power between Andropov and Chernenko. The theory exists in the West that Andropov was against the invasion of Afghanistan. If we accept this theory, we can assume that Vladimir Danchev's broadcast was arranged to reflect Andropov's viewpoint."

This opinion was not shared by everyone, to be sure. The official U.S. reaction was more restrained, for example: The deviations in Soviet radio broadcasts "could be a political protest by an angry—and perhaps now unemployed—Soviet journalist against Moscow's occupation of Afghanistan."

The Soviet mass media passed over the Radio Moscow reports in harmonious silence. Rumors still spread through Moscow, however, about some Danchenko or Danchev who had thrown down a challenge to the regime.

No one was surprised, of course, when it was reported from the West that Danchev had been put away for his foolhardiness into either a prison or a psychiatric hospital. Although some people today are inclined to view the "Andropov era" as almost the overture to the restructuring, it reminds me personally of a "late frost" (in contrast to "thaw"). There was a reason why the people nicknamed the general secretary "Yuriy Dolgorukiy."

Mass arrests of trade workers swept the nation. They were designed to dishearten people, to sow panic, and not to break the backbone of the trade Mafia at all. Attacks were made on customers at GUM, for example, and at other large Moscow department stores: It is wrong to stand in line during work hours. Academician Sakharov, whom Andropov called "a mentally ill man," was spending his fourth year in exile in Gorkiy. Judicial punishment continued against participants in the movement for upholding the law in the USSR. Any public criticism of the official course was therefore the same as endorsing a sentence for oneself.

People arrive at dissident thinking by various routes. Despite this, the fates of many dissidents are similar. Prosaic aspects of life were frequently the final straw forcing people to declare a political hunger strike or to barricade themselves inside some municipal building as a sign of protest: chronic disrepair of a bathroom forgotten by Soviet power in the person of plumbers from the housing administration, a shut-off of hot water in the winter or piping hot radiators in the summer. Who can say that, had workers in the housing and municipal services been a little more efficient during the years of stagnation, there would not have been fewer political prisoners in the camps?

This is a joke, of course, and a fairly painful one, but there is some truth to it. The walls were ice cold in Danchev's apartment in Ulan-Bator, where he lived and worked at the end of the '70s. After "wrapping up" his shift on Mongolian radio, where Danchev was sent to work under some unremunerative program, he was not eager to return home. He avoided his icy den for our cozy embassy, where he gave English lessons to Soviet diplomats in the evening.

The teacher and his students talked not only about the English language, but also about the times the nation was living through. Diplomats are educated people, who

spend many years abroad and are isolated from Soviet reality longer than others. They would only smile condescendingly when Danchev defended something pro-Marxist in their discussions about politics. Banquets were held from time to time at the Soviet cultural center, to which Englishmen, Poles and Hungarians working in Ulan-Bator were invited. Danchev became friends with some of them, and their families were on friendly terms.

I want to reassure the reader that they did not recruit him. He simply sensed that those with whom he was arguing were right. He sensed it especially acutely when he stepped onto the platform at Yaroslavskiy Station in Moscow. The capital greeted him with long lines, crowding in public transport, cursing and a nerve-racking conditions. He experienced no joy from his return to the city which had grown so accustomed to itself that it did not even look around but rushed off, head down, without even noticing the foreign soil on Danchev's boots. "Life abroad is good...." Those who have not been abroad, however, have nothing with which to compare their crude life, and so they have nothing to be mad at. Just go to the shoeshine boy and... live like everyone else.

He could no longer be like everyone else, however.

He had had to stand in lines in Mongolia, of course, but there was a special little distributor there, where one could buy something tasty at least for a holiday. Party meetings were also held in Mongolia, but there he had mixed with people not shaped by the "code of the builder of communism." To live "like a human being" for four years, that means something.

As I talked with Danchev, I tried to understand what had motivated him to engage in guerilla warfare with the Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting]. He answered with what were banalities at that time:

"I didn't like the bragging and phoniness which came out in all the news about Soviet life. World events were also presented with bias. I knew a little bit about how people live abroad and how they live here, after all. And when a person understands that, he begins to think seriously about things. Before, I had just read my material well, and that was it. I now took a look at my work through different eyes. I was on an enormous front of the ideological struggle, after all. Someone had to halt the flow of disinformation...."

But there have always been plenty of people dissatisfied with the leadership. Not many of them, however, have had a service pass giving them entrance to the very heart of Soviet foreign broadcasting, to the broadcast studio on the third floor.

"The first time there was simply a misprint in the news report," Danchev recalled. "The meaning of a sentence was totally altered by the inadvertent insertion of the particle 'not.' I thought to myself: What if I were to leave

the particle in and read it right on the air? I shall read it the way it is. If worse comes to worst, I can point to the misprint...."

His experiments continued for about a year. He managed to insert a few words of his own only when the censor left the studio, leaving him alone with the microphone. And this did not happen often—once in two or even three weeks. In the West his attempts were either simply not noticed or were considered slips of the tongue. Danchev did not become the subject of talk until after 23 May 1983, when he condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in three news reports in a row. From BBC reports his coworkers at Radio Moscow also learned about his shenanigans.

It has been a long time since so many people had assembled at party and trade union meetings. In the front rows were gray-haired veterans who had worked for Gosteleradio for more than a single decade. "And you, Danchev, just what are your feelings? Do you love the homeland?"

He was expelled from everything: from the CPSU, from the trade union. The following notation was entered in his labor book (postdated and unbeknownst to him): "Discharged for deliberate distortion of the meaning of information" under Paragraph 3, Article 254 of the USSR KZoT [Labor Law Code?]. And although the law does not permit the discharge of announcers for "immorality," no one paid any attention to that.

In order to defuse the situation—and foreign journalists were besieging the Gosteleradio building on Pyatnitskaya [Street] at that time—Danchev had to be removed from the scene at once. The choice fell on Tashkent, where his mother, father and sister lived.

"You must be especially vigilant. The West is showing heightened interest in us," Danchev was told in the personnel department on the eve of his departure. "We believe that you are ours, a Soviet man, though, and will not yield to acts of provocation. You can live with your parents a week or two, rest up and return to Moscow."

Two people Danchev did not know took part in the conversation. He understood from the discussion that they were a KGB worker and a doctor.

At first they wanted to send him to a psychiatric hospital directly from the airport but then changed their minds for some reason. Perhaps they felt pity for his family. They conducted the "capture" a day later. Danchev was told that he was being summoned by the deputy chairman of the Uzbek Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, but two robust young fellows sat next to him, one on either side, in the Volga:

"We are going where we need to go. Don't ask questions," he was told.

We shall not describe the details of Danchev's existence in the psychiatric hospital. Many people read or saw

"One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest." It takes place in an American psychiatric hospital, to be sure....

He was diagnosed as schizophrenic and given 40 numbing injections of insulin. After each such injection a person experiences excruciating pain, becomes comatose and rapidly falls into a state of insanity in the full sense of the word. At one point one of the doctors asked him:

"If you had the chance, would you leave the country?"

"I think I would," Danchev replied.

The "treatment" continued.

And who knows how long he would have remained in the hospital if not for the "protection" of... A.A. Gromyko.

Naturally, I had a reason for putting the word "protection" in quotes. It is difficult to believe that it would occur to a person who at the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was named as one of the initiators of the movement of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, to rescue his radio enemy. All the more, since Gromyko, as V.G. Makarov, his former assistant, told me, did not respond to requests from the defenders of dissidents.

French journalists were the first to come to Danchev's defense. With difficulty I got through to Paris by phone to speak with Martine Gozlan, a journalist with the weekly *EVENEMENT DE JEUDI*, who established the Committee of Journalists to Free Vladimir Danchev in 1983. Incidentally, she first learned from our television conversation that Danchev was free. At that time, 7 years ago, her committee was deluging the Soviet embassy in Paris with letters (unanswered, of course) and demands for Danchev's immediate release.

All attempts by foreign journalists to get through to Danchev in Tashkent by phone were unsuccessful. His relatives would not just simply hang up the phone every time but would also report suspicious calls to the Uzbek Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. They had also been asked to exercise vigilance. And this was during the time when the International Human Rights Federation in Paris established the special Vladimir Danchev Prize for journalists exhibiting outstanding bravery in their work. Truly two different worlds.... The movement for his defense grew in the West. Well-known French philosopher Henri Glucksmann dedicated one of his books to Vladimir Danchev. Amnesty International took him under its protection as a prisoner of conscience, and Phillip Viennay, vice president of the French Center for the Training and Advanced Training of Journalists invited the Soviet announcer to Paris to present lectures to the students. The invitation was addressed to the Tashkent Psychiatric Hospital, and, of course, Danchev did not receive it.

The French journalists finally succeeded in drawing the attention of Claude Cheysson, France's foreign minister,

to Danchev's fate. They hoped that Cheysson would put in a good word for him at the forthcoming talks with Gromyko.

"Not long before the meeting with Gromyko Cheysson asked me in passing about Danchev," I was told by Yuliy Vorontsov, former USSR ambassador to France and current deputy minister of foreign affairs, told me. "He asked this precisely in passing, as though it just happened to occur to him. I told him I had never heard of the person and would have to enquire from Moscow. I honestly do not remember the reply from Moscow. Cheysson never returned to the subject. He did not even bring it up at the meeting with Gromyko in Paris."

As the ambassador, Yuliy Vorontsov, was involved in the meeting of the two ministers, and we have grounds for believing him. A. Adamishin, now USSR ambassador to Italy and also a participant in those talks, told me that the French preferred to discuss the most delicate issues privately. Indeed, why was it absolutely essential to ask about Danchev at the negotiating table and have it recorded, and not out in the hall or on the stairs?

But let us not speculate. One thing is known for certain: The meeting between Cheysson and Gromyko took place in Paris on 9 September 1983. Andrey Andreyevich returned to Moscow on the 10th, and two weeks later Danchev, whom the doctors were about to list as disabled, was given his freedom. During those autumn months the Soviet Union was busy on all fronts. The South Korean Boeing passenger plane had just been shot down in the Far East, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had enough problems without Danchev.

"When I returned to Moscow and went to the foreign broadcast personnel department, a comrade from the CPSU Central Committee was already there," Vladimir told me. "He suggested that I make an official statement and repent publicly, and I would be permitted to work as an announcer again. I refused. He then told me that I would never again work on the air."

Our story of the Vladimir Danchev "affair" stops there. Since then his life has involved neither swift raids nor attacks. The comrade from the CPSU kept his word. The most important thing Danchev is entrusted with today is answering letters from radio listeners. He is not permitted to come within a mile of a microphone. The foreign broadcast leadership includes the same people today as seven years ago. His former bosses, thanks to whom he became acquainted with the mysteries of Soviet psychiatry, have risen in the ranks....

In my conversations with these people I have frequently been asked: You are going to describe Danchev as a hero, aren't you? In fact, what should one consider Danchev to be? A hero who took on the Politburo alone and committed an act of self-sacrifice before the whole world? Or a madman, which is what they particularly insist upon in the USSR Gosteleradio?

Danchev's actions appear strange from the professional standpoint.

"Let us project this conflict onto any democratic society," suggested Vladimir Matusevich, director of the Russian service of Radio Liberty, who helped me a great deal with the gathering of information for this article. "Let us say that Mr. Smith, who works at BBC, is terribly upset about the Falkland war. He considers the war a crime, and, instead of the information provided him by the person in charge of reports from the Falkland front, he tells his fellow countrymen and the world community how evil the war is. They would fire him immediately, and they would apparently be right."

But do the actions of those who sent thousands and thousands of young men to their deaths in Afghanistan not appear even "stranger"? Few people were bold enough publicly to express their attitude toward that bloody business at the time. The Moscow newspaper KARETNY RYAD told about a certain Maj. Petrov who fought in Afghanistan and was wounded but miraculously remained alive. He was recommended for the title Hero of the Soviet Union in 1984. During the award ceremony at the Kremlin he threw the award into the faces of those presenting the award. He was immediately arrested and sent to Lubyanka. This was followed by camps and a psychiatric hospital. You can see that the stories are similar.

There were others who condemned the war in Afghanistan: some well known and others about whom we simply know nothing. And one somehow does not want to think about which of them are the bigger heroes, which the lesser; about which of them deserve respect today and which do not. But that is not the main thing: Long before the restructuring they were not afraid to say what they thought. And in this they appeared in a more favorable light than those who remained silent.

CPSU Central Committee Official on Party Leadership of Press

90US1234B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Aug 90
Second Edition p 3

[Interview with Georgiy Vladimirovich Pryakhin, deputy chief of the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee, by V. Sinenko, correspondent: "Who Is Being Rude to the Journalist?"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The Law on the Press and Other News Media went into effect yesterday. What kind of institution should the CPSU press be under these new conditions? Deputy Chief G. Pryakhin of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department discussed this in a conversation with a correspondent from PRAVDA's press and journalism department.

[Correspondent] Public feelings about the press are ambivalent. This was apparent at the 28th CPSU Congress. Many reproaches and accusations were made from

the podium. Delegates banished the television reporters from the hall during the meeting of gorkom and raykom secretaries with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. What do you, Georgiy Vladimirovich, think about this? I hope that your view of the problem is less a view "from above" than "from within." After all, the service record of Pryakhin the journalist is much longer than that of Pryakhin the party official: rayon, kray, and central newspapers, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting....

[Pryakhin] You know, each time emotions flared up at the congress over the press, I remembered the latest data of a unionwide sociological survey announced at the constituent congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR. In one of the questions, respondents were asked where, in which social institution, the average person could expect to find people who would protect his interests. Around 6 percent of the respondents said that party organs would be most likely to protect their interests, seven percent named law enforcement agencies, nine percent said it was trade unions, and 11 percent relied most on soviet organs. A full 16 percent, however, said that they could expect constant protection only from the press. This is one of the realities of our life today. I would even dare to say that although the press has been accused of elitism and of losing touch with reality, it is our most "popular" institution today. Is it possible to base policy on confrontations with the press? No! The news media play a perceptible role in politics all over the world. In other countries people take pains not to be "rude" to the press. On the contrary, political parties stay in close contact with the press and do everything within their power to win it over to their side. They do not have to be ingratiating with the press, but they do not have to "pull its pants down" either. Anyway, they will not be able to. The people will protect the press in the same way that the press protects the people.

Nevertheless, the mood of the delegates at the 28th congress was understandable. They have had to answer too many questions recently. The press and television have worded these questions in tough and sarcastic terms, and we must admit that they have not always been fair. Nevertheless, it seems to me that there were signs of reconciliation toward the end of the congress. Delegates realized that the press had to have a say in matters and express its own point of view. This realization was reflected to a considerable extent in the resolution "On the News Media of the CPSU."

[Correspondent] The resolution complains that "the pages of party newspapers and journals are sometimes used to publicize views hostile to the CPSU." But where is the yardstick to measure the accuracy or inaccuracy of our views? Criticism of the first secretary of the party raykom in a local newspaper could also be interpreted as an attack on the CPSU, and the appropriate administrative measures could then be taken.

[Pryakhin] It is true that the line dividing party views from anti-party views is sometimes so fine that its

detection would require an electronic microscope. We, however, are accustomed to using a wooden ruler and an axe. It seems to me that the main criterion is not the party's interests, but the public interest, the state interest. Do the contents of newspaper articles promote civic harmony? This is what I would define as the main guideline today.

It was not that long ago that criticism of any of Marx' or Lenin's statements aroused sanctimonious horror. But let us take an unbiased view of criticism and remember its original meaning: The word "criticism" comes from the Greek word for "judgment." And after all, this does not necessarily mean denial, denigration, or outright rejection. If we eliminate the right to criticize, including people's right to criticize the great thinkers of the past, or if we are too sensitive to criticism and overreact to it, we will eliminate the right to think, and, consequently, to move ahead. I agree that some interpretations can be false—either by design or through ignorance—but this is all the more reason not to exaggerate their importance.

When lines started forming in front of newspaper stands and the circulation figures of publications soared, that was the beginning of perestroika. The present period is the next phase, during which the level of glasnost is not measured by circulation figures, but by the variety of publications and the variety of opinions expressed. I have ceased to be personally moved by the knowledge that millions of subscribers are getting their news from a single source. Has one monopoly been replaced by another? The law on the press will broaden publishing opportunities. I am certain that the party press will also find its own place and its own reader—a reader capable of thinking and comparing. He will not be won by flattery or tricks. Whatever the circumstances, the most reliable "news agency" in the world is the person's own mind. Glasnost has done its job: People have begun thinking for themselves, without any prompting. The party press must address the thinking individual.

[Correspondent] Many of the letters PRAVDA receives complain that our party press has been trying so hard to adhere to a middle-of-the-road position that it has sacrificed its commitment to principles and its fighting spirit for the sake of consolidation.

[Pryakhin] Communist party publications had no competition for many years and were in such a comfortable position that their creative muscles grew slack. Many competing publications suddenly sprang up during the years of perestroika. They fought for each reader and tried to find topics and forms of transmission corresponding to the spirit of the times and the mood of the public. The party press, however, was more susceptible to the force of inertia. In spite of all its drawbacks, the reorganization of several central party publications and the appearance of DIALOG and RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA will produce, in my opinion, good results. PRAVDA is changing literally before our very eyes. It is becoming more incisive and topical. I am watching the progress of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA with great

interest. On the whole, however, the party press is still only a runner-up. Editors are still too timid.

[Correspondent] Could the journalists really be the reason? Today we rarely hear the term "party leadership of the press," but the leadership itself still exists, and it is often incompetent and motivated by personal ambitions. It is most noticeable in rayon and oblast newspapers. The editor or correspondent who is incisive and bold usually ends up looking for a new job. The people who write letters to PRAVDA are also confused about the statement in the congress resolution recommending that party committees form editorial councils, including representatives of the public, "for the purpose of eliminating the corporative-professional exclusivity of editorial boards." Is this another case of a lack of trust in party journalists?

[Pryakhin] There is no need to exaggerate the importance of this recommendation. No one today is demanding reports on the immediate inclusion of a certain number of workers and kolkhoz members in the editorial councils. The resolution contains the words "when necessary." Journals have had these editorial councils for a long time, and they have been useful in revealing public opinion and the opinions of experts. What the newspapers need are councils of experts, and not "overseers." Relations between the founders, editors, and publishers and the powers of the team of journalists will be regulated from now on by the appropriate contract and the editorial charter, just as the Law on the Press and Other News Media stipulates. There will be no difference between party publications and all others in this respect. The introduction of order here will clear up many misunderstandings. The party press must have more freedom, and not less, than other publications in its activities and creative inquiries. Otherwise, it will "lose" its journalists (they will simply quit) and then its readers. And this will be a loss for the party committee as well.

[Correspondent] But the letters to PRAVDA, Georgiy Vladimirovich, suggest that not everyone understands this. Today the relations between the party committee and the editors depend less on the law than on the first secretary's personal ethics and level of democracy. Many people are waiting for instructions. It is true that the CPSU Central Committee freed local committees and its own ideological establishments from rigid tutelage, but it simultaneously left them to deal with problems on their own. They are stewing in their own juices. The outdated thinking of personnel and the symptoms of ideological prohibitions have not been surmounted.

[Pryakhin] The founders of party publications must realize that the press is not their personal property. It belongs to the whole party, and in our country, with its shortage of publications and its almost "sacred" treatment of the written word, it belongs to all of the people. The congress resolution, incidentally, stresses that categorical dictates and bureaucratic tyranny are impermissible in the relations between party committees and their

press organs. The journalistic team is more distinctive than any other group. It is probably an even more precise organism than the theater. After all, the theater is only literature, whereas journalism is literature plus politics.

[Correspondent] It seems to me that you are digressing....

[Pryakhin] I apologize, but it is time for the party committee to stop working with the whole group of journalists at once and to begin dealing with each on an individual basis.

[Correspondent] There are not as many press conferences, meetings with the team, or bureau editorial assignments as there were before. The journalist, who influences the thoughts and feelings of huge groups of people with his pen, and not with his official status, must have access to high-level party offices, and this must be individual access because journalists cannot work as a group. He must have the same rights as other members of the office staff, the rights of a person sharing the responsibility for the common cause. Only this can lead to understanding. Party personnel are not the only ones who have to give some thought to the proprieties of their work and their relationships and to professionalism, however. Journalists also have to do this. Another side of the matter, it seems to me, was stated quite aptly in a PRAVDA article by renowned television journalist Eduard Sagalayev at the time of the congress. Journalists, he said, sometimes remind him of a servant who suddenly becomes the lady of the manor. Her manners leave much to be desired. That is all right. As people in my village used to say, "live and learn." As far as the creative image of the publication is concerned, no directives or appeals can help. Creativity, vivid journalism, and talent come from another source.

[Correspondent] But even you are worried that all of the talent might take refuge in the alternative press, where people already have more creative and artistic freedom.

[Pryakhin] You know, this reminds me of my first rayon newspaper, SOVETSKOYE PRIKUMYE. It was headed by Georgiy Grigoryevich Putilin—a professional, a front-line soldier, and a genuine "chief." I remember once when he read us a memo from the party raykom and rebuked a young but incisive reporter for making a mistake. At our next gathering the young man presented evidence indicating that the editor had been wrong. Georgiy Grigoryevich stood and apologized to him in the presence of everyone. Then he said: "Why did you wait a whole week to respond? I would have apologized a week ago." It seems to me that there is a shortage of this kind of mutual trust in the atmosphere of party publications today, especially on the local level. If breakthroughs are possible on the staff of newspapers and journals today, they can only be made through camaraderie and enthusiasm, and not through squabbles and rank-pulling.

The party press should base its interrelations with each journalist on contracts. The congress resolution points

out this fact. Talent and ability should receive the appreciation and compensation they deserve.

[Correspondent] The party press is losing the financial race to publications with an independent financial status. We must admit that even the last increase in the salaries of party journalists did not rectify the situation.

[Pryakhin] Although I was involved in it, I think this should be the last increase "from above." We will never catch up with the more generous publications in this way. The party publication must be granted economic and commercial freedom as well as artistic freedom. Only the percentage of receipts to be deposited in the party treasury should be stipulated in contracts. The publications should set salaries themselves. Salaries should depend on the amount of effort. The party is beginning to operate in line with market relations. Its position in this sphere will not be comfortable. How can the profitability of a rayon newspaper be guaranteed? The simplest solutions immediately come to mind: The publication could be issued less frequently, its volume could be reduced, several rayons could publish a newspaper jointly, etc. All of this is permitted, but what about advertisements and announcements? I am still amazed when I remember that we would not allow people to use our rayon newspaper to convey their greetings to their mothers or to announce the purchase of a new home, but we did print divorce announcements. Why are we so stingy with advertising space? After all, this is exactly what the local reader needs, and it provides the newspaper with income and humanizes it. The reader can find reports on "big politics" elsewhere. In Moscow and the regional centers, we should make use of the Western experience. Publishing concerns with their own powerful material-technical base and their own television and radio broadcasting stations have been operating in the West for a long time. In addition to publishing respectable and elitist journals which have low circulation figures and are often printed at a loss, these concerns also publish popular magazines for the general reading public which produce most of their income. Now that everyone's hands are untied, they should start using them.

[Correspondent] Most local newspapers have a double jurisdiction—the party committee and the soviet. In some places this leads to occasional conflicts over the control of the press.

[Pryakhin] Property disputes have many fine points. In the case of the news media, we must remember that these sometimes involve thousands of people fighting for the control of "their" newspaper. The friction this arouses is social in nature. We must understand this and strive for mutual tact. Wherever an agreement can be reached, let the newspaper have two patrons (sometimes it is even freer with two "bosses" than with one). Wherever an agreement cannot be reached, "divorce" is the answer. But this must be a civilized divorce, with no loss of face. Party committees, as M. S. Gorbachev said at the congress, must have their own newspaper, and this newspaper must be as humane as possible. Today this is a

synonym for adherence to party principles. I would include advertisements and announcements on matters of vital interest to the individual among the elements of humanness.

[Correspondent] Here is my last question, Georgiy Vladimirovich. Does the party have any means of influencing the alternative press today? What are the prospects for interaction and consolidation?

[Pryakhin] The main means of influence are the party's ideas, its program, and its goals. Many communists work for the alternative press, just as many non-members of the party work for the CPSU press. In the final analysis, the search for ways of emerging from the crisis is a matter of interest to all the people. I think that today, when we are laying the foundation for an updated party press, we must use every means at our disposal to attract extraordinary people to work for our press. As long as they are talented, they can even be driven by unquenchable ambition. They can be the kind of people who were not solicited by the party before for several reasons. Returning to the beginning of our conversation, I have to say that the person who is "rude" to the journalist today is a person who wants to lose. Aside from the courts, the only thing that can keep a newspaper in check today is another newspaper, a better one.

Correspondent Defends TASS Against Charges of Conservatism

90US12344 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (Second Edition) in Russian 2 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Malyshev, TASS correspondent "Fearlessness in Slander"]

[Text] We are not against democracy and glasnost. God forbid! No one plans to throw stones at the critic and then, in the familiar accusing tones of the past, exclaim with anguish: "Our big team is selflessly working for the good, but that man..." and so on and so forth. Furthermore, no one plans to sum it all up by implying that someone is playing into someone else's hands. No, we have something else to say. We want to talk about how convenient it is to spit in all directions today. The person who spits at the boss is called a courageous man. The person who spits at a professional colleague is called a man of principle. This fairly easy way of displaying "civic initiative" appeals to many people today. As we have seen, it also appealed to A. Papeta, the TASS correspondent in the Mordovian Autonomous SSR. His efforts in this rather disgraceful but, to our deep regret, now popular field appeared recently in the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY under the eye-catching title "What We Read Under the TASS Blyne."

I must say right away that I was not sure at first whether one TASS correspondent should argue publicly with another in the press. I thought this might be something like a domestic squabble. Nevertheless, when I read the

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY article while I was on vacation in Moscow, I could not resist. There were too many slanderous remarks about TASS in it.

In essence, some of the statements were positively devastating: The TASS agency "has ceased to care about the wishes of the people," is "adapting to meet the needs and wishes of the official party staff," edits articles "to feed the obsession with official reports," etc.

The set of abusive statements about TASS is also interesting because it is too reminiscent of the sad days when those who "did not care about the interests of the people" were unhesitatingly branded enemies of the people. We must not, however, presume to guess the author's intentions. Instead, let us appreciate the audacity of a man who worked in Saransk but fearlessly evaluated the performance of all TASS personnel—both his colleagues in our country and foreign correspondents.

It would probably be worthwhile to describe what TASS represents today. It is a recognized world news agency, sending a continuous flow of reports in eight languages to more than 120 countries and simultaneously receiving reports from the whole world. The agency has news bureaus and offices in 115 foreign countries. The total amount of information transmitted through TASS channels each day is equivalent to around 700 newspaper pages.

Any journalist who has worked for our agency for a fairly long time will say that today's TASS is strikingly different from what it was, for instance, just five years ago. The subject matter of releases is more diversified, the news is reported more quickly, and the reports are more vivid and challenging. This is not our opinion. It is the opinion of our subscribers, especially abroad. In fact, at least a third of what is sent out on the TASS wires today is something that none of us would have dared to even think of releasing to the press just recently.

There is certainly no sense in hiding the fact that TASS was once "under the heel" of the Kremlin. Who at TASS does not remember all of the mandatory items which were transmitted to the agency from Kremlin offices? Now, however, the Kremlin is silent, and correspondents put their own political spin on the news.

We are striving to establish a civilized society in our country. To this end, we must know how certain institutions in the civilized societies work, including their news agencies, which could hardly be accused of collusion with the "partocracy" and other mortal sins of that type. There is no question that this knowledge would reveal many surprises to Papeta and to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, which offered him the use of its pages. If we compare the releases of any Western official news agency to TASS releases, we find many common features. They have the same uncompromising judgments, brevity, restraint, and reluctance to express a biased point of view, but they also display indisputable leanings in favor of the party or government in power. This is understandable. An official agency has to be of . . . other words,

it has to express the point of view of official groups rather than the opposition. This is the accepted practice throughout the world. From my own experience working as a journalist in Italy, and now in Greece (exemplary countries in the sense of bourgeois democracy), I can say that this is exactly how ANSA [Associated National Press Agency] and ANA [Athens News Agency], the official agencies there, work.

I was particularly confused by the statement that TASS is "losing touch with the people." What does this mean? Does this mean that TASS is covering only the official undertakings and affairs of the "party elite"? From my own experience, I know that there is a special interest in original and unique articles in the agency today. I know that pointed criticism is encouraged. When I was working in Greece, I transmitted a whole series of incisive reports on the problems in our relations with that country—the deliveries of substandard trolleybuses, the accidents in the turbines of power plants built with Soviet participation, etc. TASS did not hesitate to send these reports out on the wire, although it immediately received irate telegrams from the government agencies concerned.

My article in the TASS journal EKHO PLANETY on the Greek parliament's decision to prosecute former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu aroused the indignation of some officials in our own Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who felt that this "should not have been mentioned." They even held a "private briefing" on this matter, citing my article as an example of "how not to write." The TASS administrators, however, did not give in to this pressure.

And what about the turbulent and tragic events in Romania? The whole world first heard about these in TASS reports. At that time the biggest news agencies in the world based their coverage on TASS releases and expressed their sincere gratitude for the bold, objective, and quick reports of our correspondents. I also remember the series of investigative reports Larisa Kislinskaya wrote about the Moscow mafia, the drug trade, and prostitution.

There are so many of these examples. Can anyone say that all of our hard work was "irrelevant" and was performed simply to "serve obsolete structures"?

In short, everything that ARGUMENTY I FAKTY printed about TASS on Papeta's testimony has little in common with reality. It was simply a set of hackneyed accusations that would have applied to the work of any of our news organs in the days before perestroika. Of course, there are still many shortcomings. People who worked for years within the confines of one system cannot immediately start doing everything in a new way. I am certain that TASS is not the only one facing this problem. There is one thing I do not understand. There is no question that the Mordovian correspondent can have his own opinion, but why did this opinion arouse the interest of the popular weekly?

It turns out that the article was printed solely for the purpose of condemning TASS as a hopelessly conservative agency and proving that another agency—a progressive agency with nothing in common with TASS—must be opened as soon as possible in the Russian Federation. It is true that a Russian news agency does have to be established. As far as I know, this is also the opinion of the people at TASS. Why then was it necessary to offend the dignity of this huge team of journalists?

Editors Comment on Publication Cost Increases, New Press Law

90US1270A Moscow *SOBESEDNIK* in Russian No 31, Aug 90 p 2

[Interview with Anatoliy Yurkov, editor in chief, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA; Anatoliy Ivanov, editor in chief, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA; Pavel Gusev, editor in chief, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOL; Albert Belayev, editor in chief, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA; and Vitaliy Korotich, editor in chief, OGONEK by Aleksey Makartsev: "The Press Within the Law"; date, place not given]

[Text] On the eve of the subscription campaign and of the entry into force of the Law on the Press, we asked the editors of some central publications to respond to two questions:

1. How do you assess the impending price increase for newspapers and magazines?
2. How acceptable to the mass information media is the Law on the Press entering into force on 1 August 1990?

[Yurkov] I don't think it is hard to imagine the state of both the collective and the editor of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA when they are told that starting with the new year, the price could triple or quadruple. Other newspapers—TRUD, PRAVDA—can cover the shortfall with their profit or readers' donations. It is easy to guess how the realization of such a project will turn out for our newspaper, which is only six months old, born with the introduction of competition into our lives. That is why we have one last chance: to appeal to the country's labor collective to pass around the hat.

I can't understand how the perestroika law cannot defend the rights of new enterprises. After all, in all the world's civilized countries, they receive economic and tax indulgences. Our parliament gave even the cooperatives these privileges. It turns out that the law is not written for glasnost. Otherwise, why is it not defending the interests of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, a new enterprise? Someone will say that the editor in chief is taking the law upon himself. But why not? If the Law on the Press does not defend our collective, must we praise it? If it does not obligate the Government to provide the newspaper with paper (for the appropriate price, of course), that means that it is not performing its functions. In all other things, the law probably responds to the hopes of those who prepared and adopted it.

[Ivanov] We oppose a radical price increase. Ours is a youth publication, and it cannot withstand a 25-percent increase. I personally gave my consent to only 25 percent.

This law is imperfect in many ways. The status of newspapers and magazines as publications is insufficiently regulated. The independence of the press is low, and it is still maintaining its independence from someone. Although, however, there are more pluses in the law.

[Gusev] In my view, this is above all a masked action to strike a blow at the freedom of speech. As a result, the population that does not have much, exactly those who need it most, are deprived of it. Secondly, until there exists an alternative system of newspaper dissemination, and the price increase is for the increased expense of their distribution, the planned change will be a blatant theft of journalistic labor.

The law will lead us from glasnost to freedom of speech. Yet it is still necessary to create a precise system of judicial defense of journalists, not from the law, but from the people who who could exploit them to hinder the work of the press. In starting down that path, we run into serious problems, for which, in my opinion, journalists are not yet ready.

[Belayev] My attitude toward the price increase in and of itself cannot be optimistic. I feel that the segment of society and the apparatus that for so long has wanted to smother glasnost has now found its pretext—the transition to a market economy—for cutting off interest in newspapers through their cost increase. It is necessary to seek forms of donations to important newspapers, as in the West. There, publication consortiums subsidize the most important press, and if our Government thinks about it more profoundly, it will find means for compensation. For the time being, our situation is very grave; we are discussing alternatives, but we have not found a solution.

On the one hand, the law is heartening, but on the other, it accent the a priori culpability of journalists. Now, any critical article, any satirical piece can serve as a pretext for dragging someone into the courts if anyone feels humiliated, and I am not certain that the court will always perceive the boundary between justifiable criticism and insult. This could deter journalists from the desire to come out strongly, and could bring about a leveling in which facts are given amorously, with evaluations smoothed over.

[Korotich] The state's attempt to force us to eat what it dishes out seems undignified to me. The economists have now calculated it: If prices double, subscription will fall by, say, a factor of about two. The cost of printing and services in the Ministry of Communications will increase, even when the state goes on jacking up the prices and pretending that paper is not the problem, that even under those conditions, it is possible to make a profit. How? If we maintain contact with the reader. We

must develop a system of privileges for subscribers so that the magazine by subscription costs 20-25 percent less than it does in regular sales. People who have subscribed to the magazine for 2-3 years should get a 30-40 percent discount. If we provide this, we can survive.

This is a good law. This is what I want to say: For the first time, we have declared our independence and our aversion to subordinating ourselves to the directions of any political organizations. We had a meeting on Monday at which we decided that the editorial collective will become the founder of OGONEK. A report of this was sent to press on Tuesday morning. And by 2 PM, the publishing house director came to me: He had just been called by the Central Committee, wanting to know what kind of declaration had been adopted at OGONEK...

If independence of the press is to continue to be implemented on this level, we will not get far. I don't want to be subordinate to phone calls, but rather to the Criminal Code and the Constitution. In our country, in general, it is easier to adopt a law than to implement it.

Glavlit Chairman on Censorship Work Under New Press Law

90US1270B Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 31, Aug 90 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Alekseyevich Boldyrev, chief of USSR Council of Ministers Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press by correspondent Ruslan Kozlov: "Farewell, Censorship?" date, place not given]

[Text] *Starting 1 August, at the moment the Law on the Press enters into force, the dream of many generations of journalists will come true: Censorship in our country is being ceremoniously abolished. And it will go over to economic accountability. At any rate, such a possibility was not excluded during the conversation between our correspondent and Vladimir Alekseyevich Boldyrev, chief of USSR Council of Ministers Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press.*

[Correspondent] Excuse me, Vladimir Alekseyevich, but how can we be speaking of economic accountability? Everyone is now learning to count money. Who is going to pay the censor? Pardon me, but formally, you do not exist anymore.

[Boldyrev] That is not quite it. Advance censorship is being abolished. But our administration remains. Just its functions are changing, the nature of our work. Previously, everything was reduced to the formula of "allowing—forbidding." Now we speak of consulting assistance to journalists and consistency—I emphasize—consistency control. Editorial boards will receive complete freedom to publish any information, without even taking our opinion into consideration.

But let's figure this out. Every civilized country strives to safeguard its scientific, defense, and commercial secret. Making it public, especially intentionally, entails criminal accountability. Information comprising a state secret is defined by a special list. We have such a list too. Incidentally, it has been substantially reduced in recent years, and for the most part is spared the limitations dictated by overregulation and narrow departmental ambitions. The editorial board voluntarily monitors itself so that information that is secret not get into the press, or it makes a contract with our specialist. The heat of commerce has not yet touched us, so our evaluations are regular, one could say, symbolic. So we are speaking only about private economic accountability. But as before, the majority of our employees will receive their state salary.

[Correspondent] Tell me, are criminal cases frequently instigated for making state secrets public in the press?

[Boldyrev] There have been no such cases in my memory. If any sort of information did leak through, our "undervigilant" staffer and editor were punished. But they were not punished by other means. Now, with the abolition of mandatory censorship, with the party organs' rejection of total supervision over the press, the corresponding article of legislation will have ever greater force.

[Correspondent] That's understandable. It used to be that when need be, the editor would reach for his party card in terror; now he grasps for his purse. And in particularly serious cases, lay in provisions. Of course, it makes more sense to insure against unpleasantness. Nevertheless, I have difficulty imaginin how the Glavlit staffers will be greeted at the editorial offices: "If you please, Comrade Censor, go over what there is, excuse me, Comrade Consultant, here is your work station. Are you comfortable? Now we'll bring you some material to go over a bit..." To be honest, journalists have formed a rather different stereotype of attitude toward your colleagues.

[Boldyrev] And we are faced with breaking this stereotype through mutual efforts. The unpleasant dependency of the journalist upon the censor remains in the past. And there are now no grounds to see in our staffers any Cerberuses or spies affixed to the press of the administrative-command system. I am certain that in the near future our relations will change for the better.

[Correspondent] Vladimir Alekseyevich, censorship has been abolished, but I have the impression that you feel even more confident than before.

[Boldyrev] Exactly. And it's easy to explain why: Our work has finally moved into a normal, civilized channel.

Deputy Editor on Political, Legal Pressures Used Against PRAVDA

90US1279A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 7, Jul 90 pp 50-52

[Interview with PRAVDA Deputy Chief Editor Anatoliy Karpychev by A. Gostyushin: "And Now We've Stopped 'Ironing Pants'"]

[Text] Our conversation with PRAVDA Deputy Chief Editor Anatoliy Karpychev was from the very beginning interrupted several times by telephone calls, from which I inadvertently learned that my interlocutor was being called to respond in People's Court on the formulation, "On the Defense of Honor and Dignity," which has been very popular of late. Perhaps that is why our conversation about a journalist's independence and the degree of his protection in the face of "external" pressure, which was of interest to me, at once became very concrete.

[Gostyushin] Could you not describe the essence of the conflict, since an example is already knocking on the door?

[Karpychev] We do not have exactly the same situation here as you may imagine. These are ripples following a dismissal from the editorial office. But I find something else to be curious. The first time, I was unable to go to court, because following my heart attack I could hardly move around. And so they immediately fined me for failure to appear... But I take comfort in the fact that we are heading toward a rule-of-law state, and that the law is highest of all, and I say to myself: That is exactly right! Unfortunately, we have an extremely murky conception of what "honor and dignity" mean. In the past these concepts were hardly ever cited as values of ordinary life. Not via the courts at any rate. Honesty, honor, dignity—these words all have the same moral root.

[Gostyushin] Many conceptions of "the defense of honor and dignity" are highly eroded. More precise legal definitions, if there are such things or will be, will remove only part of the problem. But society has a mass of other instruments to put pressure on journalists, both from below and above. You worked as executive secretary to the editorial office nine years, and you know its kitchen very well. Did they exert pressure on you from above?

[Karpychev] I'm sure you're expecting a one-word answer—Yes, he says, of course they exerted pressure. And you can imagine that it was not altogether necessary to exert pressure, but just to give a little nudge, that is, give a little advice, and everything would be OK?.. You don't believe me? Then let's look at it from the other side. Tell me please, where have the chief editors of our newspapers and magazines been brought up? In the universities? Along the paths of journalism? Extremely unlikely; that would more likely be a pleasant exception. They, as a rule, come from the party apparat. There they have been brought up as jacks of all trades: for justice, films, journalism, metallurgy. Probably neither Harvard University nor Cambridge prepares specialists on such a

"broad" profile as our party committees have done. The "political school" made up for lack of professionalism or even brains, in spades. Therefore, when the true pupils of the system become the heads of newspapers, it is not necessary to exert pressure on them from above. Why? They understood from the first word, and would rush to carry out their instructions, even if they placed the newspaper in an awkward position in the eyes of the readers. And you say—pressure, a clash of opinions. One functionary bluntly pointed out to me, saying: You have to obey; after all, your fate depends on my report to the leadership.

[Gostyushin] And so, did you obey?

[Karpychev] He did not put his "threat" to use. Incidentally, there were various kinds of people in the apparat: both good and bad. I most often found myself with good people. But then I would not want to put all the blame for our problems on "pressure" alone. There is such a censor within each of us that, oy-oy-oy! Without even starting to write materials we would say, "It won't pass." It seems to me this is an excellent form of covering up one's own laziness or professional incompetence. Or, one's playing-it-safe. Once a department editor came up to me carrying my article, and said: "I took out one little spot here; in my opinion it would not pass." And I replied: "Listen, we already have someone to take things out: you give him a chance to read it and don't you strike it out." He restored the "little spot," and it passed. I personally think that there is no such thing as "impassable" articles. But there is such a thing as inability to think. If you write intelligently—everything will pass. And that is where one must begin the struggle for freedom of speech and for one's own freedom—behind the writing desk, with one's own self. We love to seek first causes elsewhere; but if you look, you will see her seated comfortably within ourselves, laughing. "To exert pressure" today, in my view, is necessary for a different reason—so that one learns to work and think; so that one learns to put out a modern newspaper.

[Gostyushin] The habitual, "It shall be done" did not come about by chance. It also had its initial material. Not so long ago, we were always being taught from the ideological heights—how to think, and what to publish. Was PRAVDA prompted or not?

[Karpychev] Someone always wants to be in command of a party newspaper. Even when the chief editor was a member of the CPSU Central Committee, and a central committee apparatchik wants to command him. Or take TASS: One time some information was sent from TASS with the note, "For PRAVDA." Why, one might ask, "for PRAVDA"? Who decided? If the party central committee wants to publish something in its own newspaper, it is altogether natural, if this information comes to the editors from the Central Committee. This is respect for its own organ, for its own newspaper. But it seems that they have no confidence in doing things that way. Or take the semiofficial organ. Don't cut out any excess lines, or tomorrow morning there will be a

scandal. At present we are finally getting away from that. A large number of mines had to be cleared from the CPSU Central Committee resolution on the newspaper PRAVDA in the area of command-administrative habits. The editorial board itself has been given the right to bring up and make decisions on just what to publish. In my view this is a great victory.

I think that everyone should do his own work. Persevering, and honestly. And that's all there is to it—both simple and understandable. But with us things had become absurd. The bosses were seized with the urge to offer advice where special skills and knowledge are needed; where only one thing was required of them—trust. I remember how officials at the former CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Department dictated via TASS instructions on how to lay out the first column. The circumstances were exceptional—the General Secretary had died. Apparently those working in the department thought that we newspapermen would not be able to cope with the layout of the materials, and so they took it upon themselves to command us. But the esteemed comrades from the Central Committee bungled everything, and there were not enough pages in the newspaper for their version. We composed the pages ourselves—we did not see the “instructions”—and anyway, PRAVDA had a rather special position. Phone calls came in from other papers: Did you send “advice” to TASS? I replied that I had not given anything to anyone. And you see, all the oblast, kray, republic and even central newspapers were knocking themselves out to comply with the “instructions” but nothing could be done. Apparently, the Propaganda Department used an ordinary ruler rather than a typographical measure. But we at PRAVDA read everything, then arranged the material, and countermanded the orders the Central Committee secretary sent to the newspapers.

[Gostyushin] And what about the story of Suslov's pants?

[Karpychev] This story is also remarkable because of its consequences. Suslov, as I recall, was awarding a medal to Brezhnev. The latter was standing erect, and solemnly, but Suslov was somehow stooped; moreover his baggy trousers exaggerated his stoop. As a result it turned out—without retouching—as the figure of some kind of toady cowering before the boss. Well, we know a thing or two about documentary photographs—the way you actually are is how you will be in the photo. IZVESTIYA trimmed the photograph, and “presented” Brezhnev and Suslov up to the waist; with them everything was fitting; but with us, it was like a friendly caricature. They cut into us properly. The reaction was enormous: You'd better watch out. Well, after that I too began to watch for whose trousers were rumpled in a photograph, and who had to be ironed. Thus the retouchers learned to put in creases, so that it would be a real pleasure to look upon certain of our aging leaders.

In general, the work of a retoucher at the central newspaper, who knew all the “tricks,” was at that time worth

its weight in gold. Let us say, escorting or meeting the top man. Certain people were to be in the cadre and others not, and this is natural. And then work would begin on searching out someone who is not visible, and pasting him into the “unchanging” row. Assistants were exceptionally insulted. They considered it almost a personal insult if their chief was not seen among the cadre. It was very hard on the nerves. Ask me today about the kind of photographs I would not print, so as not to repeat 'he past, and I would answer without thinking: the escorts. We were prepared to give them up, but TASS for some reason decided to foist them on us, and some of our people were hesitant. These pictures remind me of the time of stagnation and I do not want any resemblance to remain. The moreso, since the leaders have changed, but the “tradition” is still alive. Former apparatchiks are cultivating it, those who reason: no good will come of it. We are doing a poor service if we remind people of this. Stars and magnificent photographs—these were Brezhnev's stunts. During the short reign of Yu.V. Andropov, all this motley stream of trumpery disappeared. But under Chernenko, once again a mindless flight of pomposity. But you see, these were not just innocent stunts.

[Gostyushin] While still a student at journalism school I heard that one of the leaders was somehow unsuccessfully pasted into a photograph, and was “cut” in half...

[Karpychev] Anything is possible. The fact of the matter is that the fawning entourage wanted to see “their own” chief right next to Leonid Ilich. But it is one thing to want something, and another—to observe the strictest subordination and etiquette. As they say, you can't jump higher than yourself. But what difference does it make, honestly, on what side of Brezhnev one stands and in what order? There was, it seems, a difference. It was stupid. But you see, it is not the person who is valued, but the easy chair in which he is seated. One easy chair meant rank, decorations, and being close to “himself,” and another—did not. Other newspapers would often call us and ask for our photographs. TASS was offended—Why aren't they taking its products? But the entire matter was, that with PRAVDA's photographs, one could fend off attacks: why was their leader standing so far from the top man at the wreath-laying ceremony or the visit to the exhibit? And the other newspapers would answer: “That's the way it was in PRAVA.” The newspapermen knew that we would soften the blow.

[Gostyushin] My memories of those times are still associated with the daily echo of any speech by the General Secretary. A good half of the articles were quotations of the Leader's speeches. But I well remember the day when the echo was suddenly cut off. A rumor was circulating among Moscow editorial offices of M.S. Gorbachev's phone call to PRAVDA's chief editor at that time. It is said that he asked him to quote Lenin more, and Gorbachev—less. Is that true?

[Karpychev] I was not present during the conversation, and therefore do not make so bold as to confirm it... Something took place, but not in such a threatening tone

as it sounds in your question. In the past, on the whole, they used to quote a great deal, with deference. Quotations were even used as arguments in critical articles. It is not a question of our newspaper alone, but of all the press. Although, of course, one also had to know one's limits. Certain editors, to their peril and risk, had struck out quotations, but that was not without danger; it was possible that "they would not understand." But I reiterate, the impression that the telephone on the editor's desk never stopped ringing with calls from the Central Committee—is an exaggeration. Of course, the publisher has a right to control his own newspaper, but what kind of control there is depends upon us...

[Gostyushin] Administration by orders and decrees is perceived as especially painful in cadre policy. I admit, that in the past, only elections seemed natural and just to me... But abroad, if I am not mistaken, in all democracies, the editor is appointed. Secret balloting at the editorial office—is not choosing the best, but choosing those like oneself... What is your response?

[Karpychev] If one is in one's right mind, one must acknowledge the right of the publisher. I do not see anything strange in it, if he wants to appoint the editor himself. And he, the publisher, also has a full right to fire an editor. The important thing is that a functionary does not speak in the publisher's name. Journalists must bear this in mind, in order to be able to stick up for oneself. I do not see an ideal method for choosing a leader. For example, I like democratic elections; but, on the other hand, we after all have experienced some unexpectedly bitter fruits in the form of collective egoism or manipulation of public opinion. On the whole I believe that there cannot be strict division into chiefs and subordinates in the editorial offices, but conductors and soloists, where intellect and creativity rule. Not everyone can be the conductor of the editorial orchestra. As a reader, I am completely indifferent as to who appointed Yegor Yakovlev to the post of chief editor. But I am not indifferent as to whether he can put out a newspaper. If he can, I can only be happy with the choice. And that's all there is to it.

[Gostyushin] In other words, you consider the publisher's word decisive?

[Karpychev] The publisher is defending his own interests. If I were a publisher, the moreso in conditions of the impending multiparty state, and I differ with you on vital positions, or if my views and demands as a publisher do not suit you—you are free to leave. Or, I will fire you. And here, in my view, a contract system would be suitable for us.

[Gostyushin] And do the views of your publisher suit you?

[Karpychev] They do. They are promulgated in the draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee. The limits of agreement, if you will, I would define for myself—and forgive me for the lofty words—as a sense of conscience and honesty. I think that here one should also rely on

such nonmathematical criteria as how you feel in the editorial office. And of course, one cannot get along without a feeling for measures and tact. Do you recall when the newspaper reprinted an article from the Italian REPUBBLICA about Yeltsin? We received a deluge of letters. And the readers (under the present politization of society this might appear strange) held the tactlessness of the article against us. It was the kind one finds among the linen while rummaging through drawers. People wrote: Now you listen; how low can you get? Is that really the proper tone for PRAVDA?!

[Gostyushin] I too shared those feelings. It struck one right between the eyes. I consider PRAVDA a stable, somewhat conservative newspaper, with well-founded analyses. At times it falls short because of this in terms of acuteness; but on the other hand, it reliably protects itself from clamoring, into which it is easy to fall in our times of "irate exposes." In today's concert of the mass information media, I consider PRAVDA without a doubt a centrist newspaper. I like its position. Even though after these admissions they will call me a conservative.

[Karpychev] The word "conservative" has become a swear-word among us. Why do we like to swear so much?

[Gostyushin] And so, the "small nudges" from above have ceased, and the direction of the newspaper under the new chief editor is changing. But there is still the court...

[Karpychev] The readers are the court. Speaking seriously, we all depend upon the reader. I do not believe the principal virtue of man is to write letters to the newspaper. But I value the readers highly who can, and who can both grieve and rejoice with us. It is very hard for PRAVDA. Criticism of the party—is also criticism addressed to it. The pressure from below is very strong. And at times the means are excessive

[Gostyushin] It seems to me that is just something one has to live with, like the inevitable muddy roads in the spring.

[Karpychev] While we understand the inevitability of muddy roads, we nevertheless do not want to wallow in the mud. You and I are continually bypassing the question: Has the journalist become more free? He has, and he shall. But every one should resolve the question for himself. I am convinced that the only path toward professional independence is—the ability to work in the contemporary manner; to be—and not just to pass for—a journalist

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Zhurnal", 1990

Editor Details Function of Moscow Armenian Cultural Society Paper

90US1270C Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
24 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Ruben Shirinyan, editor of ARMYANSKIY VESTNIK, by KOMMUNIST correspondent S. Geoletysyan: "We Present the New Newspaper ARMYANSKIY VESTNIK;" date, place not given]

[Text] Starting in November of last year, it was possible to buy in Moscow and Yerevan the newspaper ARMYANSKIY VESTNIK (AY LRABER) in Armenian and Russian. The founder of the press publication is the Moscow Armenian Cultural Society—MAKO. Its editor, Ruben Shirinyan, visited Moscow recently, and a KOMMUNIST correspondent speaks with him.

[Correspondent] Please tell me about the print organ you direct, its goals, its problems.

[Shirinyan] Our newspaper is published in eight sheets in two languages, with the content of the parts not being identical. It is the same format as ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. The main task is the publication of materials on the life of the Moscow Armenian community, objective information from Armenia, and domestic and foreign [spyurka].

[Correspondent] Did the idea of publishing a newspaper come up a long time ago?

[Shirinyan] The history of the Armenian press in Moscow covers over 100 years. Recall the journal YUSISAPAYL, which was published in the late 50s-early 60s. It was published by professor Stepanos Nazaryan. Our predecessor, the monthly ARMYANSKIY VESTNIK (in Russian, 1916-1918) was very popular; its actual editor was the well-known publicist, literary scholar and public figure Alesha Dzhivelegov.

Before the October revolution and after it, several Armenian newspapers were published in Moscow, and then were still. Our newspaper broke the 70-year silence. There now exist here several Armenian associations: "Yusisapayl" (Northern Lights), and the Moscow Armenian Democratic Movement. The Moscow committee for refugee assistance is doing great work. These social tendencies used to branch off in various channels. But we came to the agreement that difference of opinion is good, although solidarity is needed. A coordinating conference was held at which the idea of consolidation received concrete enactment. The newspaper heralds this joyous fact. Armenia's permanent representative in Moscow, Eduard Aykazyan, make a great contribution to the unification.

[Correspondent] What can you say about your collaborators, about yourself?

[Shirinyan] The newspaper is produced mostly by enthusiasts, professional journalists, several people. We have no premises, we need at least one room. We hope that the permanent representative can help us with that.

I am 48 years old, and have lived in Moscow all my life. I have worked at TASS for over 20 years. I was a correspondent in Yugoslavia. Now I am a TASS special correspondent. As I said, we publish informational materials, and even articles supporting traditional Armenian-Russian friendship. We attach great significance to this. The traditions are rich. For centuries, the Armenians lived side by side with the Russians, experiencing mutual respect and friendly inclinations. The newspaper prints articles on Armenian-Russian relations, urgent problems of interethnic relations.

[Correspondent] Glancing at the files of your newspaper, I am convinced that there are interesting articles. Before me is the fifth May issue. The material published here is about the day of the establishment of Armenian statehood, "Villa Abamelek," and other things. There are also Armenian language lessons...

[Shirinyan] Yes indeed. We attract professional scholars, historians, philologists, writers, and economists to collaborate. Materials by people's deputies Lyudmila Arutyunyan, Zoriy Balayan, poetess Yevgeniya Ambartsumova, and IZVESTIYA political observer Konstantin Geyvandov have been published. Talented author and translator, Yerevan State University graduate Enokh Lazyan has the column, "Armenian Language Lesson."

Five Armenian Sunday schools are being run in Moscow, and this is only the beginning. There must be more of them. And we are writing about this.

[Correspondent] What are your problems, your plans?

[Shirinyan] We have more problems than we need. We have no "place"; the newspaper is published in Yerevan. Thanks to the Armenian CP Central Committee, which took this mission upon itself.

True, now, for a number of reasons, it would be more expedient to publish the newspaper in Moscow. Everybody needs an all-Armenian print organ put out in the capital. In the republic, they frequently complain that Armenian problems are not reaching the union reader. It is very important to fine-tune the publication of ARMYANSKIY VESTNIK. We would be grateful to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, and the permanent representative for moral support, or, as they say, "sponsorship." Human participation, assistance and a good attitude will benefit the common cause.

The press run is 15,000 copies. But since the newspaper sells out, we will try to increase the press run in order to sell it not only in Moscow and Yerevan, but in cities with pockets of Armenian population. I hope that after MAKO opens a hard currency account, we will have foreign subscribers as well. Contacts are being established not only in Armenia, but with foreign authors.

Our correspondent Boris Tosunyan visited Paris and brought material from there—a talk about the workdays of the newspaper Arach. Another correspondent, Grachiya Martirosyan, is preparing a series of reports from the United States. A link has been established with

the recently emerged Serbian-Armenian Society in Belgrade. We plan to involve in the newspaper's work famous Armenian figures in science, culture, and art. As you see, there are many ideas. They need only to be brought to life.

Party Examines Ukraine's Political History

90UN2267A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
16 Jun 90 p 3

[Article from the Press Center of Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee: "Little-Studied Pages of the History of the Ukraine"]

[Text] In recent times the history of the Ukraine has become not only an object of intellectual interest, but has increasingly been transformed into a subject of intense political struggle. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, scientific institutions and mass media in the republic receive many letters from working people expressing the need to step up work on little-studied problems in Ukrainian history.

Work in this area has been expanded in the republic, and the necessary conditions for developing the people's historical memory are being created. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has passed a decree on the need to deepen the study and objective evaluation of some pages in the history of the Ukrainian Communist Party in the 1930's, 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's; of the famine of 1932-1933, and the need to publish archive material involving these events.

Recently the Ideology Department of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and scientific associates at the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences' History Institute and the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's Institute for Party History—a branch of the CPSU Central Committee's Institute for Marxism-Leninism—discussed some questions on the history of our people, particularly their sovereignty.

It was noted that 23 June marks the 73rd anniversary of the restoration of Ukrainian statehood, liquidated at the end of the 18th Century. It was on this day that the Second All-Ukrainian Military Congress announced the "First Universal Ukrainian Central Rada to the Ukrainian People in the Ukraine and Outside It." By this historic act, "not separating themselves from all of

Russia and not breaking with the Russian state," the Ukrainian people declared their right to take charge of their lives.

So far a full and thorough evaluation of the activities of the Central Rada at various stages of its existence has not been made. However, there can be no doubt that most of its members were representatives of the peasantry, soldiers and workers (444 delegates out of 586). As a result, it was manifested in the Universal, which witnessed its national rebirth and itself ameliorated its development, the age-old aspiration of the entire Ukrainian people.

The Bolshevik Party was the only one of the general Russian parties that spoke out in support of the democratic demands of the First Universal. V. I. Lenin dedicated to the Universal a special article in PRAVDA, titled "The Ukraine." In it he decisively defended the rights of the Ukrainian people. "Not a single democrat, to say nothing of a socialist," Lenin wrote, "can deny the full legality of Ukrainian demands." (Complete Collected Works, Vol 32, p 341). Vladimir Ilich stressed that neither can one "deny the right of the Ukraine to a free separation from Russia. For only with the unconditional recognition of this right is it possible to agitate for the free union of Ukrainians and Great Russians, for the voluntary unification of the two peoples in one state" (loc. cit.) This position was met with approval by the Ukrainian people.

The beginnings of the most recent Ukrainian sovereignty took place under the complex historical conditions of World War I, difficult revolutionary processes, a bitter struggle between various classes and social groups. It was pointed out at the First Universal that bold hands and great national efforts were needed to make the people free.

Seventy-three years have passed. However, even today these words sound prophetic. In order to overcome the present difficulties in the republic, now, as never before, it is necessary to have intensive joint efforts, the consolidation of all healthy forces in the Ukrainian nation and national groups living in the Ukrainian SSR.

Volga, Kuybyshev Reservoir Contaminated

90US1262A Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition)
in Russian 14 Aug 90 p 2

[Report by IZVESTIYA staff correspondent S. Zhigalov:
"After the Accident in Tolyatti"]

[Text] Kuybyshev Oblast—The accident in Tolyatti has
created a threat of bacterial contamination of the Volga.

The accident occurred during repair work at the municipal purification facilities. A valve nozzle broke off, and the gushing stream flooded the sewage treatment station of the Volga Automobile Plant, which treats production and fecal wastes of the Avtozavodskiy Rayon.

Thousands of cubic meters of raw discharge (4-6 cubic meters per hour) gushed into the Kuybyshev reservoir. The danger of contamination of the reservoir's water supply by pathogenic microbes arose. To reduce the volume of untreated waste, the supply of drinking water in the rayon was suspended.

...And once again, there came the need for heroism while overcoming the accident. This time, the difficult mission befell the divers. They eliminated the consequences of the accident by diving under water for 3-5 minutes under the most difficult conditions, and at risk to their health.

The supply of drinking water to the city is now being restored.

The equipment commission is faced with determining how it happened that the Volga was polluted by a nozzle costing just a few kopecks.

"Since the accident, when using untreated Volga water, the probability of acute gastrointestinal illnesses has increased," thinks V. Zhernov, deputy chief physician of the oblast epidemiology and public health station. "Yet there is no knowing whether the accident will cause a rash of such illnesses. The incubation period of hepatitis, dysentery, is 30-40 days. To avoid extreme situations, superchlorination of the water has been started, and intensified lab monitoring of its condition is being conducted."

According to some reports, the dirty spot is "walking" about the reservoir for the time being; according to others, it has already passed through the locks of the Volga GES [hydroelectric power station] and moved downstream. This accident has put millions in a state of tension. By Monday morning, it had still not been completely eliminated. The discharge of untreated wastes still continues in smaller quantities.

Another Chernobyl-Related Strike Committee Formed in Gomel Oblast

90UN2792A

[Editorial Report] Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUS-
SIYA in Russian on 12 August 1990 carries on page 1 a
100-word report by D. Pavlov on a "sanctioned"

meeting in the city of Rechitsa [Gomel Oblast] called to
assess the ecological consequences of Chernobyl. The
meeting, attended by 5,000 people, adopted a resolution
to form a strike committee.

Contacted by phone, V.M. Kleyman, deputy chairman of
the Rechitsa gorispolkom, said that official registration
had not yet been requested for the strike committee. He
conceded that the ecological situation in the city is more
"complex" than is believed by the Ministry of Health.

Chernobyl-Related Assistance

Funds to be Dispersed to Victims

90UN2277A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 27, 4 Jul 90 p 12

[Article by G. Apresyan: "Chernobyl Money To People"]

[Text] Last 26 July LITERATURNAYA GAZETA pub-
lished an article by the poet Igor Shklyarevskiy, "Child-
ren in the Radiation Zone" and Account No 700073 for
donations to help refugees from Mogilev and Gomel
oblasts suffering from the Chernobyl catastrophe.

There were many responses to the article. The secretary
of the Board of the Writers' Union heard my comments
about the situation in Belorussia and donated 200,000
rubles to help the refugees. The Cinematographers'
Union donated 100,000 rubles. LITERATURNAYA
GAZETA donated a similar sum. Well known writers
and poets in the Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia donated
their own money. Enterprises and private individuals
also responded.

**A year has passed and the account has received almost 17
million rubles. How will this money be spent?**

There has been great concern about the loss of money
from the previously established All-Union Chernobyl
Fund. It has been used for purposes other than those
designated.

People have become skeptical about charitable actions.
Therefore, a public council for auditing Chernobyl
(Belorussian) money has been created. It includes the
poets, R. Borodulin and I. Shklyarevskiy (cochairmen),
the film director, Yu. Marukhin, the historian, V.
Ivanovskiy, First Secretary of the Mogilev Obkom V.
Leonov and representatives of Gomel Oblast and
informal organizations

We met with Vyacheslav Frantsevich Kabich, chairman
of the Belorussian Council of Ministers and suggested
that Gomel and Mogilev refugees be given 16 million
rubles—15,000 to 20,000 per family—to build their own
houses. These people will move to uncontaminated
regions and will live there, no longer afraid of their own
gardens and no longer pouring milk onto graves.

In giving this money to inhabitants of the zone, we will help the government—more than 1,000 families will move on their own—and will be of direct assistance to these people.

V. F. Kebich responded to our suggestion with understanding and support and even promised to back up this 16 million with construction materials.

We have already selected attractive building sites for the Mogilev refugees—hills, forests, clean lakes full of life. It is important to build now and not to let the summer pass.

We reject a policy which does not obligate us to do very much: Live in the zone, they say, we will take pity on you, treat you, send throwaway syringes and build new hospitals. The sooner people are sent away, the fewer hospitals will have to be built. Inhabitants of the zone—up to 40 curies—are not given first priority for resettlement. However, they are working on contaminated fields and producing products containing radionuclides. These products are sent all over the country. Being accountable to people, we are continuing our account No 70073.

Cleanup Workers Union to be Formed

90UN2277B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIA
in Russian 17 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by I. Aleksandrov: "A Union for 'Liquidators'"]

[Text] At 10 am on 24 June in Sevastopol Park in Minsk there was a regular meeting of the Republic Union "Pripyat" for participants in liquidating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

Genadiy Korbut, a 26-year old worker at the Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant, explains: "I had to be in the zone from June to November 1986—the first and most difficult days after the catastrophe. My colleagues and I had started to experience a deterioration in our health by the end of 1986. However, doctors refused to link our health problems with our presence in the zone. I still do not have a precise diagnosis. Nobody will tell me the meaning of these severe headaches and weakness in the legs."

We have been granted benefits, but only on paper. How can they be utilized? In general, there are no certifications for the liquidators. Young people have held fasts in

protest. I know that this is an extreme measure, but something is required to attract attention to our problems. It is clear that one can accomplish nothing alone. Therefore, we are getting together. Our meetings are waiting for representatives from all cities in the republic. According to rough estimates, 20,000 young men from Belorussia participated in deactivation work.

Assistance Certification to be Issued

90UN2277C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIA
in Russian 17 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by G. N. Pankova in response to letter from V. Zaytsev: "Awards—by 1 July"]

[Text] Nobody can arrange for me to obtain an award and certification as a participant in liquidating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. Who should do this?

V. Zaytsev, Pinskiy Rayon

The editors asked G. N. Pankova, Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers Department Chief for Questions Concerning the Liquidation of the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES, to answer the reader's questions.

As provided for by USSR Council of Ministers and AUCCTU Decree No 325 of 31 March 1990, benefits for participants in the Chernobyl events are to be introduced on 1 July 1990. The appropriate certifications will be issued by Belorussian SSR ministries and agencies, ispolkoms of oblast soviets of people's deputies, social security organs and military commissariats who sent citizens to work in the increased danger zone. Consequently, one must turn to these organizations. The republic has ordered 16,000 certificates: this should be enough for all. They will be awarded simultaneously.

For your information: Since this May Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers and Belorussian Trade Union Council Decree No 105 has been in force. This decree is on measures to improve medical services and social security to participants in liquidating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. It provides benefits in addition to the all-union decree. However, as the certificates will be all-union, no republic certificates to participants are foreseen.

Demographic Situation in Georgia Reviewed

90US1219A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
14 Jul 90 p 3

[GRUZINFORM report: "The Demographic Situation in the Mirror of Statistics"]

[Text] The State Committee for Statistics of the Georgian SSR has summarized figures reflecting the subtleties of the republic's demographic situation.

A total of 91,138 babies were born in the republic in 1989, 51.5 percent of them boys and 48.5 percent girls. The birthrate was 16.7 per 1,000 people for the population as a whole, 16.2 for urban residents and 17.4 for the rural population. The birthrate dropped by 9.7 percent compared with 1985.

"The bare statistical figures reveal certain trends in the demographic processes," said Temur Ratiani, deputy chairman of the Georgian SSR state committee, in an interview with a GRUZINFORM correspondent.

For example, 17.7 percent of the babies were born to mothers not legally married (10.5 percent in 1985), 5.2 percent of whom were registered by the mother alone.

Most of the babies (38.7 percent) were born to mothers between the ages of 20 and 24, and most of the babies born out of wedlock were born to mothers in the same age group (34.2 percent of the total giving birth without being legally married).

August was the most productive month in 1989, with 8,280 babies (9.1 percent of the total) born that month. The month with the lowest birthrate was April, with 7,098 births (7.8 percent).

A total of 60,957 (66 percent) of those born in the republic last year were Georgians.

A total of 58.1 percent of the new mothers have a secondary education, 17 percent have a higher or partial higher education, and only 0.2 percent have just a primary education.

A total of 617 stillbirths were recorded last year, which is 0.7 percent of the total. There were 6.8 stillbirths per 1,000 births. In 1985 886 stillbirths were recorded (9.1 percent of total births).

A total of 47,077 people died in the republic in 1989, 50 percent men and 50 percent women. The death rate was 8.6 per 1,000 people, which was 1.1 percent below the 1985 level. The death rate was 7.8 in the urban, 9.7 in the rural population.

There has been a marked reduction in the mortality rate for babies below the age of 1 year in recent years. It was 24 per 1000 babies born in 1985, compared with 19.6 in 1989. Of these 57.8 percent were boys, 42.2 percent girls. The largest number of babies died in March.

A total of 252 babies died at the age of 1 year in the republic, 80.6 percent of them in rural areas.

A total of 9,920 working-age people (21.6 percent) died in the republic in 1989, 77 percent of them men and 23 percent women.

Georgians accounted for 68.3 percent of those who died.

A total of 247 people committed suicide or sacrificed their lives in the republic in 1989 (240 in 1985), 69.2 percent of them men, 30.8 percent women. There were 4.5 suicides per 100,000 people.

Atheistic Propaganda, Religious Freedoms Discussed

90US1245A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 27 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with Abdulkhamid Tursun, the director of the publishing house SADUM [expansion unknown], by the correspondent, Dilshod Makhmudkhanov: "Separation from the Government: Turning to the Muslim Clergy"]

[Text] In May of this year the parliament of the country discussed the legislative project of the law concerning the freedom of conscience and religious organizations. What do the believers themselves think about it? Our correspondent, Dilshod Makhmudkhanov asked the director of the publishing house SADUM, Abdulkhamid Tursun, to comment about the majority of the governing clergy's attitude of Central Asia and Kazakhstan towards this project.

I will say directly: the project of the law provoked quite a few complaints. On 16 July in the SADUM [offices] a large meeting took place, at which the project of this document was discussed. At the meeting the representatives of the Muslim clergy of all the republics of our region were present.

In the discussion of the legislative project, a representative of SADUM, a People's Deputy of the USSR, Mufti Mukhammad-Sodiyk Mukhammad-Yusuf, his deputy Zakhidzhan khodzhi Abdukadir, the chief editor of the journal MUSLIMS OF THE SOVIET EAST, Mukhammadamin Mukhammad-Yusuf, and other leaders and members of SADUM participated.

At the meeting the project was read article by article, after which the participants in discussion expressed their proposals and remarks. His most Holy Mufti also shared his proposals on issues concerning Hadji, taxes, and levies on the clergy, the opening of new homes of prayer, mosques, and religious education.

The meeting's main theme was the proposal of emendations to the following paragraph of article 3 of chapter 1. The meeting unanimously proposes to change it thus: "Every citizen has the right to propagate and disseminate and attract other persons to the religions, which he himself professes." Besides this, the participants of the

meeting thought that in the law there should be written the following words: "In the USSR atheism is separated from the state. Atheist propaganda is a matter of conscience for each citizen. The state does not support it neither morally, nor materially. The believers just like the atheists, are guaranteed the right to conduct propaganda by such methods, which do not diminish the dignity or worth of citizens."

If religion is separated from the state, then atheism should also be separated from it. The state does not help believers; they support religion on the basis of their own voluntary donations. Atheism is materially kept up by the state. This is wrong. Let the atheist propagate and disseminate atheism also by their own means.

Besides this, we put forward a number of proposals, which have a fundamentally important character. We would like there to be general, educational institutions where on religious subjects would be taught by volunteers, that religious organizations would have the right to participate in elections and to put forward their candidates, that in regions where the majority of the population is made up of Muslims, that Friday would be declared a day of rest, and days that are religious holidays would be declared holidays off from work.

We will strive to attain all these conditions for believers in the army, in hospitals, in public places; we will ask the government to provide the believers with a television channel. In case we would not manage to get into the law a majority of these demands, then we would insist that the committee working on the law concerning the freedom of conscience and religious organizations in Uzbekistanian SSR would include within it both materialists and believers with equal rights, who would be led by their most Holy Mufti of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

All these and other proposals were included in the meeting's protocol. On its basis, a resolution will be worked out, which will be sent to the Higher Council of the USSR.

Chernobyl Compensation Restrictions Noted

90UN2274B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 30 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by O. Shepitko: "Paper Benefits"]

[Text] When, on 31 March of this year, the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU finally passed the decree "On Measures for Improving Medical Service and Social Security to People Who Participated in Liquidating the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES," many "liquidators" were overjoyed: finally! The decree guarantees them the entire list of benefits going into effect this 1 July. However, it turned out that it was too soon for joy: Benefits can be received only by those given a special certification and award. These, in turn, should be granted by councils of ministers of union republics, local soviets, military committees and social

security organs. Perhaps, other regions of the country are more fortunate, but the Chernobylers in Donetsk Oblast can still only dream about receiving certification. They said at the Oblast Department of the Chernobyl Union that it would be good if the certifications came by autumn. So, there are some sort of benefits, but it is impossible to utilize them.

Writer's Anti-Semitic Views Protested

90UN2274A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jul 90
Morning Edition p 3

[Letter From V. Lihanova, A. Khapacheva, Ye. Lomakina, B. Bitenberg, T. Kuchina, T. Nikolskaya: "On V. Rasputin's Interview with the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE"]

[Text] The report of an interview that the writer V. Rasputin gave to the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE prompted us to write to the editors. Here are a few quotes from the letter: "I think that Jews among us today should feel some responsibility for the sins of the revolution and its consequences...", "They should feel responsible for the terror during the revolution and especially after it. They played a big role here and their guilt is great. Both for the murder of God and for this." It went on in the same spirit.

In the 1990th year after the birth of Christ this Russian writer continues to talk about the "guilt" of an entire people, the Jews, for the crucifixion of Christ. Poorly acquainted with history, including the history of the church, the writer should be told that this accusation, serving as a pretext for the extermination of people in the Middle Ages, has been refuted by the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches. Moreover, this accusation is an insult to the religious sensitivities of Christians, for, according to the gospel, Mary and the apostles, the followers of Christ, were members of the accused race.

It is difficult to believe but it is a fact that the famous writer makes responsible for the revolution only one of the more than 100 peoples of Russia who participated in it—once again the Jews. This is nothing new, the Nazis identified the revolution with "Jew-commissars." This was one of the reasons for exterminating millions of Jews during the fascist dictatorship. However, it is indicative that 45 years after the destruction of fascism this view is shared by a person whose public statements never reject the revolution and the socialist alternative.

It is one thing for such attacks, and alas, they are not punished, to be made by people from Pamyat and similar organizations. However, when the same thoughts are expressed openly by a USSR people's deputy and a member of the Presidential Council they are not perceived as a personal opinion. Haven't we had enough bloody conflicts on international soil. Why kindle even stronger foci of hate and force people to emigrate?

We propose that the interview of V. Rasputin be examined by the Ethics Committee of the USSR Supreme

Soviet. We also await an explanation from the Presidential Council. In a law governed state no body should escape punishment for insults against fellow citizens of different nationalities.

Council Formed To Defend Rights in Culture Sphere

90UN2379A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 28, 1 Jul 90 p 2

[Open letter by F.M. Burlatskiy, editor-in-chief, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA et al.: "For a Rebirth of Culture: On Creating a Coordinating Council To Defend the Rights of Employees and Enterprises in the Fields of Culture and Science"]

[Text] By means of the present letter the Initiative Group of Employees in the Fields of Culture, Art, Science, and Information informs the broad public concerning the creation of a Coordinating Council To Defend the Rights of Employees and Enterprises in the Fields of Culture and Science.

The status of our culture in recent years has been recognized by the public as a national drama. Nowadays, in the crucial phase of perestroika, the censorship and other political organizations which for so long a period cramped freedom of expression and creativity in our country are dying out. But trouble is now advancing from another side. Having liberated culture, art, and science, the state is constantly increasing economic pressure, which could wipe out everything that has been gained by intellectual, creative work during the last few years. The taxes being imposed upon literary persons, artists, actors, and musicians, as well as on legitimate theaters, motion-picture theaters, and cultural enterprises, have exceeded any and all reasonable bounds. Nowadays an author who has created a work of art risks becoming a debtor to the fiscal departments. According to the new taxation scheme, he can be required to pay as much as 60 percent or more of his author's fee. New taxes are being introduced on newspapers, journals, and other mass media of news and science. Culture is becoming more and more dependent upon market conditions. The present level of state financing—1.2 percent of budgetary funds for the needs of culture—is obviously insufficient. Classical works in the field of culture and basic research in science, neither of which are intended for the mass consumer, suffer particularly from this.

Striking contradictions are manifesting themselves more and more in cultural policy. We are trying to "enlist" in the worldwide civilization, to create an open, civilian-type society, and this is possible only on the basis of a genuine cultural and scientific upsurge, along with freedom of creative activity. A law concerning exiting from and entering into the USSR is absolutely necessary for cooperation in the fields of culture and science, as well as for upgrading the occupational skills of Soviet people. At the very same time we have begun to witness the beginning of an actual campaign against intellectuals,

a shattering of the material basis and the prestige of persons engaged in creative work. Even in the highest organs of state power there is a failure to manifest a sufficient understanding of cultural problems, of defending and multiplying intellectual property. Can we really count on the success of perestroika, a radical increase of labor productivity and the people's quality of life under conditions whereby the country's intellectual potential is being put down, and the "brain drain" to foreign countries is being artificially stimulated?!

All of this has impelled us to come out with an initiative for forming the institution of a public, Coordinating Council To Defend the Rights of Employees and Enterprises in the Fields of Culture and Science. We are not talking about setting up some sort of new, bureaucratic institution or of taking upon ourselves the task of analyzing certain conflict-type situations or individual complaints. We are setting ourselves a different task: in the struggle for the survival and development of culture and science we wish to unite the efforts of the creative unions, newspapers, and journals, the committees and commissions on culture and science in the soviets, ministries, and departments engaged in handling the problems of culture, science, education, and information. In practical terms, this means joint advancement of the initiatives to change copyright and tax policy in the field of culture, along with forming special institutions to which persons in the creative professions could appeal for help. We invite the representatives of other public and state institutions concerned, as we are, with the rebirth of culture and science to join the Coordinating Council.

F.M. BURLATSKIY, editor-in-chief, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA;

G.Ya. BAKLANOV, editor-in-chief of the journal ZNAMYA;

A.V. VASNETSOV, chairman of the board, USSR Union of Artists;

N.N. GUBENKO, USSR minister of culture;

N.I. YeFIMOV, editor-in-chief of the newspaper IZVESTIYA;

V.V. KARPOV, first secretary of the board, USSR Union of Writers;

V.N. KUDRYAVTSEV, vice-president, USSR Academy of Sciences;

M.F. NENASHEV, chairman, USSR Gostelradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting];

Yu.P. PLATONOV, first secretary of the board, USSR Union of Architects;

T.N. KHRENNIKOV, first secretary of the board, USSR Union of Composers;

D. KhUDONAZAROV, chairman of the board, USSR Union of Cinematographers

Greater Investment in Culture in Turkmenia Noted

90UN2379B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 27 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by L. Kachurina: "If There Is No Culture, There Will Be Nothing"]

[Text] Just as 10 years ago, in our country only 1.2 percent of the state budget is expended on culture. That means that the state spends less than three kopecks per day per capita on cultural needs! Just think about that insultingly-miserly figure!

It is becoming completely evident that nowadays, above all, we need not only to feed people, but also to rescue, save, and revive the people's culture, as well as their morality. We must, finally, understand, when we speak about the breakdown of the economy, the decline of morals, the increasing crudity of people, the upsurge of crime, the monstrous interethnic strife, that the causes of these things are not only political and not only social. The cause lies primarily in the mass lack of culture.

Prominent figures and leading officials of the creative unions, in the name of all who are not indifferent to the fate of our fatherland's culture, addressed a letter a few days ago to the USSR President, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Supreme Soviets of the Union and autonomous republics; this letter was entitled "Prevent the Catastrophe of Culture." The authors of this appeal consider that the truly crucial and tortured period in which we are living precludes them from indifferently and coldly regarding culture and education, without which we can expect the loss of the criteria of good and evil, as well as an intellectual and moral decline. The authors of the letter call upon cultural employees, along with members of creative unions and organizations, to conduct on 28 June of this year an action to defend culture. This action proposes to stop on that day, at 1930 hours, for five minutes the showing of plays and other stage presentations, concerts, motion-picture screenings—and to have five minutes of silence in the defense of culture. They also propose to hold meetings, collect signatures, and other measures.

A discussion of the appeal entitled "Prevent the Catastrophe of Culture" was held a few days ago in the Ashkhabad Gorkom of the Turkmenian Communist Party. Taking part in it were the following persons: S. Rakhimov, secretary of the Turkmenian CP Central Committee; B. Sardzhayev, first secretary of the party gorkom; M. Aymedova, chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Science, Public Education, Culture, and Upbringing; A. Mamiliev and M. Aliyeva, ministers of culture and public education; along with leading officials of the creative unions and organizations, representatives from the Ministry of Finances and the Ashkhabad Gorispolkom, as well as journalists.

Those who had gathered here spoke with pain and concern about the very grave, crisis-type situation in which Turkmenia's culture has been for more than a decade. Only 1.5 percent of this republic's budget is allocated for all the cultural sectors. Hence—the extremely poor material-and-technical base.

Judge for yourselves: in 200 centers with a population of more than 300 each there are no stationary libraries; in 400 there are club-type institutions; more than 600 clubs are in accident-prone or auxiliary rooms. Twenty-six rayon centers lack winter-type motion-picture theaters, whereas summer-type motion-picture theaters are not being built in new neighborhoods or districts even in the republic's capital. Up to now Ashkhabad does not have a concert hall; it is 18 schools and kindergartens short; and the children study in one shift in 6 schools. The Young People's Experimental Theater Studio, which has gained a high reputation not only in our republic but throughout the entire country and even abroad, does not have its own building. There are not enough staff personnel, especially highly skilled ones. The social protection of the employees in the cultural sphere is too low.

Nothing about which the cultural figures spoke with such feeling was anything newly discovered by most of those attending the meeting. There was some hope in the specific proposals which were made for the purpose of radically altering this situation.

We need to adopt a law on culture and a concept for developing Turkmenia's culture, and this should be done at the level of this republic's government. It was proposed that the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet increase the funds for culture up to 15 percent of the republic's budget. We ought to convoke by this autumn a united plenum of creative figures, of employees in the fields of culture and education for the purpose of creating a common or general plan of assisting in the development of the above-mentioned spheres.

We must turn the attention of this republic's public opinion to the problems of culture. The decisive factor for success in this matter of the utmost importance must be a comprehensive approach, a consolidation of all forces—the republic's party organization and the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, along with the ministries and departments. And for this purpose we need constant efforts, financial, material, and moral support not only from the above-mentioned organs, but also from production collectives, industrial and agricultural groups, cooperatives, and even private individuals. The time has come to revive the patronage system—a worthy matter of unselfish sponsorship of art which has become basically neglected and forgotten in society.

As to an upsurge in rural culture, a good initiative has been advanced here by the RK of the cultural employees trade union. In April of this year it adopted an appeal to the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet containing a call for it turn its attention to the rural areas, to its cultural and

spiritual needs; it also made a proposal that the republic's Gosagroprom develop patronage, sponsorship, etc.

In order to unite the efforts of the leaders in culture, education, and art, it has been proposed to create a coordinate council in this republic.

The press and other mass media should conduct purposive, coordinated, targeted, and explanatory work on culture, its development and upsurge. Without this it is

inconceivable to carry out the transformation of our life and to convert our society into a truly civilized one, and ourselves into morally enriched persons.

We must do everything possible and even "impossible" in order to rescue and save culture. "To prevent the catastrophe of culture,"—that which remains when everything has been forgotten. If there is no culture, there will be nothing.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

9 Oct. 1990

